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Preface
Starting with Becker (1964), traditional economics of education has pointed out that
the returns to investments in early childhood are likely to be relatively high, simply because
of the long time in which to reap the rewards. Carneiro and Heckman (2003) develop
further this argument, arguing that investments in early childhood are not affected by
an equity-efficiency trade-off and mostly respond to equity reasons. Cunha and Heckman
(2010) point out that skills produced at one stage augment the skills obtained at later
stages and increase the productivity of later investments. These features produce the
mechanisms through which skills beget skills, so that the rate of return of investments
done at early years is higher than the one of investments made later on (Heckman, 2008).
Equalizing this rate of return to a fixed rate representing the opportunity cost of funds
in the capital market yields the optimal investment level across child’s life: the optimal
investment in the child’s human capital should be higher when the child is in preschool
age and decreasing over time (Carneiro and Heckman, 2003). On the grounds of equity,
this result suggests that a remediation for disadvantaged children would be less costly and
would have higher returns if made in early years of the life cycle (Almond and Currie,
2011, Bennet, 2008).
Another strand of this literature assesses that children’s skills during childhood are
strongly related with subsequent outcomes in labor market and social life (Currie and
Thomas, 2001, Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua, 2006). Even though causality is difficult to
ascertain, these studies show that child cognitive achievements are strong predictors of a
variety of outcomes in later life, such as college attendance and wages. Hence, skills that
are used, with different weight in different tasks in the labor market and social life, are
produced long before children start kindergarten.
All these results highlight the need to better understand the determinants of early test
scores and to assess the effects of investments in human capital made when the child is
very young.
Following the notation proposed by Haveman and Wolfe (1995), there may be two
main actors involved in the determination of human capital investments during early
childhood: (i) the society or government, that provides policies for very young children;
(ii) the household, whose decisions concerning time and good allocation affect subsequent
child’s development. More precisely, while the household decisions can have an effect on
subsequent child’s outcomes, representing a form of investment in child’s human capital,
the household decision rule can be also influenced by the opportunity set available for the
family members, as provided by the government or the society.
This thesis studies the effects on child development of both policies providing external
child care services and household decisions concerning the use of non-parental child care.
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During the last decades, there has been a growing interest among economists for the
effects of maternal employment and non-parental child care on child development. This
has been mostly justified by the increase in maternal employment rate and the subsequent
use of external child care that have characterized all developed countries and that have
raised concerns for the effects they may have on child development.
While several psychological studies argue that maternal employment determines in-
secure mother-child attachments (NICHD, 1997, Varin, 2007), implying a negative effect
for child development, the economic literature reports mixed findings and these nega-
tive effects are far from being confirmed. For instance, Ermisch and Francesconi (2005)
report that maternal employment estimates range from being detrimental (Baydar and
Brooks-Gunn, 1991, Belsky and Eggebeen, 1991, Bernal, 2008, Chase-Lansdale, Desai,
and Michael, 1989, Ruhm, 2004) to having no effect (Blau and Grossberg, 1992, Chase-
Lansdale, Moffit, Lohman, Cherlin, Coley, Pittman, Roff, and Votruba-Drzal, 2003, James-
Burdumy, 2005) to being beneficial (Parcel and Menaghan, 1994, Vandell and Ramanan,
1992). As pointed out by Almond and Currie (2011), maternal employment matters since
it changes the inputs combinations chosen by the parents and according to what are the
alternative forms of care used for the child. Despite there being several studies assessing
the effects of non-parental child care on child development, also in this case the findings are
mixed. Some studies referred to the U.S. (Bernal and Keane, 2011, 2010) find that having
attended child care before kindergarten reduces children’s test scores. Other studies find
instead positive results (Currie and Thomas, 1995, 1999, Deming, 2009, Loeb, Bridges,
Bassok, Fuller, and Rumberger, 2007).
The estimation of the impacts of non-parental child care use is hampered by two main
issues: (i) the scarcity of data on all relevant inputs for child development, in primis
on time and goods inputs; (ii) the endogeneity issues due to the correlation of the non-
parental child care choice with unobservables of both parents and children (Bernal and
Keane, 2010), as well as with other choices made within the household, e.g., maternal
employment. The diversity of the results found in the literature may depend on the
different outcomes considered in the analysis, as well as on the diverse data sources or
country evaluated, or on the different strategy used to handle the sources of endogeneity.
Moreover, all the studies evaluating the impact of external child care on child development
use proxies for the goods and time investments of parents, since this information is often
incorrectly measured or absent in survey data.
This thesis is composed by three distinct, although complementary, chapters dealing
with the effects of non-parental child care policies and use for subsequent child develop-
ment. It contributes to the existing literature on the effects of non-parental child care
on child development in the following ways. First, reviewing the most recent results on
the effects of large-scale child care policies, it shows that the diversity of the results may
also depend on the different institutional context and public intervention in the child care
service: in fact, while the decision to use non-parental child care remains up to parents,
public intervention in child care provision or regulation can change the opportunity set
available to them. Second, it provides further evidence of this finding studying the effects
of a child care policy in a country characterized by very low public investments in early
childhood education, i.e., Italy. Third, it estimates the effects of several decisions made
2
within the household, i.e., non-parental child care use and maternal employment, using
a relatively new empirical strategy and exploiting a unique dataset that allows to use an
actual measure rather than a proxy of the time inputs received by the child.
Chapter 1 provides a review of the most recent studies evaluating the impacts of
external child care, with a focus on policies providing non-parental child care. Although
there being surveys dealing with the determinants of child development (Haveman and
Wolfe, 1995) or reviewing the impacts of early childhood programs targeted toward very
young children and mostly implemented in the U.S. (Almond and Currie, 2011, Cunha,
Heckman, Lochner, and Masterov, 2006), a review of the most recent findings referred
to other European or Latin American countries is lacking. The empirical findings of
these studies are conceptualized in a simple theoretical framework showing how parents’
decisions and policy intervention interact in contributing to child’s development. The aim
of this review is to show the role played by the institutional context where the policy
has been implemented and the timing of the intervention. Taking into account these
features, European studies evaluating the effects of public child care policies providing
high-quality services agree on their positive effects for children’s development, especially
for children belonging to low socio-economic backgrounds (see, for instance, Datta Gupta
and Simonsen (2011a) for Denmark or Havnes and Mogstad (2010, 2011b) for Norway).
Chapter 2 presents a study assessing the impact of public child care coverage in Italy
on both mother’s employment status and children’s cognitive development.
Non-parental child care can have a custodial role supporting mothers’ participation
in the labor market but also an educational one, contributing to children’s cognitive and
noncognitive development and leading to gains in the accumulation of human capital in
the society. This study provides first evidence on both the custodial and the educational
roles of child care in Italy, evaluating its effects on both mother’s employment and child’s
cognitive outcomes at school. The analysis is performed using newly available data pro-
vided by INVALSI (the Italian Institute for the Evaluation of the Education System) and
referred to the school year 2009-10, matched with data on child care coverage at province
level provided by Cittadinanzattiva (2007). Italy is an interesting case study, since child
care availability covers only 12 percent of children aged between 0 and 2 (ISTAT, 2011),
and demand for a child care slot outnumbers supply everywhere (Zollino, 2008): according
to a recent report from Cittadinanzattiva, only 20 percent of potential demanders can have
a place in a public structure, while this figure is more than 50 percent for Denmark and
Sweden and between 25 and 50 percent for France and the U.K. (Cittadinanzattiva, 2012).
The female employment rate is endemically low with respect to other European countries
and to the U.S.: the participation rate of mothers with children aged 0-2 is equal to 47.3
percent, while for Denmark and Sweden it is around 71 percent and 54 percent for the U.S.
and France (OECD, 2007b); between 20 and 30 percent of mothers leave the labor market
after the birth of the first child (Bratti, Del Bono, and Vuri, 2005, Casadio, Lo Conte, and
Neri, 2008). Furthermore, according to 2006 data from PISA (the Programme for Inter-
national Student Assessment), 15-year-old Italian students rank fourth from the bottom
in average educational performance among advanced countries (OECD, 2007a). Due to
the scarce availability of the service, the municipality, that is the main decision-maker for
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the child care policy, decides how to allocate the available slots using eligibility criteria.
These criteria may respond to a custodial role for the service, if priority is given to work-
ing mothers, or to an educational one if they give priority to children belonging to poor
socio-economic backgrounds. The decisions of the municipalities regarding the number of
child care slots to supply is very likely to depend on their preferences, concerning the type
of households to target the service. If the availability of child care slots is not sufficient to
cover the demand, the municipalities can use rationing, i.e., eligibility criteria, as a mean
to maximize their objective function and to give priority to some households instead of
others. In this case, the additional slot can be targeted toward families and children who
may benefit more from it. For this reason, the relationship between child care coverage
and both the outcomes (i.e., maternal employment and child cognitive outcomes) is very
likely to be non-linear and the effects of a percentage change in public child care to be
greater when child care coverage is lower.
Chapter 3 presents and estimates a behavioral model, used to assess the effects of
maternal decisions (i.e., employment, non-parental child care and time with the child) on
subsequent child’s development. The main contribution of this chapter is that it exploits
unique data on the amount of time spent by the mother with the child to assess the impacts
of maternal employment and external child care use on child development: this permits
to avoid using a proxy for maternal time, as it has been done in the literature so far. The
model is estimated using U.S. data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and
the Child Development Supplement (CDS) conducted in 1997, 2002 and 2007. The CDS
provides retrospective information on all child care arrangements used since birth and
widely-recognized measures of child’s cognitive outcomes; the Time Diary (TD) section
provides unique data on the amount of time the child spends with the mother. Structural
estimation is used to recover the effects of all maternal choices and has several advantages
with respect to reduced form approaches. First, it allows to model the different sources
of endogeneity arising in this framework, due to the correlation of the choices with unob-
servables of both mothers and children. Second, it permits the definition of the maternal
decision making process for more than one endogenous choice: this point is relevant in this
framework, since the choice of using external child care is strictly related to the maternal
employment decisions. Third, structural estimation provides parameters from theoretical
model that can be used to simulate the effects of related policies. In the existing literature
on non-parental child care, only Bernal (2008) uses structural estimation to assess the ef-
fect of non-parental child care and maternal employment on child development. Assuming
that the actual time spent by the mother with the child can be proxied by the time the
mother spends out of work, she finds that one year of maternal employment and external
child care reduces children’s cognitive outcomes by 1.8 percent. The analysis performed in
this chapter allows the estimation of the productivity of both maternal time and external
child care time. The results show that, for an equal amount of maternal time and external
child care time, the marginal productivity of maternal time is slightly lower than the one
of external child care. Hence, if the mother works, a reduction in child’s ability induced
by a reduction in maternal time can be fully compensated for if the child spends the same
amount of time in external child care. Thus, maternal employment is not detrimental for
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child development. This finding shows that, using a real measure of maternal time instead
of a proxy, the negative results previously found by Bernal (2008) are reversed.
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CHAPTER 1
Public and parental investments on children. Evidence from
the literature on non-parental child care
ABSTRACT - This chapter summarizes the most recent empirical research on parental
and social investments in children, with a focus on policies providing non-parental child
care. The empirical findings are conceptualized in a simple theoretical framework showing
how parents’ decisions and policy intervention interact in contributing to child’s develop-
ment. The results from these studies are presented taking into account the institutional
context where the policy has been implemented and the timing of the intervention. The
majority of large-scale policies providing non-parental child care have positive effects on
children’s cognitive outcomes, both in the short and in the medium run. Early childhood
policies can have long-lasting effects on adult outcomes, also boosting the development of
noncognitive skills, that are used and rewarded in labor market and social life.
JEL Classification: J13, I24, I38
Keywords: child care, child development, review, public intervention
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1.1. Introduction
In the last decades there has been a large growth in the body of social science research
that investigates the effects of parents’ behavior on children’s development. This literature
has also focused on maternal employment and on the consequences of externalizing child
care activities, especially during the child’s first years of life.
Despite the concerns related to the mother’s participation in the labor market, the
findings from this literature are mixed. Ermisch and Francesconi (2005) summarize ex-
isting studies evaluating the impact of maternal employment on several child’s outcomes,
as children’s attainments and years of schooling, and report that maternal employment
estimates range from being detrimental (Baydar and Brooks-Gunn, 1991, Belsky and Egge-
been, 1991, Bernal, 2008, Chase-Lansdale et al., 1989, Ruhm, 2004) to having no effect
(Blau and Grossberg, 1992, Chase-Lansdale et al., 2003, James-Burdumy, 2005) to being
beneficial (Parcel and Menaghan, 1994, Vandell and Ramanan, 1992). The development
psychology literature suggests that if the mother works, this may cause insecure mother-
child attachments, which are formed in the first years of a child’s life; in other words,
the detrimental effect can be due to the loss of time the mother spends with the child.
Rarely, this negative impact is compensated by a positive income effect, due to the higher
household income related to the mother’s participation in the labor market. Almond and
Currie (2011) argue that maternal employment really matters for child development as
long as it changes the inputs combination chosen by parents and according to what are
the alternative forms of care used for the child. The issue is then whether non-parental
child care can have positive or negative impacts for child development when the mother
works.
Recently, a related literature assessing the impacts of non-parental child care on child’s
development has emerged. These studies consider very different outcomes and do not
provide homogeneous results. Some of them referred to the United States (Bernal and
Keane, 2011, 2010) find that having attended (any) child care before kindergarten induces
a reduction in children’s test scores by 2 to 3 percent, while Baydar and Brooks-Gunn
(1991) find a more detrimental effect if non-parental child care is used during the child’s
first year of life. Other studies, referred to the same country, find positive results. For
instance, Loeb et al. (2007) find that children who attended a center-based arrangement,
compared to children cared for by their parents, have reading scores higher by 1.1 points
and Math scores higher by 2 points. Currie and Thomas (1995, 1999) and Deming (2009)
evaluate the effect of having attended Head Start and find positive differences in test scores
between those who attended the program and those who did not.
The reasons for these disparate findings are multiple, and range from the different
child’s outcome measure that is used, to the diverse data source considered and to the
different empirical strategy handled to estimate the parameter of interests. More im-
portantly, the variation in these estimates can also depend on the different institutional
contexts and the characteristics of the service that is analyzed.
Only very recently a similar literature has evaluated non-parental child care impacts in
Europe and other countries, different from the U.S.. These studies focus more on publicly
provided large-scale programs and the majority of them suggests positive implications of
highly regulated services for children’s development, especially for children belonging to
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the most disadvantaged backgrounds. The present survey aims to present an overview of
these newly available results, focusing more on studies evaluating large-scale child care
and preschool programs and stressing the importance of institutions and government in-
tervention for child care to have an effect on child development.
As pointed out by Haveman and Wolfe (1995), investments on children’s human capital
depend on two main factors:1 (i) the society or government that determines the opportu-
nities available to both children and their parents (social investment), and (ii) the choices
made by the parents regarding the family time and resources devoted to children (parental
investment). This distinction is particularly suitable for non-parental child care, where the
choice of whether to use external forms of care remains up to parents, but the government
can influence this choice changing the opportunity set available to them and the quality
of the service they can buy.
The countries to which existing studies on non-parental child care refer are character-
ized by very different institutional frameworks, especially in terms of government inter-
vention in child care policies. The first difference to note is on the ground of formal child
care and preschool enrollment. As shown in figure 1.1, enrollment in formal (public and
private) preschool is higher than 60 percent in almost all countries, but enrollment in nurs-
eries is more differentiated. There are countries, such as Denmark, the Netherlands and
Sweden, where more than 50 percent of children younger than 2 attend a formal facility,
while in others (e.g., Spain, Italy and U.S.) this percentage drops to less than 30. These
figures are the outcomes of both parental attitudes toward external child care and the
real availability of formal services. In fact, these percentages represent just a lower bound
of the true external child care use, ignoring all households using informal arrangements
provided by relatives, friends or babysitters.
Moreover, the structure and characteristics of the child care systems differ significantly
across these countries. More precisely, government intervention can imply the direct pro-
vision of the service, its regulation or just its subsidization. In U.S. and U.K., the child
care market is characterized by a large participation of the private sector, while govern-
ment intervenes through subsidies in order to assist poor households to afford child care
expenditures. In these countries, a distinction aimed to identify services with better qual-
ity and stricter regulation is the one between center-based and informal arrangements.
However, there are also examples of public intervention in some U.S. states. For instance,
pre-kindergarten services are universally provided to children with at least 4 years of age
in several states; there are also programs targeted to poor and disadvantaged families
and children.2 In Europe, instead, governments are more involved in the provision and
regulation of the service and the supply from the private sector is very limited. There
are also differences across European countries: countries in Northern Europe - such as
1Haveman and Wolfe (1995) consider a third factor influencing children’s attainment, i.e., the decisions
made by the child himself once he reaches adolescence. Since this review deals with non-parental child
care choices that are mostly taken by parents when the child is in preschool ages, this factor is neglected.
However, as the child grows up, the decisions made by the child himself play a stronger role. Cardoso,
Fontainha, and Monfardini (2010) and Del Boca, Monfardini, and Nicoletti (2012) analyze this topic.
2Concerning universal pre-kindergarten, the Georgia Pre-K program, started in 1995, and the Oklahoma
Universal pre-kindergarten, started in 1998, represent some examples. Instead, the Perry Pre-School,
Abecedarian and Head Start programs are targeted toward disadvantaged families and imply different
degree of involvement for both parents and children. See Almond and Currie (2011) and Cunha et al.
(2006) for further details.
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Figure 1.1
Enrollment rates of children under age 6 in formal care or early education services,
2008.
Sources: OECD Education database. Formal care and early education services include both public and private
facilities.
Sweden, Denmark and Norway - are characterized by universal public child care services,
while countries in Southern Europe - such as Italy - are moving toward a mixed child care
supply, where both private and public sectors are involved, and all providers are regulated
in order to respect minimum quality standards. This difference can also be seen looking at
the levels of government spending for pre-primary education. Northern-Europe countries
spend around 100 thousands Million Euro for pre-primary education, while countries in
Southern Europe spend less than 10 thousands Million Euro.3
The differences in the institutional contexts and in the features of the child care sys-
tems should be taken into account when evaluating the impacts of child care attendance
on subsequent child’s development. It is widely recognized that child care should be of
high-quality in order to be effective for child development, even though it is not clear
which characteristics of the service should be regulated to respect this requirement.4 Non-
parental child care may also have different implications for the development of cognitive
and noncognitive skills, since diverse features may affect differently each type of ability.
For example, center-based group arrangements, characterized by stricter regulation, may
be more effective for the development of cognitive skills and child’s readiness to school;
however, in case of higher child-staff ratio, they may fail in contributing to the child’s
3Specifically, Norway spends 50 thousands Million Euro per year, while Sweden have the highest expendi-
ture level of 170 thousands Million Euro. France expenditure is about 13 thousands Million Euro, while
Italy and Spain spend only 6 thousands Million Euro for pre-primary education. Own elaboration on data
from OECD and Eurostat referred to 2008.
4For instance, Blau (1999a) studies the effect of several child care features, usually regulated by the
policy maker (e.g., group size, child-staff ratio, teacher education and training, etc) on child’s cognitive
development and find no statistically significant effects for any of them. Blau and Currie (2006) argue that
there may be two dimensions of quality: one characterized by these observables features, and the other,
mostly unobservable, related to the quality of interactions between the provider and children. The latter
seems more effective for child’s development than the former.
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vocabulary and language skills, for which the child needs more interactions with only
one person. Group-based services can improve child’s socialization with other children,
while they may be detrimental if the child needs special attention by a single minder.
Finally, formal child care is likely to reduce the importance of family background for child
development by serving as a substitute for parental care or informal care arrangements,
contributing to reduce inequalities and providing better opportunities to children living
in low socio-economic backgrounds (Almond and Currie, 2011).
This survey builds on three previous studies that have reviewed part of the broad liter-
ature on child development. Haveman and Wolfe (1995) provide an excellent survey of the
determinants of children’s attainment focusing on family and neighborhood investments.
They consider studies evaluating the determinants of economic mobility, high school grad-
uation, years of schooling, out-of-wedlock fertility during adolescence and adult earnings.
However they do not explicitly deal with the role of public policies and school and do
not consider non-parental child care as an input in the production of child’s human cap-
ital. Almond and Currie (2011) provide an extensive review of studies evaluating child
care impacts focusing on investments made during the first 5 years of life of the child.
Specifically, they analyze both non-experimental studies, where the child care treatment
is usually every type of non-maternal child care, and experimental analyses, where specific
programs targeted toward disadvantaged children and families were considered. All these
studies refer to the United States, while the authors, as well as Blau and Currie (2006),
recognize the importance of reviewing also studies referred to other countries. Moreover,
results from both experimental and non-experimental studies can provide limited infor-
mation to the policy maker as long as it is not possible to identify precise features of the
input, and results from targeted programs can rarely be extended to other contexts. Also
Cunha et al. (2006) provide a survey of existing studies evaluating the impacts of targeted
programs implemented in the U.S.. They also present a framework modeling the child’s
development process and based on the idea that agents possess a vector of skills of two
types: cognitive and noncognitive. They suggest that cognitive ability, although necessary
for success in life, it is not sufficient and that noncognitive skills also matter for education
and labor market outcomes (Heckman et al., 2006).
This review mostly follows Ermisch and Francesconi (2005), in that it considers the
impact on child’s development of a specific input, i.e., non-parental child care. The con-
tributions to the existing surveys are multiple. First, it provides a unique description of
studies mostly referred to countries different from the U.S.. To the best of my knowledge,
a comprehensive literature review dealing with child care impacts for countries different
from the U.S. is lacking. This point, together with the inclusion of more recent analyses,
allow to present the non-parental child care impacts taking into account the institutional
framework where the service is offered and the policy is implemented. Moreover, consider-
ing different contexts allows to test the consistency of the results across countries. Second,
the results are presented according to the timing of the investments and in such a way to
take into account the contribution to both cognitive and noncognitive child’s skills. In fact,
the studies analyzed here use different outcomes, measured in diverse stages of the child’s
life. The structure of this survey takes into account the fact that non-parental child care
impact may change over time and may influence in a different manner the development
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of cognitive and noncognitive abilities. Among the surveys presented before, only Cunha
et al. (2006) recognizes the importance of early childhood intervention for noncognitive
skills.
The rest of this chapter develops as follows. Section 1.2 presents the theoretical back-
ground for the impacts of child care policies on child’s development: section 1.2.1 de-
scribes the economic rationals under which government participation in the child care
market is justified; section 1.2.2 presents a theoretical model where the parents decide
the non-parental child care input for their children and discusses the plausible patterns
of the child care impacts over time. Section 1.3 presents the empirical issues arising for
the estimation and identification of non-parental child care impacts. Section 1.4 presents
the results from selected studies, distinguishing between outcomes measured during early
childhood (section 1.4.1), middle-childhood and adolescence (section 1.4.2) and adulthood
(section 1.4.3). Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2. Theoretical background
Economic theory provides a framework for the evaluation of child care impacts on
child’s development, that helps in understanding the results from the empirical studies.
As already stated, child’s development depends on two main factors: (i) the government
or social intervention, that determines the opportunities available to parents and chil-
dren, and (ii) the parents, that decides their investments on child’s human capital. This
distinction is particularly important for the non-parental child care decisions, since the
actual choice of the parents depends on their opportunity set, that can be manipulated
through government intervention. Although not being a pure public good, public inter-
vention in the provision, regulation or subsidization of the child care service is justified by
the presence of several market failures that prevent parents from optimally investing in
the human capital of their children. Subsection 1.2.1 discusses the economic framework
under which the government intervention in child care policies is justified. Subsection
1.2.2 presents a model describing the parental decisions to use external child care and the
plausible patterns with which this investment can affect child’s development over time.
1.2.1. Rationals for government intervention in the child care market. The
first justification for government intervention in child care provision is on the grounds
of equity. A government that is concerned with equity can compensate for differences
in final outcomes, attempt to equalize initial endowment or both. However, investing in
early childhood programs can be more cost-effective and impede the moral hazard problem
that may arise when society attempts to compensate people with poor outcomes (Blau and
Currie, 2006). Moreover, as suggested by Cunha et al. (2006), human capital accumulation
has a dynamic feature that has implications for how investments in human skills should
be distributed over the life cycle. Heckman (2008) shows that the rate of return of human
capital investments during early years is higher than the one of investments made later on.
Equalizing this rate of return to a fixed rate representing the opportunity cost of funds
in the capital market yields the optimal investment level across child’s life: the optimal
investment in the child’s human capital should be higher when the child is in preschool
age and decreasing over time (Carneiro and Heckman, 2003). The same reasoning justifies
public child care as a remediation for children living in poor socio-economic conditions.
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In fact, living in disadvantaged conditions in the first years of life can be detrimental for
children’s future development; public child care may provide them with better educational
opportunities with respect to the ones they could get at home (Bennet, 2008).
The second argument according to which government should intervene in child care
provision and regulation is on the grounds of efficiency. In fact, public intervention serves
to compensate for the existence of market failures, such as liquidity constraints, credit
market imperfections and asymmetric information.
Liquidity constraints of the household where the child resides may prevent parents
from investing in the human capital of their children and from choosing high-quality child
care services; hence, if only private child care is available, only parents highly valuing the
educational purpose of child care and with higher willingness to pay can use it. Carneiro
and Heckman (2003) show that liquidity constraints may have worst effect for child devel-
opment if they occur in the first years of the child’s life and these negative impacts may
persist in the long-run. Similar patterns are related to the inefficiency and imperfection
of capital markets. In fact, if capital markets are efficient and the endowed ability of
children is observed by the parents, parents could borrow against the future earnings of
their offspring, in such a way to achieve the optimal level of human capital during early
childhood. Since credit markets are imperfect and there is no commitments on the off-
spring to give back their earnings to their parents, parents can invest in their children’s
human capital only reducing their actual consumption; hence, parental income becomes
a determinant of children’s attainments (Haveman and Wolfe, 1995). Both these issues
justify government intervention in terms of subsidization of the services, but do not say
nothing about public provision and regulation. However, Bergmann (1996) argues that
traditional arguments in favor of cash transfer over in-kind services do not apply to merit
goods, such as external child care: in fact, parents may spend the cash grant received by
the government in services different from child care or they would not be able to choose
the better option for their children. Instead, government provision or, at least, regulation
of the service ensures homogeneous standards and well regulated options for the parents.
In fact, public involvement in child care supply is also justified on the existence of
asymmetric information of the parents, that leads to inefficient demand and supply of the
service. As several studies argue (see, for instance, Blau and Currie (2006) for the U.S.
or Bosi and Silvestri (2008) for Italy), parents may not fully account for the benefits of
high-quality child care for children; this implies, on average, a lower willingness to pay
of the parents and an higher incentive for the child care provider to offer a low-quality
service. In order to ensure higher and more homogeneous quality, the government can
directly provide the service or establish minimum requirements that should be respected
by all child care providers (both private and public).
1.2.2. Non-parental child care choices and child’s development. The majority
of existing studies evaluating the impact of child care attendance on subsequent child’s
outcomes interprets child care as an input in the Education Production Function (EPF)
framework. Child’s ability is the outcome of a cumulative process of knowledge acquisition,
fostered both by family and school inputs, and of child’s specific initial endowment (Cunha
and Heckman, 2008, Todd and Wolpin, 2003). Non-parental child care, as well as the time
and goods the parents spend for their child, are the inputs chosen by parents. This
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relationship can be summarized by the following expression:
A = A(c, τ, g, µ) (1.1)
where child’s ability is a function of non-parental child care c, parental time τ , the goods
bought for the child and effective for his own development g and µ, that represents the
child’s initial endowment. For the purposes of this survey, A represents both cognitive
and noncognitive skills. The majority of studies estimate (1.1) or an approximation of
that, without taking into account that the inputs c, τ, g are chosen by parents. However,
the parents’ decision making process should be taken into account when interpreting the
empirical results.
The economic modeling explaining how the c, g, τ choices are made derives from the
model developed by Becker and Tomes (1986), where the members of the household pro-
duce a commodity, i.e., child’s ability, by combining inputs of goods and time, as in a firm
production process. In this framework, the household maximizes a unitary utility function
with child’s ability as an argument, and subject to a production function for child’s ability
with inputs including time of family members, purchased goods and non-parental child
care.5
The model can be written as:
maxh,c,τ,g u(l, C,A) (1.2)
s.t. TT = l + h+ τ (1.3)
C = HI − pc− g (1.4)
A = A(τ, c, g) (1.5)
where (1.2) represents parents’ utility as a function of their leisure time l, their consump-
tion C and the ability of their child A. Expressions (1.3) and (1.4) are the time and
budget constraints, respectively. Notice that household expenditures include consump-
tion, expenditure for external child care (where p is the price of child care) and for the
goods bought for the child g, whose price is normalized to 1. Finally, (1.5) represents
the child’s ability production function. In this model the parents decide their own labor
supply h, how many hours to spend with the child τ , how many hours of child care to
use c and how many goods g to buy for the child; TT is the total time endowment, HI is
total household income, including mother’s and father’s labor income as well as non labor
income.
Assuming separability of goods in the utility function and of inputs in the child’s
ability production function, the FOC for the demand of child care is given by:
c∗ → −U ′Cp+ U ′AA′c = 0 (1.6)
5This approach assumes that the household maximizes a unitary utility function, implying that all members
in the family share the same preference patterns and have a common knowledge of inputs productivities
and child’s initial endowment. An alternative implementation consists of assuming that there is a dictator,
i.e., the mother, who makes choices based on his own preferences. Even though several criticisms to these
assumptions have been made by those viewing family decisions as the outcome of bargaining within the
household (see Vermeulen (2002) for a review on collective household models), this approach remains the
unique used in this literature.
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where U ′C represents the first-order derivative of the utility function with respect to con-
sumption, U ′A represents the first-order derivative of the utility function with respect to
ability and A′C indicates the marginal productivity of non-parental child care input.
After some rearrangements, the demand for child care is given by the following condi-
tion:
c∗ → U
′
C
U ′A
=
A′c
p
MRSCA =
A′c
p
(1.7)
where MRSCA is the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and child’s abil-
ity. Condition (1.7) states that parents will invest in their child’s human capital choosing
non-parental child care up to the point where the marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and child’s ability is equal to the ratio between child care productivity and
the price of child care. In this framework, the child care productivity A′c represents the
opportunity cost of choosing one more unit of consumption instead of investing in one
hour more of child care.
Notice that the ratio on the right-hand side in (1.7), i.e., A
′
c
p , is composed by variables
that can be manipulated by the policy maker. In fact, a child care subsidization policy
can decrease the price of child care p, while government regulation can improve the child
care productivity perceived by the parents. A change in the price of child care or in
the marginal productivity of the service can determine both an income or a substitution
effect, depending on parental preferences over consumption and child’s ability. If non-
parental care represents an investment in child’s human capital, an increase in its marginal
productivity implies an higher opportunity cost of consumption. In case the substitution
effect prevails, the demand for child care increases, yielding an increase in the child’s human
capital; instead, if the income effect prevails, parents may decide to invest less in child’s
human capital, decreasing their demand for external child care. This simple example
shows how the interactions between child care policy and parental preferences can lead to
different child care demand and different effects on child’s ability. As suggested by Havnes
and Mogstad (2010), for wealthier parents, that are supposed to be already investing in
their child’s human capital, the income effect would be prevailing and the demand for
child care decreases. Instead, a policy increasing the child care productivity or decreasing
its price can be effective for households with more stringent budget constraints for which
it may enlarge their opportunity set; in this case, a substitution effect is more likely to
prevail.
The utility function and the child’s ability production function have been defined with-
out specific functional forms. Even though the majority of this literature only considers
linear production function (without taking into account the parents’ utility maximization
problem), it should be kept in mind that different functional forms assumptions can have
different implications for the degree of substitutability between inputs and goods and,
hence, for the investments decisions made by parents. Appendix 1.A further discusses this
issue.
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Figure 1.2
Non-parental child care inputs for child’s development.
Notes. Figure adapted from Leibowitz (1974).
The model presented so far is static and assumes that parents decide their own invest-
ments during the child’s first years of life. The structure of the model is still valid if one
wants to test whether child care impacts last over time.
In order to understand the plausible mechanisms with which non-parental child care
can influence child’s development in the short, medium and long-run, consider a rearranged
version of the framework proposed by Leibowitz (1974). In the original model, parents’
abilities and education are transmitted to children genetically. They also jointly determine
the level of family income and the quantity and quality of both time and goods inputs that
parents devote to their children. Children’s ability and the levels of parental income and
home investments in time and goods determine the schooling attained by children and,
through schooling, the level of postschool investment. All of these affect children’s earnings
and income. Figure 1.2 represents a version of this model, where non-parental child care is
included among the investments made by parents and child’s ability is composed by both
cognitive and noncognitive skills. Both these types of skills are used in later developmental
stages, both in education and in the labor market (Heckman et al., 2006).
The part of the figure on the left, where parents decide their investments (time and
goods, as well as non-parental child care), reproduces the parents’ decision making process
previously described.
Notice that each investment choice has a multiplicative effect on subsequent (cognitive
and noncognitive) skills that may affect long-term outcomes. In fact, parental investments
during early childhood affect the level of child’s ability immediately after the investments
took place and during middle childhood. This short-run effect can be identified if a noisy
measure of child’s ability during early or middle childhood, e.g., test scores, is available.
In the long-run, parental decisions can have an effect on both schooling and earnings. The
effect on schooling can come either directly or through the effects of the investments on
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ability in early and middle childhood. Instead, the final effect on earnings can be due to
three channels: a direct effect on child’s productivity when the child is an adult, induced
by the investments themselves and long-lasting over time; an indirect effect that they have
through schooling, since additional schooling determines higher wages; an indirect effect
due to the impacts of the investments on middle childhood cognitive and noncognitive
skills, so that these skills do not influence final schooling but have an effect on other
personal traits and behavior that affect child’s productivity in the labor market.
1.3. Empirical issues for the estimation of child care impacts
The majority of existing studies estimate a reduced-form version of the child’s ability
production function defined by (1.1), where also observable characteristics of parents and
children are included. The estimation of the coefficient of interests in (1.1), i.e., for non-
parental child care, is hampered by two main issues: (i) the difficulty to gather data on all
relevant inputs for child development, and (ii) the selection problem due to the correlation
of input choices with unobservables of both parents and children (Bernal and Keane, 2010).
Due to the absence of available data on all relevant inputs, the majority of studies does
not estimate directly (1.1) but an approximation of that, given by the inclusion of proxy
variables for omitted inputs.6 Often this issue arises for the inputs τ and g that cannot
be available or precisely measured in survey data. The information on the amount of time
spent by the child with the parents has been substituted with the amount of working time
of both parents, assuming a specific relationship between parents’ child care and working
time (Keane, 2010).7 Only very recently information on the amount of time spent by the
parents with the child has become available through the use of time use surveys, so that
a direct measure for τ can be included in the estimation.8 Concerning the information
g, usually, it is used household income as a proxy, under the assumption that a constant
proportion of income is devoted to the child. However, as pointed out in several empirical
applications (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1995, Todd and Wolpin, 2003, Wolpin, 1997) the use
of this proxy has implications for the interpretation of parameters, since it is related to the
household decision rules.9 However, it should be also recognized that a precise information
on g is very difficult to gather. Even if explicitly asked to report their expenditure for
the child, parents may underestimate their true spending, not considering common goods,
such as food, housing, etc. (Del Boca et al., 2010).
6Keane (2010) and Rosenzweig and Schultz (1983) define this production function hybrid.
7For instance, one may define parents’ child care time as the difference between total time endowment and
the time spent at work, i.e., τ = TT − h.
8However, to the best of my knowledge, there are no studies evaluating the impact of non-parental child
care using a true measure for the time spent by the child with the parents. Chapter 3 provides the first
evidence on this issue, showing that using the actual measure of time instead of a proxy the results that are
usually found in the literature are reversed. Instead, there are studies evaluating the impact of maternal
and paternal time on child development, such as Del Boca, Flinn, and Wiswall (2010), Del Boca et al.
(2012) and Hsin (2009).
9For instance, suppose that parents use a portion of their income to buy books and toys for their child;
suppose also that once their income has increased, they choose to spend more money on books and to
decrease their expenditure for toys. A plausible positive coefficient for income, in this case, does not say
nothing about this allocation mechanism done by parents after that their income has changed: in fact, the
positive income effect can be determined by the increase in the availability of books for the child, by the
decrease in the availability of toys, or both.
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The second issue refers to the endogeneity of the investment choices with respect to
parents’ and child’s unobserved heterogeneity. Consider the following ability production
function:
A = A(c, τ, g,X, µ) (1.8)
where all inputs can be observed and the unique unobservable component is µ. The
selection issue arises if non-parental child care choices are influenced by parents’ or child’s
unobservables in a way that the researcher cannot control for. The component µ can be
defined as:
µ = µp(t) + µc(t) (1.9)
where µc represents the child’s unobservables component independent from parents’ un-
observables µp, and both of them can be varying over time. Estimating the child care
impact from (1.8) without controlling for this selection may lead to an underestimation
or an overestimation of the true effect; the direction of the bias depends not only on the
selection but also on the different characteristics of the service and on the way they may
affect child development.
Suppose that there is a positive selection of parents in external child care use, so that
corr(c, µp) > 0. This may happen if parents that provide a home environment that fosters
child development are also more likely to select child care arrangements that do so as well.
These parents may have an higher willingness to pay for the service and would be more
likely to choose a center-based arrangement instead of an informal one. Estimating the
coefficient for c without taking into account this selection would overestimate the true child
care impact. However, the bias may be reversed if parents have a limited choice set and, for
example, they can use only a service with an average quality lower than the quality time
they can offer to their child at home. This happens in Felfe and Lalive (2010) that evaluate
the impact of enrollment in public nurseries in Germany after the German reunification.
The authors argue that when the availability of child care is scarce only highly-educated
parents choose to use public nurseries that are also characterized by lower quality; their
children do not benefit from child care attendance, since they would have received better
inputs at home. Without controlling for this positive selection, in fact, the authors find a
null impact of child care attendance on subsequent outcomes, implying an underestimation
of the true effect. Allowing parents’ and child’s unobservables to be correlated would have
had different implications: in this case, more skilled parents may be more likely to work and
to use external child care but also to have more skilled children, regardless of the child care
inputs they receive. Under these hypotheses, the true child care effect is overestimated,
since those who are actually enrolled have also higher attainments. Finally, there may
be a correlation between the parental decision and the child’s unobservables, that the
parents can (partially) observe. Suppose, for instance, that there is a positive selection
of children enrolled in child care attendance: corr(c, µc) ≥ 0. This may happen if the
mother prefers to send her extrovert child to (center-based) child care service, in order to
improve his social and communicative skills. This choice reflects a reinforcing behavior of
the mother, since she is investing more in her high-skilled child. Estimating the child care
impact without controlling for this selection leads to an overestimation of the true effect.
The bias would be even larger if the child care arrangement is of low quality, because the
researcher can still conclude for a positive child care effect.
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Hence, the bias depends not only on the selection of parents and children in individual
child care use but also on the characteristics of the service offered by the market or by
institutions. Also this point underlines the importance of public intervention, especially
in the definition of homogeneous standards that, at least, can help understanding the
baseline characteristics of the service.
Existing studies evaluating non-parental child care impacts adopt different strategies
to handle these issues.
Some of them try to overcome the omitted variables bias arising because of missing
data using very rich set of control variables. Some examples are Hansen and Hawkes (2009)
and Goodman and Sianesi (2005) who evaluate the effect of several child care categories in
U.K., or Leuven, Lindahl, Oosterbeek, and Webbink (2010) that assess the impact of early
entry at school in the Netherlands. Basically, they estimate a child’s ability production
function of the form:
A = A(c,X,Z) (1.10)
where Z is a vector of control variables and the component µ is not taken into account.
Even with a large set of control variables, it is very likely that the selection arising in this
framework does not depend on observables only, but also on unobservable characteristics.
The control variable approach cannot be sufficient to take into account the selection of
parents and children in individual child care attendance.
Other studies, mostly referred to the United States, use Mother (MFE) or Siblings
(SFE) fixed effects that take into account time invariant unobserved heterogeneity at
the household level. The unique example using this approach not referred to the U.S.
is Berlinski, Galiani, and Manacorda (2008), who evaluate the impact of a child care
policy in Uruguay. With this approach, the component µp in (1.9) cancels out under
the assumptions that it is time-invariant and that parents’ behavior does not depend on
children’s unobserved ability, i.e., corr(µc, c) = 0. However, the ”MFE estimates [...]
could still be biased if there is child-specific unobserved heterogeneity or time-varying
family-specific unobserved heterogeneity”(Blau, 1999a).
If it can be assumed that parents do not react to policy changes or instruments taking
into account their child’s ability, the unique approaches providing consistent estimates of
the effects of interests are the Instrumental Variables (IV) and Differences-in-Differences
(Diff-in-Diff) estimators. Both of them rely on the existence of an exogenous variation in
child care use, due, for instance, to child care policies. The IV strategy has been used
in several studies referred to European countries, even though it is very difficult to find
enough powerful instrument in this framework. The main problem is that many variables
at individual level that could be plausible instruments for child care use should also be
included as determinants for child’s development, so that the exogeneity assumption is
very likely to fail. Other variables at aggregate level that have been used as instruments
turned to be very weak.10 This approach has been adopted by Datta Gupta and Simonsen
10In the literature estimating the impact of maternal employment on child development, James-Burdumy
(2005) uses county labor force employed in services as instrument, but it turns to be extremely weak,
yielding vary large standard errors and coefficients not statistically different from zero. James-Burdumy
(2005) argues that her preferred specification is siblings fixed effect. In the literature evaluating the effect
of external child care attendance, Datta Gupta and Simonsen (2011b) use IV but cannot reject the null
that OLS estimates are equal to the IV estimates.
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(2011a,b) and Felfe and Lalive (2010): the first studies refer to Denmark and use munici-
pality features in child care provision as exogenous variation, while the second estimates
the impact of public child care in Germany using, as exogenous variation, the large dif-
ferentials in child care availability across German local areas. The Diff-in-Diff approach,
instead, exploits the exogeneity of child care policies to evaluate their impact on child’s
subsequent attainments. Havnes and Mogstad (2010, 2011b) provide two excellent ex-
amples, evaluating the impacts of a preschool expansion policy implemented in Norway
during the 1970s.
All the approaches summarized here mostly follow the EPF framework and provide
estimates from a production function of the form defined by (1.8), or an approximation of
that. However, when interpreting the results from these studies it should be kept in mind
that each input (not only child care) is the result of a decision made by parents. As already
stated, both the interpretation of the coefficients estimates and the identification of the
effect strongly depends on the decision-making process of the parents. The interpretation
of the results requires the knowledge of how these inputs are then chosen.
There is a final approach that may be applied to analyze the response of children’s
cognitive and noncognitive ability to parental child care decisions. This approach is based
on the formulation and estimation of a behavioral model in which parents make sequential
decisions on labor market participation and other inputs for child development, such as
child care. In this framework, child’s outcome is the result of a production process where
inputs are optimally chosen by parents, that maximize their utility function subject to
several constraints (as shown in the model presented in section 1.2.2). This approach
is also based on the direct modeling of the sources of endogeneity and the estimation
techniques allow for heterogeneity in tastes and constraints. There are several studies
using this approach in the child development literature (Del Boca et al., 2010, Mroz, Liu,
and Van der Klaauw, 2010), but only Bernal (2008) explicitly models maternal choice of
work and child care use and estimates the impact of these choices on child’s subsequent
outcomes.11 The studies using structural estimation stress the importance of taking into
account the mechanisms underlying parents’ choices, that turn to represent the inputs
in the child cognitive ability production function. Among all the studies that will be
presented in the following sections, only few of them provide a theoretical framework for
the parents’ decision making process that may help interpreting the results (Felfe and
Lalive, 2010, Havnes and Mogstad, 2010).
1.4. Review of selected studies evaluating child care impacts
This section presents the results from selected studies evaluating the impacts of child
care attendance or child care policies on several outcomes. Since the outcomes considered
by the literature are multiple and range from early childhood cognitive to adolescence
noncognitive to adulthood labor market outcomes, the following subsections present the
results for each timing, i.e. early childhood vs middle childhood and adolescence vs adult-
hood. Early childhood outcomes refer to noisy measures of child’s ability assessed imme-
diately after the child care inputs have been implemented, up to the time when the child is
11Chapter 3 of this thesis estimates a model similar to the one presented in section 1.2.2, where the mother
decides not only how much to work and how many hours of external child care to use but also how much
time to dedicate to the child.
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enrolled in grade 1 of primary school. Middle childhood and adolescence outcomes include
those measured when the child is in the age range 7-16. Adulthood outcomes include the
measures referred to education or labor market experience, as final education and wage,
as measured when the child is an adult. The first two categories also distinguish between
cognitive and noncognitive outcomes: it may help in understanding whether child care
attendance can have different effects for specific developmental skills of the child.
1.4.1. Non-parental child care and early childhood cognitive and noncogni-
tive outcomes. The studies evaluating the impact of child care or preschool on cognitive
outcomes measured during early childhood are presented in tables 1.1 and 1.2. Tables
1.3 and 1.4 describes the studies evaluating short-term impacts on noncognitive outcomes.
These outcomes are measured immediately after the input has been implemented, i.e., at
kindergarten or primary school: the outcomes considered are school readiness and vocab-
ulary tests as well as behavioral index or outcomes referred to habits at school. Measuring
these effects is important, since it allows to test whether child care or preschool are effec-
tive in preparing the child for subsequent experience at school. However, it is not clear
which type of service could have more influence on cognitive and noncognitive measures in
the short-run. For instance, Hansen and Hawkes (2009) test the effectiveness of four child
care categories (formal group, formal non-group, partner care and other informal care) on
a vocabulary test and a school-readiness test, as well as on a noncognitive score, measuring
the presence of behavioral problems. They find that formal group arrangements are more
effective than other categories for the school readiness score and in decreasing the child’s
behavioral problems, while having attended a formal group child care has detrimental
effect for the child’s vocabulary abilities. Children who attended formal group child care
get vocabulary score lower by 9 percent of a standard deviation than those who attended
a formal non-group arrangement; however, those enrolled in formal group child care get
a behavioral index lower than 12 percent of a standard deviation with respect to those
cared for by their grandparents.
Felfe and Lalive (2010) provide, instead, estimates from the evaluation of the public
child care system in Germany after the German reunification. The German case is very
peculiar, since the private child care supply is almost absent and the government does not
support child care policies, under the idea that child care should be a primary responsibility
of mothers. As already stated in the previous section, the authors argue that the service
can not be effective for child development if children come from wealthier households
with more-educated parents. In fact, they find a very little impact when estimating their
model using Ordinary Least Squares and higher effect when correcting for the selection
using Instrumental Variables. They find positive effects of both having attended child care
and the local supply of the service at childbirth on both cognitive and noncognitive skills:
having attended child care increases the language skills index by 1.14 standard deviations
and the noncognitive skills index by 0.9 standard deviations.
Comparing the results from Hansen and Hawkes (2009) and Felfe and Lalive (2010)
gives an idea of the effectiveness of a privately provided center-based arrangement in
U.K. with respect to the publicly provided one in Germany. In U.K., attending a center-
based group facility has negative impacts on vocabulary scores, but also positive effects on
behavioral outcomes. In Germany, instead, public child care has positive effects on both
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Table 1.2
Selected studies evaluating child care impacts on early childhood cognitive out-
comes. Results.
Study Estimation technique Coefficients
Hansen and Hawkes (2009) OLS Vocabulary score: formal non-group
+0.089; partner care +0.108; grand-
parents care +0.193. School Readiness
Score: formal non-group -0.122; partner
care -0.129; grandparents care -0.108;
other informal -0.193. Reference cate-
gory formal group care.*
Felfe and Lalive (2010) OLS, IV and RF. Instrument: local child
care supply at childbirth.
OLS (effect of having used child care):
+0.18 on language skills. RF (child care
supply impact): +0.0118 on language
skills. IV: +1.141.*
Leuven et al. (2010) OLS Effect of one more month of schooling on
disadvantaged +0.061 on language score
and +0.06 on arithmetic score.
Berlinski et al. (2009) OLS Effect of one more place at pre-primary
school on Math score +4.694 and on
Spanish score +4.761.
Gormley and Gayer (2005) RDD. Treatment: having attended
Tulsa pre-k in 2000; Controls: 1) not
having attended Tulsa pre-k in 2000; 2)
waiting for pre-kindergarten admittance
in 2001
Treated children have cognitive score
+0.756 and language score +0.817.
Gormley (2008) RDD. Treatment: having attended
Tulsa pre-k in 2005; Controls: 1) not
having attended Tulsa pre-k in 2005; 2)
waiting for pre-kindergarten admittance
in 2006
Treated children have LW score +2.471,
AP +1.928, Spelling test score +1.360.
Abbrevations: OLS = Ordinary Least Squares, IV = Instrumental Variables, RF = Reduced Form, RDD = Regres-
sion Discontinuity Design.
Notes. Estimates reported in this table represent the raw coefficients presented in each study. * indicates that
the study uses a standardized dependent variable, so that coefficients can be interpreted in terms of a standard
deviation. + indicates that the dependent variable is log-transformed and that coefficients multiplied by 100 can be
interpreted as percentage change.
language and noncognitive skills, but the magnitude of the impact is greater for language
skills. However, both these studies pose some doubts on their ability of taking into account
observed and unobserved heterogeneity of mothers’ preferences for child care use. Hansen
and Hawkes (2009) partially control for the heterogeneity in mothers’ preferences keeping
only working mothers in the sample; even though this strategy seems to increase the
homogeneity of the sample, it is very likely to provide an upper bound of the child care
demand and the coefficients estimates should be interpreted accordingly. Instead, Felfe and
Lalive (2010) use an Instrumental Variables approach to take into account the selection
of parents in individual child care use, exploiting local (cross-sectional and temporal)
differences in child care supply as exogenous variation. Although their explanation of the
selection process driving the results can be reasonable, the high standard errors of the IV
estimates pose some doubts on the relevance of the instrument.
Berlinski et al. (2009) evaluate the impact of a policy expanding free and public pre-
primary school places, implemented during late 1990s in Argentina. Their estimates lay
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Table 1.3
Selected studies evaluating child care impacts on early childhood noncognitive
outcomes. Description.
Study Country Data and
Sample
Inputs/Policy Outcomes Timing
Hansen and
Hawkes (2009)
U.K. MCS (2001-
02). Families
with only one
child, where the
mother works
when the child
is 9 months old
and her age at
child birth is
higher than 16.
N=4,800.
4 child care cate-
gories: i) formal
group; ii) formal
non-group; iii)
partner care;
iv) other in-
formal care or
grandparents’
carea
SDQb behav-
ioral test.
Inputs are mea-
sured when the
child is 9 months
old; outcomes
are measured
when the child
is 3 years old.
Felfe and Lalive
(2010)
Germany GSOEP. N=762. Having attended
child care in 0-2
age range & local
public child care
supply at child-
birth
Standardized
indexes for: i)
independence
skills; ii) so-
cial skills; iii)
behavior; iv)
personality; v)
motor skills.
Inputs are
measured in
2002-2005 (the
child is in age
0-2); outcomes
are measured
when the child
is 24-47 months
old.
Gormley and
Gayer (2005)
Oklahoma (us) TPS (2001).
Sample: chil-
dren entering
pre-k and
kindergarten in
2001. N=2246
Universal pre-
kindergarten
Motor skills test Input measured
when children
are 4 years
old; outcomes
measured in
kindergarten (5
years old).
Abbreviations: MCS = Millennium Cohort Survey; GSOEP = German Socio-Economic Panel; TPS = Tulsa Public
Schools.
a Formal group = nurseries, creches; formal non-group = child-minders, nannies; partner care = child’s father or
mother’s partner; other informal = relatives, friends.
b SDQ = Strength and Difficulties Questionnaire. Higher score indicates more behavioral problems.
in between the U.K. and the German cases. In fact, the effect of one more place at pre-
primary school on Math score is equal to +4.694, while for Spanish score it is equal to
+4.761. Standardizing these coefficients, it yields that one more place at pre-primary
school increases the Math and the Spanish scores by 0.24 and 0.23 standard deviations,
respectively.12
Finally, two study refer to a public intervention aimed to offer universal pre-kindergarten
in Oklahoma (U.S.). Differently from the majority of studies in the U.S., they consider
a public preschool policy. Both Gormley and Gayer (2005) and Gormley (2008) evaluate
the Tulsa Pre-Kindergarten program, started in 1998, using a Regression Discontinu-
ity approach and exploiting the age cutoff for children to be enrolled in the program.
Gormley and Gayer (2005) find that having attended high-quality preschool increases
children’s cognitive, language and motor skills scores by, respectively, 0.76, 0.82 and 0.41
points. Moreover, full-day treatment has stronger effects on the outcomes for black chil-
dren. Gormley (2008) evaluates the same policy five years later only on Hispanic children
12As reported in Berlinski et al. (2009, table 4), the standard deviations of the score measures are, re-
spectively, 19.70 for Math and 20.41 for Spanish. The standardized effects are then: 4.694/19.70=0.24 for
Math and 4.761/20.41=0.23 for Spanish.
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Table 1.4
Selected studies evaluating child care impacts on early childhood noncognitive
outcomes. Results.
Study Estimation technique Coefficients
Hansen and Hawkes (2009) OLS Grandparents care with respect to for-
mal group care +0.121.a*
Felfe and Lalive (2010) OLS, IV and RF. Instrument: local child
care supply at childbirth.
OLS (effect of having used child care):
+0.203 on noncognitive skills, +0.176
on independence, +0.325 on social skills,
+0.195 on motor skills. RF (child care
supply impact): +0.0087 on noncog-
nitive skills, +0.0078 on independence,
+0.0105 on social skills, +0.00765 on
behavior, +0.0071 on motor skills. IV:
+0.901 on noncognitive skills, +0.807 on
independence, +1.086 on social skills,
+0.792 on behavior, +0.742 on motor
skills.*
Gormley and Gayer (2005) RDD. Treatment: having attended
Tulsa pre-k in 2000; Controls: 1) not
having attended Tulsa pre-k in 2000; 2)
waiting for pre-kindergarten admittance
in 2001
Treated children have motor skills index
+0.413.
Abbreviations: OLS = Ordinary Least Squares, IV = Instrumental Variables, RF = Reduced Form, RDD =
Regression Discontinuity Design.
Notes. Estimates reported in this table represent the raw coefficients presented in each study. * indicates that
the study uses a standardized dependent variable, so that coefficients can be interpreted in terms of a standard
deviation. + indicates that the dependent variable is log-transformed and that coefficients multiplied by 100 can
be interpreted as percentage change.
a Since an higher outcome means more behavioral problems, a positive coefficient implies a detrimental effect.
and finds positive and statistically significant effects on both the LW and the AP test
scores. Furthermore, he finds stronger effects for children whose parents were born in
Mexico and for Spanish speaking children, who may need more help to compensate their
linguistic disadvantage.13
From these studies, it is possible to draw some conclusions concerning the short-term
impacts of non-parental child care. The study referred to the U.K., comparing the effect
of different child care categories, confirms that the distinction between center-based and
informal services plays a significant role. All other studies evaluating specific child care
policies, although referring to very different countries, consistently find positive effects of
formal child care or preschool on both cognitive and noncognitive outcomes.
1.4.2. Non-parental child care impacts on middle-childhood and adoles-
cence outcomes. There are several studies evaluating the impacts of child care atten-
dance on medium-term outcomes, measured when children have between 7 and 11 years
of age. The majority of them considers cognitive attainments, assessed at school, but
there are also examples of noncognitive outcomes, such as scores and indexes based on
the factorization of several variables providing information on the acquisition of diverse
13It is interesting to compare these results with those provided in other studies evaluating the impact of
any non-maternal child care arrangement on subsequent child’s outcomes, i.e., the treatment is to having
used any kind of external child care. For instance, Bernal (2008) and Bernal and Keane (2011, 2010) find
that maternal employment and external child care before kindergarten have strongly negative effects on
children’s test scores ranging between 1.8 and 3 percent in absolute value.
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skills. Table 1.5 describes the main features of studies considering cognitive outcomes,
while table 1.6 presents their results; instead tables 1.7 and 1.8 show the main findings
concerning noncognitive medium-term outcomes.
Measuring the effect of child care and preschool policies in the medium run is crucial
to see whether the positive impacts of these policies remain or, instead, dissipate over
time. For instance, for the U.S., Currie and Thomas (1995, 1999) evaluate the effect
of having attended the program Head Start on children aged more than 6. They still
find a positive impact of the program on both PPVT test score and the probability of
not being retained on white and Hispanic children, but for black these effects dissipate
over time. The authors explain this finding arguing that black children are less likely to
receive high-quality investments in human capital at primary and secondary schools, so
that the positive effect of the program is more likely to vanish. These results also suggest
that effective investments in children’s human capital should be followed by subsequent
intervention of the same quality (Almond and Currie, 2011).
In the European literature, apart from Goodman and Sianesi (2005), all the stud-
ies evaluate the impact of a child care or preschool policy. Datta Gupta and Simonsen
(2011a,b) consider the high-quality preschool service in Denmark and find that having at-
tended preschool (with respect to family day care) increases the language score of children
at age 7 by 8 percent of a standard deviation and decreases their behavioral problem index
by 0.42 points; instead, they do not find any effect on noncognitive outcomes at 11. Felfe
and Lalive (2010) consider a child care policy in Germany and find that having attended
child care in the first years of life increases grades at school by 1.4 percent of a standard
deviation and noncognitive skills by 1.68 standard deviations. Comparing the estimates
from Denmark and Germany, it seems that having attended the high-quality and strictly
regulated preschool in Denmark has stronger effect than the child care policy in Germany.
However, the stronger effect of the Danish case may also be due to timing issues, since
that study refers to a preschool policy, while Felfe and Lalive (2010) evaluate a policy for
children aged 0-2: the longer distance between the time when the input is implemented
and the one when the outcome is measured can also determine the smaller effect that is
found.14
The positive implications for cognitive outcomes in the medium-run are fairly consis-
tent across countries and methodologies. Dumas and Lefranc (2010) evaluate a preschool
expansion implemented in France during the 1960s and the 1970s and estimate both the
effects of the age of entry at preschool and the effect of preschool duration. They find that
entry at 2 years (instead of at 3) increases test scores at grade 6 and the probability of
graduation at high school; moreover, staying at preschool 3 years (instead of 1) decreases
the number of grade repetitions at age 11 and 16. Berlinski et al. (2008) find that the
positive child care impact increases as the child ages, instead of dissipating over time:
having attended at least one year of preschool in Uruguay increases both the probability
of attending school and the number of years of education; further, the coefficients are
higher for 15 years old children than for children aged 7. Finally, for the U.S., Fitzpatrick
14Chapter 2 presents a study on the child care policy in Italy, using, as outcome variables, school grades
on Language and Math for 2nd graders at primary school. Results are in line with the ones found by Felfe
and Lalive (2010).
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Table 1.7
Selected studies evaluating child care impacts on middle childhood and adolescence
noncognitive outcomes. Description.
Study Country Data and Sam-
ple
Inputs/Policy Outcomes Timing
Datta Gupta and
Simonsen (2011a)
Denmark DALSC & DAR.
N=4,343.
Enrollment in
publicly pro-
vided child care
(preschool or
family day care)
vs home care.a
SDQb behavioral
test.
Inputs measured
at age 3-6; out-
comes measured
at age 7.
Datta Gupta and
Simonsen (2011b)
Denmark DALSC & DAR.
Sample size
changes ac-
cording to the
outcome, on
average N=3,000.
Enrollment in
publicly pro-
vided child care
(preschool or
family day care)
vs home care.a
SDQb behavioral
test at age 11,
dummy for smok-
ing, dummy for
drinking, dummy
for vandal behav-
ior.
Inputs measured
at age 3-6; out-
comes measured
at age 11.
Felfe and Lalive
(2010)
Germany GCP. N=686. Having attended
child care in age
0-2 & local child
care supply at
childbirth
Standardized in-
dexes for: i) in-
dependence skills;
ii) social skills; iii)
behavior; iv) per-
sonality; v) motor
skills.
Inputs measured
at age 0-2 for
children born in
1996-1997; out-
comes measured
at 5-10 years.
Goodman and
Sianesi (2005)
U.K. NCDS.
N=12,172.
Dummy for hav-
ing attended any
pre-compulsory
educationc ;
dummy for hav-
ing attended
preschool vs
staying home or
starting primary
school earlier.
Overall social de-
velopment at 7
and 11; propor-
tion of very bad
self-control skills
at 7.d
Inputs measured
at 4 years old
for the cohort of
children born in
the first week of
March 1958; out-
comes measured
in 1965, 1969 and
1974 (when the
child is 7-11 years
old).
Abbreviations: DALSC = Danish Longitudinal Survey of Children; DAR = Danish Administrative Registers; GCP
= German Child Panel; NCDS = National Child Development Study; ECH = Encuesta Continua de Hogares;
NAEP = State National Assessment of Educational Progress.
a Preschool = center based care. Family Day Care = care provided in private homes. Home care = care provided
by parents.
b SDQ = Strength and Difficulties Questionnaire. Higher score indicates more behavioral problems.
c Pre-compulsory education includes any form of education (preschool or early entry) before the compulsory starting
age of 5.
d Proportion of very bad self-control skills out of: destructive, irritable, difficulty concentrating, upset by many
situations, miserable, etc. The higher the proportion, the worse the outcome.
(2008) finds a positive effect of having attended the Georgia pre-kindergarten program on
Math score.
Hence, child care and preschool policies, both in European and in Latin American
countries, seem to have positive effects also on outcomes measured some years later their
implementation. This result is in contrast with the Currie and Thomas’ findings concerning
the program Head Start and black children. A plausible explanation for this difference
can be the institutional contexts characterizing these countries, not only in relation to
the child care policy, but also to subsequent policies investing in children’s human capital
(e.g., primary and secondary school).
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Table 1.8
Selected studies evaluating child care impacts on middle childhood and adolescence
noncognitive outcomes. Results.
Study Estimation technique Coefficients
Datta Gupta and Simonsen (2011a) OLS and IV. Instrument: dummy
for living in a municipality pro-
viding universal access to preschool
(GAPS).a
OLS: children in family day care
(vs home care) +1.808; children in
preschool (vs family day care) -
0.421.b IV: effect of preschool (vs
family day care) n.s.
Datta Gupta and Simonsen (2011b) OLS and IV. Instrument: dummy
for living in a municipality pro-
viding universal access to preschool
(GAPS).a
OLS and IV: effect of preschool (vs
family day care) n.s.
Felfe and Lalive (2010) OLS, IV and RF. Instrument: local
child care supply at childbirth.
RF (child care supply impact):
+0.0137 on noncognitive skills,
+0.0129 on independence, +0.0105
on personality. IV: +1.687 on
noncognitive skills, +1.592 on
independence.*
Goodman and Sianesi (2005) OLS Effect of any pre-compulsory educa-
tion: -0.053 on social development
index at 7, +0.008 on very bad self-
control skills at 7,b +0.006 on very
bad self-control skills at 11.b Effect
of preschool: +0.014 on very bad
self-control skills at 7, +0.01 on very
bad self-control skills at 11.b*
Abbreviations: OLS = Ordinary Least Squares, IV = Instrumental Variables, RF = Reduced Form, MFE =
Mother Fixed Effects.
Notes. Estimates reported in this table represent the raw coefficients presented in each study. * indicates that
the study uses a standardized dependent variable, so that coefficients can be interpreted in terms of a standard
deviation. + indicates that the dependent variable is log-transformed and that coefficients multiplied by 100 can
be interpreted as percentage change.
a GAPS = Guaranteed Access to Pre-School.
b Since an higher outcome means more behavioral problems, a positive coefficient implies a detrimental effect.
1.4.3. Long-term adult outcomes of early non-parental child care. In the
U.S. literature, there exist several studies evaluating the long-run impacts of child care
programs targeted toward disadvantaged households and children. For instance, Currie,
Garces, and Thomas (2002) find that having attended the program Head Start increases
the probability that the child attends high school and college and increases adult earnings
by 19 percent. Barnett and Masse (2002) assess the impacts of the Carolina Abecedarian
Program on children at 21 years of age and find positive effects on the probability of
attending college, while the impacts on criminal behavior and grade retention are negative.
Heckman, Moon, Pinto, Savelyev, and Yavitz (2010) estimate a rate of return of the Perry
Pre-School program ranging between 7 and 8 percent.15
Recently, there have been several studies assessing the long-run effects of child care
policies implemented in European countries during the 1960s and 1970s. They are sum-
marized in table 1.9, while their main findings are reported in table 1.10.
Dumas and Lefranc (2010) report the effects of preschool duration in France on
monthly wage, while Goodman and Sianesi (2005) estimate the impact of having attended
15See Cunha et al. (2006) for additional details.
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Table 1.9
Selected studies evaluating child care impacts on adulthood outcomes. Descrip-
tion.
Study Country Data and Sam-
ple
Inputs/Policy Outcomes Timing
Dumas and
Lefranc (2010)
France FQP. Sample
of birth co-
horts 1950-1973.
N=5,843.
Duration of
preschool (1, 2 or
3 years)
Monthly wage Inputs measured
when children
are 3-6; outcome
measured in 1993
when children are
20-43
Goodman and
Sianesi (2005)
U.K. NCDS.
N=12,172.
Dummy for hav-
ing attended any
pre-compulsory
educationa ;
dummy for hav-
ing attended
preschool vs
staying home or
starting primary
school earlier.
Dummy for hav-
ing obtained
any qualifica-
tion above Level
1 by age 42,
dummy for hav-
ing obtained
any qualification
at Level 4 or
5 (higher edu-
cation) by age
42, employment
status and hourly
wage at 33 and
42.
Inputs measured
at 4 years old
for the cohort of
children born in
the first week of
March 1958; out-
comes measured
in 1991 and 2000
when children are
aged 33-42 years.
Havnes and
Mogstad (2011b)
Norway Statistics Nor-
way (1967-2006).
Sample of chil-
dren born in
1967-1976, living
in Norway in
2006 and whose
mother was mar-
ried at the time of
the kindergarten
reform (1975).
N=499,026.
Impact of a
kindergarten
reform that in-
creased formal
preschool during
the ’70s.
Outcomes: years
of education,
having attended
some college,
being high-school
drop-out, being
low, average,
high or top
earner,b being on
welfare,c .
Input measured
when children
were at kinder-
garten age;
outcomes mea-
sured in 2006
(aged between
30-39 years).
Havnes and
Mogstad (2010)
Norway Statistics Nor-
way (1967-2006).
Sample of chil-
dren born in
1967-1976, living
in Norway in
2006 and whose
mother was mar-
ried at the time of
the kindergarten
reform (1975).
N=498,956.
Impact of a
kindergarten
reform that in-
creased formal
preschool during
the ’70s.
Adult annual
earnings (Million
NOK) of children
exposed to the
reform.
Input measured
when children
were at kinder-
garten age;
outcomes mea-
sured in 2006
(aged between
30-39 years).
Abbreviations: FQP = Education, Training and Occupation survey; NCDS = National Child Development Study.
a Pre-compulsory education includes any form of education (preschool or early entry at primary school) before the
compulsory starting age of 5.
b Low earner = earnings lower than 2 basic amounts; average earner = earnings equal at least to 4 basic amounts;
high earner = earnings equal at least to 8 basic amounts; top earner = earnings equal at least to 12 basic amounts.
1 basic amount = 10,500$.
c Being on welfare = receiving more than 1 basic amount as public cash transfer.
preschool in U.K. on educational attainments and hourly wage at 33 and 42 years. Re-
sults from these studies are very similar, confirming that a long-lasting positive effect of
preschool attendance is consistent across countries. The former study finds that staying
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Table 1.10
Selected studies evaluating child care impacts on adulthood outcomes. Results.
Study Estimation technique Coefficients
Dumas and Lefranc (2010) OLS with school/birth-department
fixed effects
Staying in preschool 2 years increases
monthly wage by +0.0298, staying
in preschool 3 years increases wage
by +0.046.+ Ref. cat.: staying in
preschool 1 year.
Goodman and Sianesi (2005) OLS Effect of any pre-compulsory educa-
tion: +0.018 on probability of employ-
ment at 33, -0.038 on probability of
needing special education, +0.029 on
probability of any qualification above
level 1 at 33; +0.027 on wages at
33, +0.022 on wages at 42.+ Effect
of preschool: +0.027 on wages at 33,
+0.036 on wages at 42.+
Havnes and Mogstad (2011b) Diff-in-Diff +0.3523 on years of education, +0.0685
on the probability of attending col-
lege, -0.0584 on the probability of be-
ing high-school drop-out, -0.0359 on
the probability of being low earner,
+0.0514 on the probability of being av-
erage earner, -0.0337 on the probabil-
ity of being high earner, -0.0511 on the
probability of being on welfare.
Havnes and Mogstad (2010) Non-Linear Diff-in-Diff Effect of the policy on the mean n.s..
Effect of the policy on the income dis-
tribution: +0.032 on the 10th per-
centile, +0.055 on the 20th percentile,
0 on the 68th percentile, -0.038 on the
90th percentile.a
Abbreviations: OLS = Ordinary Least Squares.
Notes. Estimates reported in this table represent the raw coefficients presented in each study. * indicates that
the study uses a standardized dependent variable, so that coefficients can be interpreted in terms of a standard
deviation. + indicates that the dependent variable is log-transformed and that coefficients multiplied by 100 can be
interpreted as percentage change.
a The dependent variable is the probability that post-reform earnings are higher than a certain percentile in the
pre-reform earnings distribution. Reported coefficients represent Treatment on the Treated (TT) effects.
in preschool 3 years (instead of 1) increases monthly wage by 4.6 percent, while the latter
finds that having attended preschool increases hourly wage by 2.7 percent at age 33 and
by 3.6 percent at age 42. To see the magnitude of these effects, consider an adult with an
hourly gross wage of 13 Euro, working 8 hours a day for 20 days in a month. According
to the Dumas and Lefranc (2010) paper, the change in the monthly wage due to 3-years
preschool attendance, other things being equal, is equivalent to almost 95 Euro;16 instead,
using the estimates from Goodman and Sianesi (2005), the change in the hourly gross
wage at 42 due to preschool attendance is equivalent to 75 Euro.17 The magnitude of
these impacts is substantial. The fact that the effects is higher in France than in U.K.
may be due to the different characteristics of the service, since preschool could be more
strictly regulated in France than the in U.K.. However, it can also depend on the defini-
tion of the variables of interests in the two studies: in Dumas and Lefranc the regressor of
16The monthly gross wage is given by 13×8×20 = 2, 080. 4.6 percent of 2,080 is equivalent to 95.68 Euro.
173.6 percent of 13 Euro is equivalent to 0.468 Euro. Measuring this change on a monthly basis, it yields
74.88 = 0.468× 8× 20.
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interests is entry age at preschool and the impact reported above refers to children that
started preschool at 2 years of age instead of 5; hence, the treatment is clearly to have
attended 3 years of preschool. Instead, in the Goodman and Sianesi paper, the treatment
is a more generic preschool attendance, that could be shorter than 3 years.
Dumas and Lefranc (2010) provide a very interesting result: the positive effect on wage
remains either controlling or not controlling for final education; it seems that preschool
has a direct effect on earnings in addition to the effect that it has through education. This
issue has been raised by other studies in this literature (Chetty, Friedman, Hilger, Saez,
Schanzenbach, and Yagan, 2011); a possible explanation is that preschool favors the ac-
quisition of noncognitive skills that are rewarded in the labor market, such as self-esteem
and socialization. This mechanism has been already presented in figure 1.2 that shows
how the parental decisions and the child’s noncognitive skills developed during early child-
hood affect directly child’s earnings in addition to the effect that they have through final
schooling. As suggested by Cunha et al. (2006), even when early childhood intervention
do not boost cognitive skills, it improves the noncognitive ones, with substantial effects
on labor market and behavioral outcomes.
Finally, Havnes and Mogstad (2010, 2011b) estimate the long-term effects of a policy
implemented in Norway during the 1970s, aimed to increase formal preschool attendance.
Havnes and Mogstad (2011b) evaluate the impact on several outcomes referred to both
the educational perspectives of children when adults and to their labor market experience:
years of education, having attended some years of college, being high-school drop-out,
earnings and being on welfare. Their results have the expected signs, confirming that
the policy18 has increased years of education and the probability to attend college and
decreased the probability of being on welfare and being high-school dropout. However
they find negative effects of the policy on the probability of being low and high earners,
while the effect is positive on the probability to be average earner. These heterogeneous
impacts are further investigated in Havnes and Mogstad (2010), that evaluate the impact
of the policy on the entire earnings distribution. They find that the policy has been more
effective for children in the lower and median part of the distribution, up to the 70th
percentile, while it has been detrimental for those in the higher part of the distribution,
that would have got higher earnings without the policy implementation. According to
the theoretical framework provided in section 1.2.2, these children did not benefit from
the policy since their parents were already investing in their human capital. Instead, the
policy can be effective for those with a low initial level of (investments in) human capital:
for those people the policy has enlarged their parents’ opportunities frontier, since they
could choose among more options to invest in the human capital of their children.
1.5. Conclusions
This survey provides an analysis of existing studies evaluating non-parental child care
impacts, posing particular attention to contexts different from the U.S. and focusing more
on child care policies rather than on heterogenous child care services. The aim of the
18Actually, the authors do not observe whether a child attended preschool or not, so that their estimates
should be considered as Intention to Treat (ITT) coefficients. Indeed, they compute the Treatment on
the Treated (TT) effects dividing the ITT coefficients by the increase in child care coverage following the
reform in the treatment group relative to the comparison group. In the tables, only TT estimates are
reported.
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survey is to show the importance of institutions in modeling the opportunity sets available
to parents when they make their non-parental child care decisions.
Existing literature on the impacts of non-parental child care on child’s outcomes do
not provide homogeneous results. The differences can be mostly explained by the diverse
institutional context considered and by the characteristics of the service that is analyzed.
In fact, when similar child care policies (or formal well-regulated arrangements) are con-
sidered, these differences cancel out and all the studies provide evidence of positive child
care impacts.
All the studies evaluating the impacts of non-parental child care in the short- and
medium-run find positive effects on cognitive outcomes, while the implications for the
noncognitive ones are mixed. As pointed out by Cunha et al. (2006), much of the effec-
tiveness of early childhood interventions comes from boosting cognitive and noncognitive
skills, that can have substantial effects on schooling and labor market outcomes dur-
ing adulthood. Positive effects of preschool attendance and preschool policies on adult
earnings are found in both U.K., France and Norway, and the magnitude of the impacts
is similar across countries. According to the theoretical framework proposed in section
1.2.2, however, not all children may equally benefit from a policy increasing child care or
preschool availability. In fact, the final outcome depends on the interaction between the
policy and parents’ preferences and budget constraint. While positive long-run effects of
child care policies have been found, on average, by Goodman and Sianesi (2005) for U.K.
and Dumas and Lefranc (2010) for France, Havnes and Mogstad (2010) report a positive
impact of a preschool policy implemented in Norway only for children in the lower part
of the earnings distribution, while children in the upper part of the distribution did not
benefit from the policy. This result also confirms that child care and preschool interven-
tion can be more effective for children living in disadvantaged backgrounds, because it can
provide better educational inputs than those they would have received at home.
The studies presented in this survey have two main limitations. First of all, the
majority of them may fail in taking into account the endogeneity sources characterizing
this framework, so that the coefficients estimates can be biased. Second, very few of them
provide a theoretical framework that may help in understanding the results and no one
takes into account that the inputs are actually chosen by parents: only the child’s ability
production function is estimated. This issue prevents also from understanding some of the
mechanisms with which non-parental child care affects child’s development.
Further research can help in identifying the mechanisms through which preschool and
child care attendance have an impact on child development, especially in the long-run. For
instance, further should be investigated on the relationship between the child care input
and the development of noncognitive skills, that may have a direct effect on earnings in
addition to the one through education.
34
1.A. Functional form assumptions and substitutability patterns
Without loss of generality, the utility function and the child’s ability production func-
tion proposed in section 1.2.2 have been defined without specific functional forms. How-
ever, different functional form assumptions may have implications for the degree of sub-
stitutability between goods and inputs.
As suggested by Almond and Currie (2011), the most flexible specification for both
the child’s ability production function and the parents’ utility function is the CES func-
tional form, since it allows to identify both the parameters of the elasticity of substitution
between inputs and the one between goods. Suppose, for instance, that child’s ability
depends only on external child care and time shared with the parents, and that parents
care about consumption and child’s ability. Thus, equations (1.2) and (1.5) can be written
as:
U = [α1C
ρ + α2A
ρ]
1
ρ (1.A.1)
A = [γτφ + (1− γ)cφ] 1φ (1.A.2)
where −∞ < ρ ≤ 1 and −∞ < φ ≤ 1.
The elasticity of substitution between inputs from equation (1.A.2) can be derived as
follows.
The marginal productivity of each input is defined as:
∂A
∂τ
= [γτφ + (1− γ)cφ] 1−φφ γτφ−1 (1.A.3)
∂A
∂c
= [γτφ + (1− γ)cφ] 1−φφ (1− γ)cφ−1 (1.A.4)
The technical rate of substitution (TRS) is given by:
TRS = −
∂A
∂τ
∂A
∂c
(1.A.5)
Substituting (1.A.3) and (1.A.4) into (1.A.5) yields:
TRS = − γτ
φ−1
(1− γ)cφ−1 = −
γ
(1− γ)(
c
τ
)1−φ (1.A.6)
The factors ratio is then:
c
τ
= [−TRS(1− γ
γ
)]
1
1−φ (1.A.7)
Applying the logarithm transformation to (1.A.7), one can compute the elasticity of sub-
stitution σ across inputs:
σAPF =
∂ln( cτ )
∂ln|TRS| =
1
1− φ (1.A.8)
where APF stems for ability production function. If φ > 0 the elasticity of substitution is
high and the inputs are perfect substitutes, so that that a decrease in maternal time due
to mother’s participation in the labor market can be compensated by an equal amount
of time in external child care; instead, if φ < 0 the elasticity is low and the inputs are
complements.19
19Apart from Heckman (2007) that uses a CES production function for the specification of the child
development process, the majority of studies using a child ability production function framework adopts
a linear (or log-linear) specification, assuming perfect substitutability of inputs across periods and φ = 1
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Moreover, the relationship between the elasticity of substitution in the utility function
and in the child’s ability production function allows to identify potential compensating
or reinforcing behavior of parents, that can be interpreted as reactions to the (partially)
observed level of child’s ability. Consider equation (1.A.1). The marginal utility for each
good is defined as:
∂U
∂C
=
1
ρ
[α1C
ρ + α2A
ρ]1/ρ−1[ρα1Cρ−1] (1.A.9)
∂U
∂A
=
1
ρ
[α1C
ρ + α2A
ρ]1/ρ−1[ρα2Aρ−1] (1.A.10)
The marginal rate of substitution (MRS) is given by:
MRS = −
∂U
∂C
∂U
∂A
(1.A.11)
Substituting (1.A.9) and (1.A.10) into (1.A.11) and solving for the goods ratio yields:
A
C
= [−MRSα2
α1
]
1
1−ρ (1.A.12)
Applying the logarithm transformation to (1.A.12), one can compute the elasticity of
substitution σ across inputs:
σUF =
∂ln(AC )
∂ln|MRS| =
1
1− ρ (1.A.13)
where UF stems for utility function.
The potential compensating or reinforcing behavior of the parents can be derived
by the relationship between σUF and σAPF . Suppose that before making any decisions
concerning time and child care use parents (partially) observe their child’s ability. Say
that, for instance, child’s ability has a negative shock after birth so that parents may
decide to compensate this shock (investing more in child’s human capital) or to reinforce
it (by investing less in child’s human capital).
If σUF < σAPF , hence ρ < φ, the elasticity of substitution across goods is smaller than
the one across inputs implying that consumption and child’s ability are complements in
parents’ utility. After a negative shock in ability, it is optimal for the parents to compensate
and to invest more in the child’s human capital. The degree of substitutability between τ
and c, i.e., σAPF determines how much the parents invest increasing τ , c or both. Instead,
if σUF > σAPF , hence ρ > φ, it is optimal for the parents to reinforce the effect of the
shock investing less in the child’s human capital (Almond and Currie, 2011).20
(for instance, see Bernal (2008)). Del Boca et al. (2010) and the model presented in chapter 3 of this thesis
adopt a Cobb-Douglas specification, where φ = 0 and the elasticity of substitution is equal to 1.
20For instance, Bernal (2008) defines the child cognitive ability as linear (φ = 1) and the utility function
as CES (CRRA) in consumption and child’s ability. She estimates the parameter for child’s ability in
the mother utility function ρ as being lower than 1, meaning that mothers find optimal to engage in
compensating behavior toward their children if their level of initial endowment is low. If both the utility
function and the child’s ability production function are Cobb-Douglas ρ = φ = 0 and investments do not
depend on the shocks.
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CHAPTER 2
Exploring the impacts of public child care on mothers and
children in Italy: does rationing play a role?
ABSTRACT - This chapter investigates the effects of public child care availability in
Italy on mothers’ working status and children’s scholastic achievements. We use a newly
available dataset containing individual standardized test scores of pupils attending second
grade of primary school in 2009-10 in conjunction with data on public child care availabil-
ity. Public child care coverage in Italy is scarce (12.7 percent versus the OECD average
of 30 percent) and the service is rationed. Consequently, each municipality allocates the
available slots according to eligibility criteria. We argue that when child care coverage is
low and these criteria play a stronger role, the effect of a percentage change in child care
is stronger. Our estimates indicate that child care availability has positive and significant
effects on both mothers’ working status and children’s Language test scores. Moreover, the
effect of a percentage change in public child care on mother’s employment and Language
test score is greater if child care availability is scarce, i.e., the service is more rationed.
JEL Classification: J13, I2, H75
Keywords: child care, female employment, child cognitive outcomes
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2.1. Introduction
Advocates1 for public intervention in child care provision offer two main arguments:
(1) child care providing children’s ”physical care” may support mothers’ participation in
the labor market and (2) child care providing early childhood education may contribute to
children’s cognitive and noncognitive development, leading to gains in the accumulation
of human capital in the society.
Existing research on the impact of child care supply on maternal employment has
been recently accompanied by growing interest in the impact of child care on childhood
development. Such studies suggest that children’s cognitive and noncognitive outcomes
are largely determined early in life and that returns on investments in early childhood
are higher than those on investments at later stages, especially for disadvantaged children
(Carneiro and Heckman, 2003). Inputs from families as well as from the school system
during early childhood play a very significant role in later cognitive, social, and behavioral
outcomes (Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua, 2006).
Child care institutions are important arenas for children’s development, and expanding
child care coverage is an explicit goal in many countries. In 2002, the European Union
Presidency established the goal of providing ”child care by 2010 to at least 90 percent
of children between 3 years old and the mandatory school age and at least 33 percent of
children under 3 years of age” (EU, 2002).
Exploring the roles of public child care is particularly relevant in Italy, where the la-
bor market participation of mothers is much lower than in other European countries and
children do less well in school than their European counterparts. In Italy, only 54 percent
of mothers are employed, while this value is over 70 percent in the U.K., France and Ger-
many.2 Furthermore, according to 2006 data from PISA (the Programme for International
Student Assessment), 15-year-old Italian students rank fourth from the bottom in average
educational performance among advanced countries (OECD, 2007a).
Given the large number of children from single-child families, their main opportunities
for early socialization may be those provided by child care services and investments in child
care policies may also help alleviate intergenerational persistence, especially for children
from low-income families. Instead, recent data (OECD, 2010) show that public investment
in pre-school education in Italy is among the lowest in Europe.3
As a result, child care is far less readily available than in other European countries:
according to ISTAT (2010), only 12.7 percent of children aged 0-2 years in Italy have access
to public child care facilities and, despite the persistence of strong traditional values, which
say that the child is better off in his mother’s care, the demand for public child care is
still higher than supply in all Italian regions. When child care applications outnumber
supply, the municipalities, as the main decision makers in child care policies, settle how
to allocate the limited number of slots defining eligibility requirements according to their
preferences. For example, child care may be limited to children from low income families,
1This chapter is a joint work with Daniela Del Boca and Chiara Pronzato (University of Turin and Collegio
Carlo Alberto).
2Data from Eurostat referred to 2009.
3According to data from OECD Family Database for 2005, public expenditure on child care and early
education services in Italy is equivalent to 0.6 percent of GDP, while this figure for France, Sweden and
Denmark is higher than 1 percent (OECD, 2010).
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to provide them educational opportunities and better inputs for their development than
those received at home, or to those with working mothers, to support parents’ conciliation
between parenthood and work.
This chapter explores the role of public child care in Italy, investigating its impact on
mothers’ working status and children’s educational outcomes. We use a newly available
dataset on children’s primary school performance, in conjunction with data on public child
care coverage at the provincial level. Our identification strategy exploits cross-sectional
variation in child care coverage across provinces to recover the effects of interests.
This chapter contributes to the existing literature in two ways. First, differently from
the majority of studies on this issue, which deals with child care policies for children
older than 3, we explicitly deal with early child care for children aged 0-2 years. A policy
targeted toward very young children may have different effects on both the outcomes, with
respect to policies focused on children in preschool ages. Concerning mother’s employment,
a policy offering external child care for children aged 0-2 may be more effective than a
preschool policy in decreasing the probability that mothers without alternative forms of
care leave the labor market. Concerning children’s outcomes, instead, this study allows
to test whether a policy for very young children can have an effect on cognitive outcomes
measured at primary schools, as suggested by a recent literature saying that the returns
of investments made during early years is higher than that of investments made later
one (Carneiro and Heckman, 2003). Second, when considering the impacts of child care
coverage on these outcomes, we take into account the potential non-linearity in child care
impacts, to see whether they change if the service is more rationed, i.e., less available.
In the base specification, controlling for children’s and parents’ characteristics as well
as provinces’ features, we find that child care availability is positively related to mothers’
participation in the labor market and to Language test scores. This result is robust to the
inclusion of province fixed effects and to a battery of sensitivity checks. Once we allow
for a non-linear effect, we find that in areas where the supply of child care is more limited
the effect of a percentage change in child care supply on both mother’s employment and
Language test score is higher.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 2.2 we review the existing
literature concerning the impact of child care on both mothers’ participation and children’s
cognitive outcomes. In section 2.3 we describe public child care in Italy and its features,
with particular attention to eligibility criteria and rationing; in section 2.4 we present a
theoretical model, representing the framework for our empirical analysis. In section 2.5 we
define the empirical strategy and the issues involved in the estimation, while section 2.6
provides a description of the data and variables used. In section 2.7 we present the results
from our estimation; section 2.8 discusses the robustness checks we perform. Section 2.9
presents the results where non-linearity in child care impacts is taken into account. Finally,
section 2.10 concludes.
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2.2. The Literature
Several studies have analyzed the role of child care as an important tool for reconciling
work and family commitments during the childbearing years. Studies in the U.S. have
mainly focused on programs for disadvantaged households and children.4
According to microeconomic theory, an increase in child care availability lowers the
cost of using the service, determining an increase in mother’s net wage. However, the final
impact on mother’s participation is unclear: an higher net wage may determine an increase
in mother’s participation (substitution effect) or an increase in leisure time (income effect),
which one prevails depending on the structure of mother’s preferences.
The empirical research analyzing the impact of child care availability reports in fact
mixed findings. Havnes and Mogstad (2011a) analyze the impact of a change in child
care availability in Norway and find a very small effect on mothers’ participation in the
labor market, similarly to some studies for the U.S. (Cascio, 2009). Baker, Gruber, and
Milligan (2008) evaluate the impact of a public child care program in Quebec (Canada),
finding that the introduction of generous child care subsidies led to a strong increase in
employment for married mothers.
For Italy, Del Boca (2002), Del Boca and Vuri (2007) and Del Boca, Pasqua, and
Pronzato (2009) find a positive impact of child care coverage and child care subsidies on
the likelihood that the mother works. In particular, Del Boca and Vuri (2007) take into
account the impact of rationing, due to child care system rigidity (in terms of accessibility,
opening time and costs), and find that in areas with higher child care availability the
probability of female employment increases.
In recent years, economic analyses have also focused on the impact of child care on
children’s outcomes. In the economics literature on human capital, Becker (1964) has
pointed out that the returns to investments in early childhood are likely to be relatively
high, simply because of the long time in which to reap the rewards. Carneiro and Heck-
man (2003) took this argument further, arguing that investments in early childhood have
higher returns for children living in disadvantaged contexts. Early childhood educational
programs can generate learning gains in the short-run and, in many cases, improve the
long-run prospects of children, especially for low-income families.
A number of studies for the U.S. show that the evidence regarding this impact is limited
to short-run outcomes and that the findings are mixed. Loeb et al. (2007), for instance,
find that pre-primary education in the U.S. is associated with improved reading and Math
skills at primary school entry. Positive effects of child care on children’s short-run outcomes
are also found by Fitzpatrick (2008) but the impacts depend strongly on ethnicity and
family income. Other studies (Magnuson, Rhum, and Waldfogel, 2007) confirm these
results, showing that the positive effects dissipate for most children already by the end of
first grade, while larger and longer lasting associations with academic gains are found for
disadvantaged children. Melhuish, Sylva, Sammons, Siraj-Blatchford, Taggart, Phan, and
Malin (2008) suggest that children with low educated parents benefit most from child care
attendance.
Research from Europe focuses on public child care, which is more widespread than in
the U.S., especially in Northern countries. Datta Gupta and Simonsen (2011b) evaluate
4See Blau and Currie (2006) and Ruhm (2004) for excellent surveys.
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the impact of child care exposure at age 3 on children’s cognitive outcomes at age 11,
in Denmark. They find that having attended high-quality pre-school (instead of family
day-care) has a positive impact on Language and problem solving tests scores, while it
decreases the probability of grade retention. Other studies use information on child care
coverage at aggregate level, as we do in this study. Havnes and Mogstad (2010, 2011b)
find that a substantial change in child care supply in Norway has strong positive impacts
on children’s outcomes, although the impact is much stronger for children of low educated
parents. Their results suggest a positive and significant impact of child care coverage on
educational outcomes, such as years of education and college attendance, but also on long-
term outcomes, such as adult earnings. Felfe and Lalive (2010), instead, exploit a variation
in child care supply in Germany and find positive and significant effects on Language skills
in the short run and on school grades in the medium run. Similarly, Berlinski et al. (2009)
report a positive effect of a preschool expansion policy in Argentina on both Math and
Spanish test scores.
In Italy, the topic of early child intervention and child care impacts on children’s
outcomes has largely been neglected. Only very recently there has been availability of
data on children’s outcomes (ISFOL, INVALSI and local data sources referring to specific
regions, such as Emilia Romagna and Piedmont), which made it possible to consider
the impact of child care not only from the standpoint of physical care but also in terms
of its role in educating young children. Del Boca and Pasqua (2010) compare different
Italian data sources and show a positive correlation between child care use and subsequent
cognitive outcomes of children.
This chapter contributes to the existing literature in the following ways. First of all,
it provides evidence of child care impacts in the Italian context. This is important not
only because studies on this topic are absent, but also because of the characteristics of this
country in terms of child care policy, mothers’ employment and children’s performances at
school. Second, differently from the majority of studies detailed above, we will explicitly
consider the child care policy for very young children, aged 0-2 years.5 Finally, we estimate
the impacts of child care availability on mother’s working status and children’s outcomes
taking into account the role of rationing, i.e., scarce availability, in public child care. To
do this, we also refer to other related literature that has investigated the functioning of the
child care market in Italy and the criteria used to allocate the limited slots to households
(Antonelli and Grembi, 2010, Bosi and Silvestri, 2008).
2.3. Child care in Italy
While Italy is ranked quite high for its child care policies for children aged 3-6, it fares
much worse for its policies for children under 3: public child care for children aged 3 or
older has a utilization rate of 95 percent, whereas public child care for children younger
than 3 covers only the 12.7 percent of children aged 0-2 (ISTAT, 2010).
5To the best of our knowledge, only Felfe and Lalive (2010) consider the impacts of child care attendance
when the child was younger than 3 years old. Instead, the majority of studies consider child care policies
for children older than 3 and their attendance to kindergarten or pre-primary schools (for instance, see
Loeb et al. (2007), Fitzpatrick (2008), Magnuson et al. (2007) Melhuish et al. (2008) and Datta Gupta
and Simonsen (2011b)).
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In Italy, the child care policy for children aged 0-2 is decentralized: the municipality is
the main decision-maker, while the regions define general management criteria;6 the central
government is only responsible for defining common objective standards and resources
allocation among regions.7 This may explain why the availability of public child care
for children under three varies greatly across regions, from around 25 per cent in some
areas in the North to under 5 percent in most of the South (see figure 2.1). Furthermore,
in the last years, child care supply from private providers has increased and developed
differently across Italian regions (Istituto Degli Innocenti, 2002, 2009). Public child care
differs from private child care in several ways. For instance, public services are more strictly
regulated both in terms of service standards and in terms of management and personnel
requirements (Istituto Degli Innocenti, 2002). As stated in Budget Law 2002,8 one of the
most important aim of public child care is educational. This goal has been implemented
through the introduction of quality standards, especially in regions with greater experience
in child care provision (such as Emilia Romagna and Tuscany). Public child care is also
less expensive than the private one, since it is highly subsidized (Del Boca, Locatelli, and
Vuri, 2005).
Although it is higher-quality and less expensive than either private child care or baby-
sitting services, public child care is used by only a fraction of Italian households. This
is the outcome of both families’ and municipalities’ decisions. Families’ decisions are
often conditioned by persistent, strongly-rooted cultural norms. In Southern European
countries, and Italy in particular, the traditional role of mothers is still highly valued and,
hence, mothers are considered the best caregivers for their children. However, as reported
in Zollino (2008), not all the households willing to use the service are able to do it, due to
scarce availability and waiting lists.
On the supply side, the decisions of the municipalities concerning the number of child
care slots to offer depend on their preferences, as to which types of household to target,
and on their budget constraint. Each municipality establishes eligibility requirements so
that the number of available slots can be assigned to households who benefit more.9
While absolute priority is given to applications of children with disability,10 the other
criteria can be classified into two main categories. The first category mainly includes the
following eligibility criteria: having both parents working (part-time or full-time), having
parents with turns at work or commuting, having other siblings (an higher score is given
6To date, in Italy there are 8,092 municipalities in 20 regions.
7Appendix 2.A provides further details on the institutional and historical background concerning the child
care policy in Italy.
8Law 448/2001 (Budget Law 2002) defined formal child care as ”structures aimed at granting the develop-
ment and socialization of girls and boys aged between 3 months and 3 years and to support families and
parents with young children”.
9Bosi and Silvestri (2008) argue that the municipality has imperfect information about the real demand
of child care, so that eligibility criteria can help the social planner in identifying parents that can be more
interested in the service among all potential demanders. In this context, access criteria might be viewed
also as a screening device used by the social planner.
10National Law 104/1992.
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Figure 2.1
Child care coverage across Italian regions (percentage ratio between slots and
population 0-2 years), 2005.
Source: own elaborations from Cittadinanzattiva (2007).
if siblings are aged 0-2). The second category includes mostly criteria related to the socio-
economic conditions of the household, such as being orphan or fostered child, having one
or both parents unemployed, living with single parent.11
Thus, according to these access criteria, public child care can be viewed both as a tool
to help families to reconcile work and parenthood during the childbearing years, and as
a social service aimed to support the early education and the social inclusion of children
from low income families and stressful environments.12
From the social planner’s point of view, both outcomes are particularly important for
Italy. On one hand, in fact, nearly 30 percent of mothers leave their jobs after the birth of
the first child and the probability of leaving the labor market after childbirth is higher for
11There may be a third category, including criteria not related to specific social planner’s objectives but
often used as a priority criterion when candidates have equal scores: for example, being in the waiting list
or attending the facility the previous year, household income or the availability of grandparents.
12According to Antonelli and Grembi (2010), who collected information on accessibility criteria adopted in
a sample of 144 Italian municipalities, the second criterion, that is support the early education and social
inclusion of children from disadvantaged backgrounds, seems to prevail.
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low educated mothers and in areas with limited child care (Bratti et al., 2005, Pronzato,
2009). Moreover, mothers’ participation to the labor market in Italy does not change
significantly as the child ages from 0-2 to 3-5 years (OECD, 2007b), while it changes with
the birth of a child.13 This may confirm that childbirth plays a crucial role for mothers’
employment carriers and that child care for children 0-2 may soften the negative trend of
employment after childbirth, since it may help women without alternative forms of care
to remain in the labor market.
On the other hand, among low income households eligible for child care, a growing
number of children are from immigrant families implying the importance of institutions
favoring their social integration (Dalla Zuanna, Giraldo, and Rettore, 2011).
2.4. Theoretical Framework
In this section, we present a theoretical framework that summarizes the main mech-
anisms at work when we assess the effects of child care availability on both mother’s
employment and children’s cognitive outcomes.
The municipalities’ decisions regarding the supply of child care slots depend on the
local budget constraint and preferences of the local government. We assume that local
governments aim to encourage women’s work and to increase the educational outcomes of
children through public child care.
The objective of the municipality is given by
U(L,E)
where L is the participation of mothers (of young children) and E is an indicator of the
educational outcomes of children in the local area. The social planner seeks to maximize
her objective by manipulating (final) demand, which is accomplished by using the policy
variables at disposal. We assume that the policy variables are: N , the number of public
child care slots; P , the price charged each household for a slot; and R, the rules used
to assign slots to potential demanders in the case of excess demand at the price P . In
this simple model, we assume that the price P is the same for all households in the same
municipality, while it can change across municipalities. Given the population of potential
demanders (mothers with young children), there exists a set of households that would
gain access to public child care under (N,R, P ). In this set of households, we say that the
number L(N,R, P ) would work and that the educational outcome of all children is given
by E(N,R, P ). Hence, the social planner solves the following maximization problem:
max
N,R,P
U(L(N,R, P ), E(N,R, P ))
We now consider the constraints on the social planner’s choices. A social planner may
use rationing as a means to maximize her objective function. For example, if the social
planner wants to increase maternal employment, she could do so by limiting access and
making maternal employment one of the criteria for acquiring a slot. Different rationing
13According to OECD (2007b), maternal employment rate in Italy (for women in the age range 15-64) is
equal to 47.3 percent when the youngest child is aged less than 2 years, and equal to 50.6 percent when
the age of the youngest child is between 3 and 5 years. Instead, the difference in women participation to
the labor market between those without children and those with children aged 0-6 is equal to 8 percent
(Commissione Europea, , 2009, Data from Labor Force Survey 2006).
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criteria may be utilized if the social planner wants to increase the educational outcomes of
children in this population. Viewed in this way, rationing and selective access are outcomes
of a mechanism design implemented by the social planner. The monetary constraint the
social planner faces is given by
C ×N = S + P ×N
where C is the cost of each child care slot sustained by the municipality; S are the fixed
subsidies that the central government has allocated to the local government; and P , the
price per slot sustained by the family. Hence, the number of slots the social planner can
provide given S and P is
N = S/(C − P ). (2.1)
As the social planner increases the price (P ), the number of slots increases.
We assume that for any N , potential demand is such that there exists a P ∗(N) allowing
demand to exactly equal supply (N) at that price. In this case, the price serves to ”ration”
demand, and the rules R are irrelevant: only households with a willingness to pay for child
care greater than or equal to P ∗would get a slot. This implies that, in such cases, only
households with higher income would be able to pay for this service.
Thus, at any P less than P ∗(N), there will be excess demand and the rationing rules
become operative, selecting potential demanders whose characteristics and choices the
social planner values. By lowering the price and creating excess demand, the social planner
can choose individuals who acquire the slots instead of having the ”market” to do this
strictly through the price mechanism. However, there is a cost to this selection, in that
fewer slots can be generated. At P = 0, the municipality can choose perfectly how to
allocate the slots to households which are eligible according to the allocation criteria R.
But, in this case, the supply of slots may be very low given that S will be the only source
of program revenue.
The final choice of the social planner would involve something in the middle between
the case with P = 0 and the case with P = P ∗. The social planner can propose a
price lower than P ∗, so that there will be excess demand, choosing among the potential
demanders using the rules R.
We posit that municipalities with higher availability can provide more slots increasing
the price charged to the households. However, if they mostly use the price to ration the
demand, they would be able to allocate the slots only to children of wealthier families,
where parents are more likely to be high educated and to be both employed. In this case,
as confirmed by previous literature (Felfe and Lalive, 2010, Havnes and Mogstad, 2010,
2011a,b), we expect the effect of an additional child care slot to be lower, since the policy
has been targeted toward children that would have received better inputs at home and
mothers that would have been more likely to combine family and work. Instead, munici-
palities that cannot charge higher prices would be also characterized by fewer slots and,
for them, rules R are more relevant. In this case, instead, the municipality is able to iden-
tify households who may benefit more from the policy, both providing to the mother an
alternative form of care if she wants to work or offering to children coming from disadvan-
taged backgrounds better educational inputs. Even though eligibility requirements may
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be different across local areas, producing mixed types of eligible households, we expect
that when child care coverage is rationed, it has a stronger impact on mothers’ working
status and on children’s educational outcomes, since the social planner is able to select
groups which are more likely to benefit from the service.
The same selection may happen at provincial level, that is the level of aggregation we
use for the child care variable in the empirical analysis. At provincial level, the availability
of child care slots can be a proxy for the choice variables used by the social planner at
the municipal level. Assuming that, conditioned on the population aged 0-2, the amount
of the subsidy is equal across provinces, from (2.1) we know that the higher is the price
the lower the role for the rules R. We argue that provinces with higher availability are
also more likely to charge higher prices, since the potential demanders in these areas are
richer and have better employment opportunities. However, an additional child care slot
in these provinces would have a very low effect on the outcomes, since mothers could have
come back at work thanks to other opportunities offered by the province or children could
have got good results at school due to other educational inputs. Instead, in provinces
where child care availability is lower, the price is also lower and there is more space for
the eligibility requirements. Hence, we expect in these areas an higher child care effect on
both outcomes.
Notice that this positive selection of provinces in ”high child care coverage” may
also bias our results if not taken into account. In fact, in the empirical analysis, we are
comparing provinces with very high availability of the service (mostly in the Northern part
of Italy) with others where child care availability is close to zero (mostly in the South). If
the selection described above is not taken into account, we expect to underestimate the
child care effects on both outcomes.
2.5. Empirical strategy
We want to investigate empirically the role played by child care coverage when children
were aged 0-2 (t ∈ (0, 2)) on mothers’ probability to work and on children’s outcomes in
second grade at primary school (when children are aged 7 years, t = 7). The relationship
between these outcome variables and the availability of child care can be summarized by
the following equations:
Lipt=7 = α0 +X
′
ipα1 +H
′
ipα2 + α3Npt∈(0,2) + ipt (2.2)
Eipt=7 = δ0 +X
′
ipδ1 +H
′
ipδ2 + δ3Npt∈(0,2) + εipt (2.3)
where Lip is a binary variable equal to 1 if the mother of child i in province p works and
Eip is child i’s cognitive outcome, measured by child i’s scores in Language and Math
tests. Xip and Hip represent child’s and parents’ observable time invariant characteristics.
The variable whose effect is the main interest of this work is Np, that represents
public child care coverage at the level of the province (defined as percentage ratio between
available slots and population aged 0-2 years) and is an indicator of the likelihood that
the child attended child care.14
14The INVALSI wave 2009-10 that we are using actually contains a question regarding individual child
care attendance during infancy. However, this information cannot be used in a credible manner, since it is
characterized by almost 40 percent of (non-random) missing values.
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The estimated coefficients of interest comprise the effect of child care attendance on
the individual plus the effect given by the fact that other individuals in the same province
have been more likely to use it too. Formally, since N is defined as the percentage child
care coverage over the population aged 0-2 years, α3 and δ3 in equations (2.2) and (2.3)
represent reduced form estimates of the effects of a percentage change in nursery avail-
ability on all children, including any indirect or spillover effects. Hence, we identify the
Intention to Treat effect (ITT) rather than the effect on the children affected by the child
care policy (the effect of the Treatment on the Treated - TT). In order to understand the
importance of spillover and indirect effects in this framework, let us provide some illus-
trative examples. In case of children’s outcomes, we may think that a child in a primary
school may benefit not only from his own child care experience but also from staying in
a class where many children have been attended child care; thus, the coefficient estimate
δ3 represents the full effect of child care ”exposure”on all children in a province, not only
on those who actually attended child care. In the case of mother’s work, instead, we may
expect that the cost of participating in the labor market is lower if the mother has a child
care slot available but also if other mothers of young children participate too.15
The parameters of interests capture the average effect of a percentage change in child
care availability on all children. Notice that we are averaging over two dimensions: first,
we average over all children living in different provinces; second, we average across mar-
ginal effects of the additional child care slot that can be heterogeneous in the population.
This second dimension is particularly important, since we are measuring both outcomes
when the child is enrolled at primary school, after several years from the exposure to
the treatment. Our results are directly comparable with other studies using child care
information at aggregate level and recovering ITT estimates (e.g. Havnes and Mogstad
(2011a) and Berlinski and Galiani (2007) for child care effects on mother’s employment
and Berlinski et al. (2009) and Felfe and Lalive (2010) for impacts on children’s cognitive
outcomes).
Apart from the observable characteristics Xip and Hip, there are of course other un-
measured characteristics of the household, the child and the province where the household
resides that are important determinants of the mother’s labor market participation and
children’s cognitive outcomes, which are reflected in the disturbance term ipt and εipt.
The disturbances have a group structure and are defined as follows:
ipt = αp(t) + ωip(t) (2.4)
εipt = δp(t) + υip(t), (2.5)
where αp and δp are province-specific components, assumed to be normally distributed,
while ωip and υip stand for disturbance errors at individual level.
In order to take into account the error components at provincial level, we estimate
the above equations using GLS (or Random Effects -RE) model.16 Moreover, since we are
15These spillover effects have been also considered in the literature on social interactions and networks.
For instance, Maurin and Moschion (2009) focus on the interaction of mothers in the same neighborhood
as a determinant for their participation decisions.
16Concerning equation (2.2), results do not differ using probit or logit instead of GLS. When estimating
equation (2.2) with GLS we also correct the standard errors for heteroskedasticity.
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using mixed-level data, including information at the individual and provincial levels, it
is likely that observations in the same province are not independent, so standard regres-
sion techniques attribute too large levels of statistical significance to coefficient estimates
(Moulton, 1990). Following Primo, Jacobsmeier, and Milyo (2007), we adopt cluster-
adjustments of the estimates of the standard errors to account for non-independence of
observations within the same province.17
We can consistently estimate the child care effects α3 in equation (2.2) and δ3 in
equation (2.3) if the following conditions hold: (i) both the error components (at individual
and provincial levels) are uncorrelated with the included regressors; (ii) the error terms
are uncorrelated one with the other, i.e., once we take into account the unobservables at
provincial level, the ones at individual level are uniformly distributed across provinces.
Using the aggregate number of slots available in the local area allows to claim that
there is little scope for endogeneity between the child care measure and the individual com-
ponent of the disturbance terms in any equation. In fact, using information on child care
coverage at provincial level avoids the usual problem of selection and sorting of children
and parents in individual child care attendance. However, we can still have a non-zero
correlation between the child care measure and the unobservables at individual level if
local entities create policies in a purposive manner to respond to underlying economic,
social or cultural conditions. Actually, this might be more likely to happen if we were
using information on child care coverage at the municipal level, since the municipality is
the actual decision maker for child care policy (see Section 2.3). Within a province, there
may be differences across municipalities, that are equalized by using this information at
an higher level of aggregation. For instance, in any province, apart from the main munic-
ipality (called, in Italian, capoluogo di provincia), there are other smaller municipalities
and rural areas. It is reasonable to think of the main municipality to provide higher child
care coverage than the smaller municipalities, and this may respond to attitudes of the
inhabitants of big cities if they are more willing to use external child care. Using the
information at provincial level allows to avoid the potential endogeneity between the mu-
nicipality decision concerning child care coverage and the unobservables characteristics of
individuals, since we are averaging the child care effects over all municipalities in the same
province. However, to test whether other unmeasured characteristics of the municipal-
ity play a role, we replicate the analysis splitting the sample in two groups according to
whether a household resides in the main municipality or in a smaller municipality in the
same province.
Further, due to the high diversification of child care coverage across Italian regions, it
is very likely that provinces already providing this service during early 2000s are systemat-
ically different from provinces with almost a zero child care supply. This implies a positive
selection of provinces that, already by 2005, provide the service. If this is the case, then
the child care coverage at provincial level is correlated with unobservables characteristics
of the province that we cannot control for in the estimation and the coefficient of interests
in equation (2.2) and (2.3) are very likely to be biased. The direction of the bias mostly
depends on the relationships between the outcomes and the provincial characteristics re-
lated to the child care policy. If an higher child care availability is correlated with higher
17We adjust standard errors for 101 clusters, i.e., the number of provinces in our sample.
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educational investments on children or higher involvement of the social planner in provid-
ing conciliating policies, these confounding factors may determine better school outcomes
and higher mothers’ participation to the labor market regardless of child care coverage.
We try to take into account these issues including province-level regressors that reflect
provincial resources, provincial investments in education, and provincial features of the
labor market. All these factors can be correlated with provincial child care coverage and
can have an influence on the outcomes of interest. Equations (2.2) and (2.3) therefore
become:
Lipt=7 = α0 +X
′
ipα1 +H
′
ipα2 + α3Npt∈(0,2) +W
′
ptα4 + νipt (2.6)
Eipt=7 = δ0 +X
′
ipδ1 +H
′
ipδ2 + δ3Npt∈(0,2) +W
′
ptδ4 + φipt (2.7)
where W includes GDP per capita, enrollment rate at kindergarten, percentage of
graduates, the average school size per province and its square and the employment rate in
public services and health-social services where women are overrepresented. νipt and φipt
are composite error terms as defined by (2.4) and (2.5).
We also consider a specification, estimated using OLS, where we include provincial
fixed effects that capture time invariant unobserved heterogeneity.18 Specifically, the fixed
effects cancel out the error component at province level in (2.4) and (2.5) if it is constant
over time, i.e.:
αp(t) = αpt=7 = αpt∈(0,2) = αp
δp(t) = δpt=7 = δpt∈(0,2) = δp
In this way, we can control for the provincial characteristics that we cannot observe
but that affect child care availability in 2005 (the year in which we measure child care
availability) and the outcomes in 2009-10 (the year in which we measure the outcomes).
This long time gap ensures that the characteristics we are controlling are somehow related
to the historical background of the province, determining its child care provision during
early 2000s. However, the cross-sectional nature of our data prevents, for instance, from
taking into account the long-lasting effect of temporary shock increasing child care coverage
around 2005. Hence, our results may still be biased by provincial time-varying components
that we cannot control for.
Concerning the individual components of the error terms, we should take into account
that they may include unobservables of both mothers and children (e.g. ability). Mother’s
ability is very likely to be correlated with education and employment decisions; moreover,
child’s ability can be correlated with his parental background, included in the model
18In this case, the base model turns to the so-called cluster dummy variables model, as defined in Cameron
and Trivedi (2005). Notice that in the base specification we use cluster-adjustments of the estimates of
the standard errors, with the number of clusters being equal to the number of provinces in the sample.
However, when standard errors are adjusted for clusters, the F-test for the joint null that all coefficients
(except the intercept) are equal to zero is able to test at most (M-1) restrictions, where M is the number
of clusters in the sample. If the number of parameters to be estimated (i.e., the number of restrictions for
the F-test) is higher than the number of clusters it is not possible to recover the F-statistics. This happens
when we estimate the cluster dummy variables model (with the province dummies plus all the regressors
used in the base specification) and we still adjust the estimates of the standard errors for clusters. Thus,
we present the results from the cluster dummy variables model without cluster-adjustment of the standard
errors.
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through mother’s and father’s education, Hip. Since the correlation between the individual
components of the error terms and the individual (parents’ and children’s) characteristics
in both equations is very likely to be different from zero, the coefficient estimates of these
variables are likely to be biased in both equations. Therefore, we cannot claim a causal
impact of any of the variables indicating parents’ and children’s observable characteristics.
Finally, we should discuss an additional issue we face in the available data, i.e., mea-
surement error. In fact, in conjunction with our sample of children attending second
grade in 2009-10 the most appropriate measure of child care coverage would be in 2003-
2004 (when the children in our sample were aged 0-2 years). However, data on public child
care coverage at provincial level are available only for 2005. The measure of child care cov-
erage that we observe is Npt∈(1,3) = Npt∈(0,2) + ξp, where Npt∈(1,3) is the available measure
for 2005, and ξp represents the growth in child care supply between 2003-04 (Npt∈(0,2))
and 2005. This measurement error, i.e. the difference between the observed child care
coverage in 2005 and the ”true” child care coverage in 2003-04, is part of the error term
in both equations. In order to get consistent estimates for child care impacts, we need to
assume measurement error as having zero mean and being uncorrelated with the observed
measure of child care. In other words, it implies that the difference in child care sup-
ply between 2003-04 and 2005 is uncorrelated with other unobservable characteristics, at
province level, which affect the outcomes of interest; similarly, if there has been a growth
in child care provision during this period, it has been uniform across Italian provinces.
Although detailed information on provincial child care supply in the period 2003-2005
is missing and, to the best of our knowledge, the only information for this period is at
national level, several institutional reports (ISTAT, 2011, Istituto Degli Innocenti, 2009)
confirm that child care growth has been very limited in these years. Thus, we may argue
that child care coverage in 2005 can be considered a good proxy for child care coverage
in 2003-04. To increase the confidence in our identification strategy and data, we test the
role of measurement error by replicating the analysis using INVALSI data for the school
year 2008-09. Children in this survey would have been aged 0-2 in the years 2002-03, so
that the measurement error would be much higher in this case.19
2.6. Data and Variables
We use individual data on children’s primary school outcomes in conjunction with
information regarding public child care coverage at the provincial level. Table 2.1 gives
the definition of each variable, together with the source of the information we use, while
table 2.2 provides some descriptive statistics.
Data on children’s cognitive outcomes are taken from the Italian Institute for the Eval-
uation of the Education System (INVALSI) for 2009-2010. Since the school year 2008-09,
INVALSI and its National Evaluation Service (SNV) provide the only ongoing national
survey of students’ educational achievements at primary school. These assessments mea-
sure the abilities of students in second, fifth and sixth grades (ISCED levels 1 and 2).20
19Using the notation applied before, the relationship between the observed measure of child care in 2005
(when children have between 2 and 4 years) and the true child care supply faced by children assessed in
s.y. 2008-09 can be summarized by Npt∈(2,4) = Npt∈(0,2) + Ξp with Ξp ≥ ξp.
20See Appendix 2.B for details on INVALSI data and on the design and implementation of INVALSI
assessment.
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Table 2.1
Definitions of variables
Variable’s description Source
OUTCOME VARIABLES
Mother’s working status Dummy equal to 1 if the mother works (2009-10) INVALSI SNV
Language test score Percentage of correct answers in Language test (2009-10) INVALSI SNV
Math test score Percentage of correct answers in Math test (2009-10) INVALSI SNV
CHILD CARE VARIABLES
Child care coverage Public child care slots over population 0-2 years by province (2005) (*100) CITTADINANZATTIVA
CONTROL VARIABLES (INDIVIDUAL LEVEL)
Male Dummy equal to 1 if male INVALSI SNV
Non-Italian Dummy equal to 1 if the child has not Italian citinzenship INVALSI SNV
Father tertiary education Dummy equal to 1 if the father has tertiary education INVALSI SNV
Mother tertiary education Dummy equal to 1 if the mother has tertiary education INVALSI SNV
Family information missing Dummy equal to 1 if the child has family information missing INVALSI SNV
Child information missing Dummy equal to 1 if the child has individual information missing INVALSI SNV
CONTROL VARIABLES (PROVINCE LEVEL)
GDP per capita Gross Domestic Product per capita (2008 Hundreds Euro) CAMERA DI COMMERCIO
Pre-Primary enrollment rate Percentage of children aged 3-5 enrolled at Pre-Primary School (2006-07) MIUR
Private Primary Schools Percentage of private primary schools over total schools (2008-09) INVALSI SNV
School size Average number of students in Second Grade (2009-10) INVALSI SNV
Graduates Percentage of graduates over all population (2001) CENSUS
Employment rate Public Services Percentage of employed in public services over total employment (2001) CENSUS
Employment rate Health-Social Services Percentage of employed in health/social services over total employment (2001) CENSUS
In addition to test scores, INVALSI provides information on the children’s and parents’
characteristics reported by the schools. Thus, the data include individual-level covariates
indicating gender, citizenship, parents’ working status and education. However, missing
information on family characteristics represents almost 25 percent of observations and
missing data on the children’s personal characteristics are almost 3 percent. Even though
missing data may not be systematically linked with our analysis, we do not drop obser-
vations without this information and we include as regressors dummy variables indicating
whether family or child information is missing.21
For our analysis, we rely on data concerning second grade students in the school year
2009-10. In this survey INVALSI assessed the overall population of students enrolled in
second grade and designed a sample of schools and students that performed the tests
under the supervision of an external inspector. Since several studies found evidence of
cheating behavior during the test in not sampled schools (Bertoni, Brunello, and Rocco,
2012, Ferrer-Esteban, 2012, Lucifora and Tonello, 2012), in order to improve the reliability
of the results, we focus our analysis only on sampled schools and students. Out of 462,960
observations in second grade, the final sample includes students in sampled schools that
took both the Language and Math tests, yielding a sample of 33,708 observations. In
the estimation of the mother’s work equation we keep only observations without family
information missing, ending up with 25,287 observations.
We consider three dependent variables. The first is a dummy equal to one if the child’s
mother works when the child is enrolled in second grade (aged 7 years, if regular in his
school path), and equal to zero otherwise. Some considerations should be done concerning
this timing and the fact that we observe mother’s work only when the child is enrolled
in second grade. Actually, we do not have information on mothers’ work history neither
on mothers’ employment status before and after childbirth. Due to the limitations and
the cross-sectional nature of our data, we can only interpret the parameter of interest in
equation (2.6), α3, as an average effect. Given the level of child care available, mothers
may behave (in terms of employment decisions after childbirth) in different ways. While
21In order to further analyze this point, we perform a probit regression using as dependent variable a
dummy variable indicating whether any family information is missing. Results are shown in Appendix
2.C, table 2.B.1.
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some of them would have interrupted employment after childbirth, regardless of child
care availability, others may have had the opportunity to go back to work even if child
care were not available. Only those ”at the margin” would have benefited from child
care availability, in the sense that the additional child care slot may have increased their
probability to continue working. Recent studies show that in Italy female employment is
a very ”persistent” phenomenon in women’s life cycle and that work interruption after
childbirth crucially affects women’s career and their future employment (Bratti et al.,
2005, Del Boca and Sauer, 2009). Thus, we may argue that child care availability might
play a role for women working before childbirth, because it may weaken the negative trend
of female employment after childbirth. Instead, child care might have no or very low effect
for women not working before childbirth. The coefficient for child care coverage represent
an average between these heterogeneous impacts. As we can see from table 2.2, almost 60
percent of children in the sample has the mother participating in the labor market.22
Table 2.2
Descriptive Statistics.
Mean SD Median Min Max
Outcome Variables
Mother’s working status 0.60 0.48 1 0 1
Language test score 62.20 22.96 65.38 3.84 100
Math test score 57.26 18.68 57.14 3.57 100
child care Variables
child care coverage 7.98 5.81 6.58 0.32 25.47
Control Variables
Male 0.51 0.50 1 0 1
Non-Italian 0.09 0.28 0 0 1
Father tertiary education 0.15 0.36 0 0 1
Mother tertiary education 0.18 0.39 0 0 1
Family information missing 0.25 0.43 0 0 1
Child information missing 0.03 0.17 0 0 1
GDP per capita 226.19 57.73 234.37 127.31 367.632
Pre-Primary enrollment rate 75.65 2.77 75.60 67.65 83.66
Private Primary Schools 22.31 20.03 17.95 0 100
School size 84.824 16.57 86.35 39.11 125.36
Graduates 7.85 1.87 7.68 4.41 12.92
Employment rate Public Services 5.27 1.13 5.12 3.26 8.21
Employment rate Health-Social Services 6.84 0.99 6.78 4.617 9.53
The other two dependent variables refer to children’s scholastic achievements. They
represent children’s scores in Language and Math tests provided by INVALSI. Since these
tests are composed by multiple-choices questions, the final test score is built as percentage
of correct answers over the total number of questions. As shown in Table 2.2, children
perform better in Language than in Math, being the average test score in Language 62.2,
while the average score in Math is only 57.3.
22This value is close to the average participation rate of mothers aged 25-54 with children in the age range
6-11, that is 61 per cent (Eurostat data referred to 2009).
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Child care coverage is defined as the percentage ratio between public child care slots
and the population aged 0-2 years, by province. The data refer to 2005 and are taken from
Cittadinanzattiva (Cittadinanzattiva, 2007), an independent organization that runs yearly
surveys to monitor supply of public services, such as child care. Specifically, Cittadinan-
zattiva gathers the information on the number of slots available for each municipality from
the Ministry of Interior and then reports the number of slots for each province (see Cit-
tadinanzattiva (2007) from page 14 on). The variable of interest has been defined dividing
the number of slots available in each province by the population aged 0-2 in the same
year and in each province; this information includes only public child care services, i.e.,
publicly provided services in publicly owned facilities (Cittadinanzattiva, 2007).23 This is
the only source of data on child care coverage in Italy with a sufficiently disaggregated
level of information (province level). 24
As we can see from table 2.2, public child care coverage is, on average, around 8, and
the median child care availability is equal to 6.6. Child care is also highly differentiated
across Italian provinces, ranging from values close to 0 in some Southern Italian areas to
more than 25 percent in some Northern Italian areas.
As stated in table 2.1, we use several control at individual level exploiting the infor-
mation gathered by INVALSI. Specifically, we control for child’s gender and citizenship,
mother’s and father’s education as well as for having some individual or family information
missing.25 As Table 2.2 shows, fifty percent of the children are male, and 8 percent of them
has not Italian citizenship.26 Finally, we do not have information on parents’ education
or mother occupation for 25 percent of the sample, while for 3 percent of children we lack
information on gender or citizenship.
Finally we use other variables at the province level to control for provinces’ charac-
teristics in the estimation. Specifically, we add information related to provincial resources
and expenditure for education, as well as variables related to specific labor market fea-
tures.27 As a general indicator for the wealth of the province, we include GDP per capita.
Instead, the enrollment rate of 3-5 years old children in pre-primary school during the
23In Italy there may be three types of child care provision: the first one refers to the cases where the public
entity (i.e, the municipality) is both the owner and the provider of the service; the second, instead, refers
to the cases where the municipality is the owner of the facility but outsources the provision of the service
to other private entities; finally, there may be some cases where the private sector is both the owner and
the provider of the service and does not receive any form of subsidies from the public sector. For this
analysis we use data concerning the first type of management. See appendix 2.A for additional details.
24The other official sources of information on child care coverage at aggregate level are ISTAT (Italian
National Statistical Institute) and Istituto Degli Innocenti (a public corporation charged by the Italian
Government to carry out analysis on childhood and adolescence starting from 1997). However, both of
them provide information only at regional level for the period relevant for this study, i.e., years 2002-2003.
Hence, data from Cittadinanzattiva remain the most suitable for our analysis.
25With child missing information we mean that child’s gender or citizenship is not available in the data;
instead, the variable family missing information is equal to one if mother’s or father’s employment or
education are missing.
26Children without Italian citizenship include both children born abroad and children born in Italy with
both parents of foreign origin. Italian law is based on the principle of jus sanguinis: children of foreign
parents are foreign citizens up to their 18th birthday, then they may apply for Italian citizenship. The
percentage of foreign children in the sample corresponds to the one of the entire population (MIUR, 2009).
27Data for GDP per capita by province are taken from Camera di Commercio, Statistical Service; data
on pre-primary enrollment rate are taken from Italian Ministry of Education (MIUR); the percentage
of private primary schools and the average school size per province have been provided by INVALSI,
Statistical Office; finally, the percentage of graduates over all population, the employment rate in public
services and the employment rate in health and social services are taken from CENSUS 2001 data.
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school year 2006-07, together with the percentage of private primary schools (over the
total number of schools),28 the average school size for each province 29 and the percentage
of graduates over the population reflect provincial characteristics related to the education
system and to the overall expenditure for all levels of education. However, the enrollment
rate of children in pre-primary school may serve also to test whether conciliation policies
for children aged 0-2 and 3-5 years may have different impacts on mother’s working sta-
tus. Last, in order to capture province’s features related to labor market opportunities
for women, we include some controls for the composition of labor demand (e.g., provincial
industrial structure). Specifically, as underlined in several studies referred to Italy and
confirmed also by our data,30 women are overrepresented in sectors like social services and
health and public sectors. Thus, we include as regressors the provincial employment rate
in public services and in health or social services.31 Notice that, apart the information
on the school characteristics on which the child is currently enrolled, constrained to the
availability of data, we include controls at provincial level referred to the year of childbirth
or before the period when the outcomes are measured.
Table 2.2, in the panel at the bottom, shows some descriptive statistics for these
variables at provincial level. GDP, on average, is equal to 226 hundreds of Euro, and
ranges from 12 to 36 hundreds of Euro. Pre-primary enrollment rate is, on average, 75
percent and, already by 2006-07, close to being universally used by children aged 3-5
years. This also confirms the strong differences existing in child care policies in Italy for
children aged 0-2 with respect to those for children aged 3-5. The average percentage of
private primary schools per province is slightly higher than 22 percent, while the average
school size in second grade is close to 84 students per school. Finally, the proportion of
the population having a degree is only 7.85 percent (with the maximum being only 12.92
percent), while the average employment rates in public services and health-social services
are, respectively, 5.27 and 6.82.
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 report the correlations between child care coverage and the out-
comes of interest at the regional level. Regions with higher child care coverage are char-
acterized by higher mothers’ employment rate and better results in Language test scores:
correlation coefficients between child care coverage and both mother’s working status and
average Language test score are positive and statistically significant, while they are not
statistically significant for Math.
28With private primary schools we refer to primary schools that are not public, but still recognized by
the National Education System and Ministry of Education. Note that all primary schools in Valle d’Aosta
(Aosta province) and Trentino Alto Adige (Trento and Bolzano provinces) are defined as private by the
Italian Ministry of Education and INVALSI because of a particular degree of accountability and autonomy
of schools located in these regions.
29In the baseline specification, we include the average number of students in second grade, by province,
and its square.
30In our INVALSI data we have information on the industrial sector of both mothers and fathers of children
enrolled in second grade, although we cannot know whether that occupation is in the private or in the
public sector. For instance, among those for which this information is available (not missing), 21 percent
of mothers works in the third sector against 14 percent of fathers.
31The public services sector includes all employed people in the following occupations: social and public
services, personal and domestic services and child care/family care workers, according to the International
Standard Classification of Occupation (88) on which the CENSUS 2001 classifications are based.
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Figure 2.2
Correlation between mother’s working status and child care coverage, by region.
Notes. Correlation coefficient: 0.6702; p-value: 0.0009. Own elaborations from INVALSI SNV 2009-10 and Cittad-
inanzattiva (2007).
Figure 2.3
Correlation between Language and Math test scores and child care coverage, by
region.
Notes. Correlation coefficients: for Language 0.4787 (p-value 0.0282); for Math 0.0301 (p-value 0.8969). Own
elaborations from INVALSI SNV 2009-10 and Cittadinanzattiva (2007).
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Table 2.3
Test of samples differences across equations. Mean characteristics of all sample
(a) with respect to the subsample used in Equation 1 (b).
(a) All sample (b) Sample in Eq. 1 t test (a=b)
Male 0.4925 0.4915 −0.26
(0.003) (0.003)
Non-Italian 0.0884 0.0687 −8.89***
(0.001) (0.001)
Mother education (tertiary) 0.1479 0.19 12.28***
(0.002) (0.002)
Father education (tertiary) 0.1214 0.15 11.12***
(0.002) (0.002)
Child care coverage 7.9841 7.8071 −3.66***
(0.032) (0.365)
GDP per-capita 226.19 225.92 −0.57
(0.314) (0.361)
Pre-primary enrollment rate 75.6474 75.5675 −3.49***
(0.015) (0.017)
Private primary schools 22.3145 21.983 −2.01***
(0.109) (0.124)
School Size 109.5074 109.9396 2.51*
(0.116) (0.1315)
Graduates 7.8498 7.7713 −5.09***
(0.0102) (0.0115)
Employment rate Public Services 5.2705 5.2277 −4.56***
(0.006) (0.007)
Employment rate Health-Social Services 6.8451 6.7987 −5.68***
(0.00) (0.00)
N 33708 25287
Notes: t-test for the null hypothesis of equal mean in the two samples (a-b). Standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
2.7. Results
In this section we discuss the results of the baseline estimation. When estimating the
first equation in which mother’s working status is the dependent variable, we only keep
observations without missing data on family characteristics, which reduces the sample to
25,287 observations. In table 2.3 we compare the mean characteristics in the different
samples used for the estimation. Since we find statistically significant differences in some
of the individual and province level variables, we also repeat the analysis for the test score
equations keeping the same number of observations used to estimate equation (2.6). The
results from this check and additional robustness analyses are presented in section 2.8.
Table 2.4 reports the results for all the dependent variables. For each variable, we use
two specifications: in the first we use GLS adding controls at provincial level, while the
second uses OLS further including province fixed effects.
Column (a) shows the result for mother’s work. The coefficients of child care coverage is
positive and statistically significant in both the specifications: an increase of 10 percentage
points in child care coverage increases the mother’s probability of working by 13 to 18
percentage points; this corresponds to an increase in the probability that the mother
works when the child is at primary school by 0.2 to 0.4 points of standard deviation.
As discussed in the previous section, mother’s working status is observed when the child
is enrolled in second grade. Even in provinces where child care 0-2 is scarce, a number
of mothers have had the opportunity to go back to work thanks to other forms of care
available when their children were 0-2 or when their children were enrolled in kindergarten
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Table 2.4
Estimates from the base model.
(a) Mother’s working status (b) Language test score (c) Math test score
GLS Prov.FE GLS Prov.FE GLS Prov.FE
Child care coverage 0.013∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗ 0.482∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.071
(0.002) (0.004) (0.069) (0.110) (0.055) (0.091)
Male −0.001 −0.001 −2.531∗∗∗ −2.517∗∗∗ 1.642∗∗∗ 1.652∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.252) (0.242) (0.254) (0.201)
Non-Italian −0.311∗∗∗ −0.315∗∗∗ −15.660∗∗∗ −15.714∗∗∗ −7.310∗∗∗ −7.317∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.012) (0.565) (0.430) (0.512) (0.357)
Father tertiary education 0.058∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 5.813∗∗∗ 5.828∗∗∗ 3.743∗∗∗ 3.757∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.008) (0.397) (0.419) (0.398) (0.348)
Mother tertiary education 0.258∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗ 7.338∗∗∗ 7.308∗∗∗ 4.707∗∗∗ 4.697∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.007) (0.385) (0.387) (0.335) (0.321)
GDP per capita 0.001∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.012∗ 0.024∗∗ 0.006 0.016∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.012) (0.006) (0.010)
Pre-primary enrollment rate 0.000 0.003 0.114 0.477∗∗∗ 0.055 0.466∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.003) (0.204) (0.111) (0.157) (0.093)
School Size 0.002 0.005 −0.081 0.197∗ −0.085 −0.175∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.086) (0.109) (0.079) (0.090)
School Size Squared −0.000 −0.000 0.000 −0.001∗∗ 0.000 0.001∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Private primary schools 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 0.010 −0.001 −0.000 −0.046∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.016) (0.029) (0.012) (0.024)
Graduates −0.012 −0.025 0.076 −0.438 0.004 −1.971∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.035) (0.394) (0.878) (0.357) (0.729)
Employment rate Public Services 0.015 −0.024 −0.546 −0.645 −0.655 0.369
(0.016) (0.022) (0.663) (0.686) (0.651) (0.570)
Employment rate Health-Social Services −0.011 −0.010 −0.750 −1.656 −0.077 0.698
(0.011) (0.017) (0.482) (1.023) (0.349) (0.850)
Child&Family Missing Info X X X X X X
Province Dummies X X X
N. Clusters 101 101 101
N.Observations 25287 25287 33708 33708 33708 33708
Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at province level for GLS
estimation and robust for heteroskedasticity in column (a).
or in primary school. So, this means that differences in mothers’employment rate across
provinces are mitigated by the fact that mothers are observed when children have access
to pre-primary and primary school, which are more homogeneously distributed. The fact
that we still find a positive impact of child care coverage on mother’s work, although
controlling for pre-primary enrollment rate and other labor market features, means that
care opportunities provided by child care services play a crucial role in helping mothers
to keep their job after childbirth. Thus, child care availability may weaken the negative
relationship between mother’s employment and fertility and decreases the likelihood of
work interruption after the birth of a child. As a confirmation of this point, it should be
noted that the coefficient for pre-primary enrollment rate is not statistically different from
zero.
Notice that our results are slightly higher than the ones previously found by Berlin-
ski and Galiani (2007) and Havnes and Mogstad (2011a). Berlinski and Galiani (2007)
evaluate the effects of a preschool policy in Argentina and find that one additional stock
in preschool availability yields an increase in mother’s employment rate by 7 percentage
points, while Havnes and Mogstad (2011a) estimate a percentage point increase in mater-
nal employment rate per percentage point increase in child care coverage equal to 0.011.
Our estimate of the percentage change in mother’s employment due to a percentage point
increase in child care coverage is equal to 0.013, while the impact of a new slot in exter-
nal child care (with respect to the average of 7.98) corresponds to 16 percentage points.
The difference may depend on the fact that we are considering child care for very young
children instead of preschool. In the Italian context, where mothers who leave the labor
market after childbirth do not have many opportunities to come back at work, a policy
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targeted toward very young children can be more effective than other policies for children
in the age range 3-5. Moreover, in Northern Europe countries, such as Norway, mothers
can rely on additional services to come back at work after childbirth, so that a policy
increasing preschool availability may not have an impact on mother’s employment.
Child’s gender is not significantly associated with mother’s working status, while im-
migrant status does matter: mothers of non-Italian children are less likely to work than
those of Italian children; the coefficient for being non-Italian is negative and significant.
Mothers’ working status, as expected, is strongly and significantly associated with her
education, confirming previous results in this strand of the literature, especially for Italy
(Del Boca et al., 2009). The same is true for father’s education: mothers married to
highly educated partners are more likely to work, indicating ”assortative mating” between
partners, even though the coefficient is lower than for mother’s education. Among other
controls at provincial level, GDP has a positive effect on mother’s employment status while
all other variables (with the only exception of private primary schools) do not influence
mother’s working status.
In columns (b) and (c) of table 2.4 we report the coefficients for Language and Math
test scores. Child care coverage affects positively Language test score, while its impact
on Math is not statistically different from zero. According to the results for Language
test score, a 10 percentage points increase in child care availability is associated with an
increase in Language test scores ranging from 1.9 to 4.8 points: the magnitude of this effect
implies that a percentage change in child care coverage yields an increase on the Language
test score by 0.8 to 2 percent of a standard deviation. This result is in line with the one
found by Felfe and Lalive (2010) (0.014 points of a standard deviation), but slightly lower
than the one reported by Berlinski et al. (2009) (0.24 points of a standard deviation) for a
preschool policy in Argentina.32 Moreover, we do not find any effect on Math test score.
This result may depend on the fact that cognitive skills used in the Language test may
benefit more from socialization and from other activities taken up at child care facilities;
instead, Math skills seem more linked to innate abilities and may benefit less from the
interactions with other children in the first years of life.
We find a positive and significant impact of both paternal and maternal education on
children’s test scores and that the coefficients are greater for Language than for Math, but
they do not differ between parents. As stated in section 2.5, however, we cannot claim a
causal impact for the coefficients of these variables. Non-Italian children perform worse
than their Italian peers and the test score gaps are higher for Language than for Math.
GDP is positively and significantly correlated with both Language and Math test scores.
The coefficients for school size and it square are statistically significant for both Language
and Math test scores only when province dummies are added to the specification. Pre-
primary enrollment rate is statistically significant for both fields when adding province
dummies, while the percentage of private primary schools and the percentage of graduates
are negatively correlated with the Math test score. Employment rate in public services
and the coefficient for employment rate in health and social services are never statistically
different from zero.
32This difference may be due to timing issues, since Berlinski et al. (2009) measure the effect of the policy
on children aged 4 to 5 years. In this study we are considering children aged 7 years, if regular in their
school path.
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For all the dependent variables, the average effects of a percentage change in child
care coverage in the GLS estimation are robust to the inclusion of province dummies.
Notice that for both maternal work and Language test score, the estimated coefficients
with province fixed effects are higher than the ones obtained from GLS, implying that
with GLS we are underestimating the true effects. While this pattern can be due to an
attenuation bias induced by measurement error, it may also provide evidence of a negative
correlation between provinces’ unobservables and the availability of public child care in
both equations. In other words, adding the province dummies to the estimation partially
solves the selection issue, for which richer and more developed provinces are also those
with the higher child care coverage. When we estimate the model using GLS, we do not
control for this selection and we find a lower child care effect. According to the theoretical
framework proposed in section 2.4, richer provinces can also provide higher child care
coverage because they are also characterized by richer demanders, on which they charge
an higher price. However, the effect of a percentage change in child care availability on
the outcomes of interests in these provinces is very likely to be low. Once this selection
is (partially) taken into account, we find that the average effect of a percentage change in
child care coverage increases: in this way, we are also taking into account the provinces
where child care coverage is lower and where the additional slot plays a role because it is
targeted toward people that may benefit more from it.
In section 2.9 we further investigate this issue, looking at non-linear child care effects
along the child care coverage distribution.
2.8. Robustness checks
The results that we have just presented are robust to several specification and sensitiv-
ity checks. Specifically, we test the robustness of the results on the following dimensions.
First, we test whether the characteristics of the municipality where the household re-
sides play a role for the child care effects within the same province. Then, we replicate
the estimation of the outcomes equations keeping only the sample used to estimate the
participation equation, in order to see whether missing data on family variables are sys-
tematically linked with our analysis. Third, we test the robustness of the results cutting
the extreme parts of the child care coverage distribution and decreasing the heterogeneity
in the sample. Finally, we test whether measurement error affects our results repeating
the analysis on the 2008-09 wave of INVALSI data.
Municipality characteristics
As stated in section 2.5, the estimates of the child care impacts presented in section
2.7 can be biased if child care is provided by the social planner responding to households
characteristics and preferences. We argue that since the child care policy is provided at
municipal level, using provincial level data we are equalizing over different municipalities
in the same provinces. However, to further check whether this correlation plays a role
in the results we replicate the analysis splitting the sample of children living in the main
municipality of each province from those living in rural areas and smaller municipalities.
The idea is that, although facing the same level of child care coverage, mothers and children
living in different municipalities may respond differently to child care for many reasons.
One is that households living in the main municipality of a province may be more willing to
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be dual-earners couples and more used to externalize child care activities. Another reason
instead may be that children living in the main municipality of a province may have also
better school at our disposal or other activities that allow them to be more prepared when
they start school. If these conditions are true, we control for these confounding factors
separating children living in the main municipality of a province from those living in the
rest of the province. Table 2.5 shows the results.
Table 2.5
Robustness check 1. Unobserved heterogeneity at municipal level. Baseline esti-
mation distinguishing between mothers and children living in big and small mu-
nicipalities.
BIG MUNICIPALITIES
(a) Mother’s work (b) Language test score (c) Math test score
GLS Prov.FE GLS Prov.FE GLS Prov.FE
Child care coverage 0.011∗∗∗ 0.005 0.278∗∗∗ 0.251 0.061 0.202
(0.003) (0.003) (0.100) (0.163) (0.089) (0.135)
Province Dummies X X X
N.Observations 8189 8189 11454 11454 11454 11454
SMALL MUNICIPALITIES
(a) Mother’s work (b) Language test score (c) Math test score
GLS Prov.FE GLS Prov.FE GLS Prov.FE
Child care coverage 0.015∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.163∗∗ 0.185 −0.003 −0.118
(0.002) (0.003) (0.072) (0.124) (0.065) (0.103)
Province Dummies X X X
N.Observations 17098 17098 22254 22254 22254 22254
Notes. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at province level
for GLS estimation and robust for heteroskedasticity in column (a). Controls: male, non-Italian, father tertiary
education and mother tertiary education, GDP, pre-primary enrollment rate, school size and its square, private
primary schools, percentage of graduates, employment rate in public services and employment rate in health-
social services. Big municipalities stem for capoluogo di provincia, while small municipalities indicate all other
municipalities in a province.
Table 2.6
Robustness check 2. Missing values. Score regressions excluding observations with
family information missing.
(a) Language test score (b) Math test score
GLS Prov.FE GLS Prov.FE
Child care coverage 0.177∗∗∗ 0.688∗∗∗ −0.040 0.070
(0.059) (0.201) (0.065) (0.168)
Province Dummies X X
N.Observations 25287 25287 25287 25287
Notes. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at province level for
GLS estimation. Controls: male, non-Italian, father tertiary education and mother tertiary education, GDP, pre-
primary enrollment rate, school size and its square, private primary schools, percentage of graduates, employment
rate in public services and employment rate in health-social services, dummies for having child or family information
missing.
Notice that the information on child care coverage is still at provincial level, so the
coefficients for the two groups still represent the effect of a percentage change in child care
coverage in the province. However, the information on whether the child lives in urban or
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rural areas allows to see whether some municipal characteristics can bias the estimates.
The results shown in table 2.5 confirms that this is not the case, since the coefficients for
the child care coverage variable are close to the ones presented in table 2.4, at least for
the specification without province dummies.
It is also interesting to note that the effects are quite different between big and small
municipalities among the dependent variables considered. In fact, we find that a percent-
age change in child care coverage yields a greater change in the probability that the mother
works for households living in rural areas, while the effect on Language is higher in the
main municipality of the province. This result may be due to the different priorities and
objectives that characterize the main municipality in a province with respect to the others
in the same province. Recalling the distinction in the access criteria, as defined in section
2.3, the difference in the results may depend on the fact that the main municipality of
the province may give priority to disadvantaged children, interpreting the service as an
educational one. Instead, the smaller municipalities in a province may be more likely to
interpret the service as a conciliating policy, giving priority to working mothers.
Missing data on family characteristics
As previously stated, we estimate the participation equation keeping only observations
without any family information missing, while we estimate the child cognitive outcomes
equations keeping all the sample. The sample size in the two equations turns out to be
very different.
Table 2.6 shows the results from the achievement equations keeping only the sample
used to estimate the participation equation, i.e. excluding observations with family in-
formation missing. The coefficients are very similar to the ones presented in section 2.4,
confirming that missing data are not systematically linked with our analysis and do not
bias our results. We only find a coefficient for child care coverage in the Language equation
that is slightly lower than the one presented in section 2.4.
Additional robustness checks
As stated in section 2.5, the coefficients estimates in our baseline specification represent
average effects, for which we average over individuals living in different provinces (i.e., with
different level of child care coverage) and over heterogeneous child care effects. In order to
decrease the heterogeneity of mothers and children in the sample we repeat the estimation
considering subsamples identified through the child care coverage distribution or other
individual characteristics of the child.
In table 2.7, panels (a), (b) and (c) we replicate the analysis excluding the extreme
part of the distribution of child care coverage. In panel (a) we drop provinces where child
care is lower than the 10th percentile (corresponding to 1.16 percent); in panel (b) we
drop all provinces in Emilia Romagna region (that is characterized by a very high child
care coverage with respect to the rest of Italy) and in panel (c) we drop provinces where
child care coverage is higher than the 90th percentile of the distribution (corresponding to
16 percent). Results are confirmed in all cases: only dropping Emilia Romagna the child
care impacts on mother’s working status and Language test score is slightly higher.
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In table 2.7, panel (d) we replicate the analysis keeping only students regular in their
school path, that should be aged 7 years.33 Also in this case, results do not differ from
the ones presented before.
Table 2.7
Robustness check 3. Sample heterogeneity in child care coverage and school per-
formances.
(a) Mother’s working status (b) Language test score (c) Math test score
GLS Prov.FE GLS Prov.FE GLS Prov.FE
Panel (a): Sample without provinces with child care coverage lower than 10th percentile
Child care coverage 0.011∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗ 0.483∗∗∗ 0.013 −0.069
(0.002) (0.004) (0.069) (0.109) (0.063) (0.089)
N.Observations 22141 22141 29723 29723 29723 29723
Panel (b): Sample without Emilia Romagna region
Child care coverage 0.014∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗ 0.463∗∗∗ 0.100 0.263∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.089) (0.118) (0.067) (0.098)
N.Observations 23417 23417 31346 31346 31346 31346
Panel (c): Sample without provinces with child care coverage higher than 90th percentile
Child care coverage 0.016∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗ 0.395∗∗ 0.086 0.248∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.094) (0.160) (0.070) (0.133)
N.Observations 22961 22961 30593 30593 30593 30593
Panel (d): Sample of regular students
Child care coverage 0.014∗∗∗ 0.007∗ 0.193∗∗∗ 0.480∗∗∗ −0.002 −0.037
(0.002) (0.004) (0.069) (0.112) (0.055) (0.093)
N.Observations 24001 24001 31953 31953 31953 31953
Notes. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at province level.
Controls: male, non-Italian, father tertiary education and mother tertiary education, GDP, pre-primary enrollment
rate, school size and its square, private primary schools, percentage of graduates, employment rate in public services
and employment rate in health-social services, dummies for having child or family information missing. The 25th
percentile of the child care coverage distribution corresponds to 4 percent, while the 90th percentile corresponds to
16 percent. Regular students are those regular in their school path.
Table 2.8
Robustness check for measurement error. Estimates using INVALSI 2008-09 data.
(a) Mother’s working status (b) Language test score (c) Math test score
GLS Prov.FE GLS Prov.FE GLS Prov.FE
Child care coverage 0.010∗∗∗ 0.005∗ 0.119∗∗ 0.283∗∗∗ −0.001 0.020
(0.002) (0.003) (0.051) (0.068) (0.053) (0.057)
Province Dummies X X X
N.Observations 27673 27673 43073 43073 43073 43073
Notes. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at province level
for GLS estimation and robust for heteroskedasticity in column (a). Controls: male, non-Italian, father tertiary
education and mother tertiary education, GDP, pre-primary enrollment rate, school size and its square, private
primary schools, percentage of graduates, employment rate in public services and employment rate in health-social
services, dummies for having child or family information missing.
Measurement error
The measure of child care coverage that we have at disposal does not exactly correspond
to the true child care availability faced by children enrolled in second grade in 2009-10.
In fact, the children in our sample would have been aged 0-2 years in 2003-04, one year
before the time to which the child care measure refers. This implies that the child care
33INVALSI data provide information on whether the child is regular in his school path or held back before
or enrolled in higher grade with respect to children with the same age.
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availability that we observe is measured with an error and may represent a lower bound
of the true child care coverage.
To test whether this discrepancy affects our estimates, we perform a test repeating the
estimation of the same model using data from the 2008-09 wave of INVALSI data. Also
in this case, we keep only schools and students that sit the test under the supervision of
an external inspector. The children in this survey are far from the measure of child care
coverage that we have at our disposal, so we expect an higher effect of measurement error
in this case.
The results from this test are presented in table 2.8, where we can see that the coeffi-
cients for all the dependent variables are slightly lower than the one found using 2009-10
data. However, while this pattern provides evidence of an attenuation bias induced by
measurement error, it seems that it does not affect significantly the estimates.34
2.9. Non-linearity in child care impacts
In order to test whether the reduced form effect of child care coverage differs across
the child care coverage distribution we repeat the baseline analysis using a non-linear
specification. Specifically, we estimate the following equations:
Lipt=7 = Ψ
′
iptβ0 + β1Npt∈(0,2) + β2N
2
pt∈(0,2) + νipt (2.8)
Eipt=7 = Ψ
′
iptγ0 + γ1Npt∈(0,2) + γ2N
2
pt∈(0,2) + φipt (2.9)
where Ψipt represents the vector of individual and provincial characteristics we controlled
for in the baseline estimation. We estimate the above equations using GLS and table 2.9
presents the results.
Notice that the relationship between child care coverage and both mother’s employ-
ment and Language test score has a concave form, being the coefficient for child care
coverage positive and the one for the non-linear term negative. This implies that the
effect of a percentage change in provincial child care coverage is higher when the avail-
ability of the service is scarce, i.e. the service is more rationed. For instance, when child
care coverage is only 5 percent, a percentage increase in the availability of the service in-
duces an increase in mother’s probability to work by 2 percentage points, while the effect
on Language corresponds to 0.42 points. Figure 2.4 further confirms this relationship,
showing that a child care coverage equal to 22.68 and 21.13 maximizes the proportion of
mothers working and the Language test scores, respectively. The figure does not plot the
relationship between child care coverage and Math score, because the coefficients for child
care coverage and its square are never statistically significant in the Math score regression.
The non-linear relationship between child care coverage and mother’s work and Lan-
guage score, respectively, implies that the average effect of a percentage change in child
care coverage where the coverage is very low, i.e., the service is more rationed, is greater
than in areas where child care is more available. This result is in line with the theoretical
framework proposed in section 2.4, predicting that when child care availability is low the
34The measure of child care coverage in 2005 represents the true child car faced by children born in 2004
and aged 0-2 in 2005-06. These children have been enrolled in second grade of primary school in school
year 2010-11. The INVALSI data referred to this cohort will be available soon, so that we will be able to
replicate the analysis without any mismatch in the timing of variables.
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Table 2.9
Non-linearity in child care impacts.
(a) Mother’s working status (b) Language test score (c) Math test score
Child care coverage 0.028∗∗∗ 0.438∗∗ 0.169
(0.006) (0.182) (0.158)
Child care coverage squared −0.001∗∗∗ −0.011 −0.008
(0.000) (0.008) (0.007)
N.Observations 25287 33708 33708
Notes. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at province level and
robust for heteroskedasticity in column (a).
Figure 2.4
Non-linear relationship between child care coverage and the outcomes.
Notes. This figure plots the fitted values of the following regressions: Lipt=7 = Ψ
′
iptβ0+β1Npt∈(0,2)+β2N
2
pt∈(0,2)+
νipt Eipt=7 = Ψ
′
iptγ0 + γ1Npt∈(0,2) + γ2N
2
pt∈(0,2) +φipt where Ψ is a vector including the following controls: male,
non-Italian, father tertiary education and mother tertiary education, GDP, pre-primary enrollment rate, school
size and its square, private primary schools, percentage of graduates, employment rate in public services and
employment rate in health-social services, dummies for having child or family information missing. N represents
child care coverage at the province level. The coefficients estimates for βi and γi, with i = 1, 2, are shown in table
2.9. c∗ represents the value of child care coverage for which the corresponding outcome is maximized. The child
care maximizing outcome is computed setting ∂y
∂child care
= 0, where y stems for mother’s employment status and
Language test score: c∗ = 22.678 for mother’s employment and c∗ = 21.1013 for Language score. L∗ = 0.5837 is
the proportion of women that works when the level of child care coverage c∗ is reached. E∗ = 62.3836 is the score
level reached when the level of child care coverage c∗ is reached.
local authority mostly uses eligibility requirements to allocate slots, targeting households
that may benefit more from it.
Notice that the level of child care coverage for which both the outcomes are maximized,
according to the estimates, is much lower than, for instance, the 33 percent target required
by the European Union. In order to understand this difference we should keep in mind
the different purposes of child care, i.e., custodial and educational. It seems reasonable
to think that this policy may have positive effects on the Language abilities of children
in a province up to a certain point. Moreover, the corresponding level that we find for
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mother’s employment may represent a lower bound of the effect on mother’s work, due
to the timing with which we observe this variable. In fact, should we have observed the
participation of mothers immediately after the implementation of the child care policy
(i.e., when the child is 3 or 4 years old), we might get a stronger effect, and, consequently,
an higher level of child care availability maximizing the outcome.
2.10. Conclusions
In this chapter we estimate the average effect of public child care coverage on mother’s
working status and children’s school performances at primary school. Using INVALSI
data for the school year 2009-10, in conjunction with data on child care coverage at
province level, we find a positive child care effect on mother’s working status as well as on
Language test scores. A percentage change in child care coverage yields an increase in the
probability that the mother works when the child is in second grade of 0.013, while the
effect on Language test score ranges from 1.9 to 4.8 points, corresponding to an average
change of 0.8 to 2 percent of a standard deviation. These results are robust to the inclusion
of province dummies and to a battery of specification checks.
In exploring the impacts of public child care, it is crucial to take into account the
social planner decision-making process. In our theoretical framework the municipalities’
decisions regarding the number of child care slots to supply depend on the budget con-
straint and preferences of the local government, and the social planner may use rationing
as a mean to maximize her objective function. Specifically, the social planner’s prefer-
ences drive her own choices on which type of households to target the service. When the
supply of public child care is lower, the social planner may further use access criteria to
give priorities to some households instead of others. In this case, the additional slot can
be targeted toward families and children who may benefit more from it. For this reason,
we expect the relationship between child care coverage and the outcomes to be non-linear
and the effects of a percentage change in public child care to be greater when child care
coverage is low.
In order to test this idea, we estimate a non-linear specification of the base model,
finding that the relationship between child care coverage and mother’s work and Language
test score is actually concave. When child care availability is low the effect of a percentage
change in child care on both mother’s working status and Language test score is stronger.
Moreover, we find a positive child care effect up to the point where child care availability
covers around 21 percent of the population aged 0-2. Notice that this value is lower than
the one proposed by the European Union of 33 percent. One plausible explanation for
this can be that child care may serve as a custodial tool to help mothers to stay in the
labor market, but also as an educational service investing in children’s human capital
accumulation. Thus, it is important to consider both these functions when estimating the
effects of public child care. It may be the case that child care can have a educational role
up to a certain point and then being just custodial, i.e. necessary for the mother to stay
in the labor market. We argue that having performed a similar analysis exploiting data
on mother’s working status when the child is younger (e.g., 4 years old), the child care
level maximizing the outcomes would have been higher. It is very likely that our estimate
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of the average effect of child care on mother’s employment after childbirth represents a
lower bound.
Despite the limitations of the data, this chapter provides new evidence on the impacts
of public child care for a country, such as Italy, characterized by very low female em-
ployment rate and poor performances of children at schools, accompanied by (low) public
intervention in policies for young children. We show that a percentage change in public
child care availability can have positive and significant effects on both maternal employ-
ment and cognitive outcomes, for all children and families exposed to that policy. This
result may represent an important message for the policy maker, in order to exploit more
the potential effects of child care policies.
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2.A. Institutional and historical background: the child care policy in Italy
Child care service in Italy has been publicly provided since 1971, when the O.N.M.I
organization, that had responsibility for childhood and motherhood assistance, was can-
celed out.35 The first law publicly regulating child care services is Law 6 December 1971,
N. 104436: this provision represented an initial attempt to implement public and free
child care services, stressing its “decentralized”nature. Still today, child care services are
managed at municipal level, while regions have the responsibility for defining criteria for
building, management and controls of child care structures. In terms of quality regula-
tion, it means that each region defines its own management criteria (in terms of opening
time, pupils/teacher ratio, space per child, etc.), but the municipalities can improve the
quality standards required at regional level and can decide to offer more strictly regulated
services.37
After this first intensive state intervention,38 Italian government has been almost un-
concerned about child care service regulation up to 1996. Moreover, according to the
division of legislative competences between regions and state, the central government has
only the power to determine the essential levels of child care performances and general
rules concerning child care services, without any power in terms of management and reg-
ulation. The lack of governance at national level has determined a strong differentiation
across Italian regions, that, even if already present in 1972, has been exacerbated in the
following years.
In order to increase child care availability and to respond to an higher child care
demand, Law N. 285/199739 established a “National Fund for Early Childhood and Ado-
lescence”, aimed to encourage the development of additional services for childhood, with
educational and recreational purposes. Actually, Law 285/1997 defined for the first time
the educational purpose of child care and allowed also the private and third sector to
provide services different from traditional day nursery.40 The entry of the private sector
has determined a differentiation on quality standards provided: private services rely on
standards decided at regional levels, while public services should respect quality standards
provided by each municipality. For this reason public child care in Italy is recognized as
being of a higher quality than the private one.
Starting from 2002, the importance of child care for future development of children
has been recognized, especially at national level. The Italian government and, later on,
35The O.N.M.I. (Opera Nazionale Maternita` Infanzia, in Italian) was founded in 1925 (Law N. 2277/1925
and T.U. N. 2316/1931). It was in charge to aid mothers and children during motherhood and infancy
and to help disadvantaged people, in particular giving medical assistance. This organization was canceled
out by Law N. 628/1975.
36“Five-year plan for the establishment of municipal child care services in collaboration with the State”,
published in G.U. 15 December 1971, n. 316.
37See Istituto Degli Innocenti (2006) for regional regulations of child care services before 2005, i.e., the
period considered in the analysis; see Istituto Degli Innocenti (2011a) for regional regulations of child care
services in 2010.
38Among other things, Law 1044/1971 provided special funds for regions and municipalities, in order to
build 3,800 child care structures in the period 1972-1976.
39Law 28 August 1997, N. 285: “Provisions for the promotion of rights and opportunities for early childhood
and adolescence”. Published in G.U. 5 September 1997, n. 207.
40These are the so-called additional services, that are characterized by shorter opening time or are more
diversified during the day, with different regulations concerning teachers’ training, teacher/pupils ratio and
space per child requirements (Istituto Degli Innocenti, 2002, 2009).
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the Italian Constitutional Court, recognized that the primary role for child care should
be to promote educational and socializing development of children aged less than 3 years
(Istituto Degli Innocenti, 2008). Budget Laws 2002 and 200341 provided special funds for
child care building and managing, both at municipal and at company levels. Anyway, these
laws have been defined partially unconstitutional by the Italian Constitutional Court, so
that each region decided autonomously legislation and regulation of child care services,
enhancing differences across Italy.42 Only in 2007, Italian Government has defined a three-
year plan43 for the development of an integrated child care system, with the aim of reaching
the Lisbon objectives defined by the European Union in 2002.
As shown in table 2.A.1, however, public child care availability is still very limited and
covers only a small fraction of children in the age-range 0-2. Moreover, the increase in
public child care availability during last years has been due more to an higher supply of day
nursery and day-care services, while the growth of the so-called additional services has been
very limited. The entry of the private sector did not favorite an equal distribution of child
care services across Italy. Instead, private child care structures widespread in different
ways across Italian regions and mostly where public child care was already available. In
other words, child care services continue to be developed where they are already present,
but not where they lack (Istituto Degli Innocenti, 2008). Figures 2.A.1 and 2.A.2 show the
absolute number of available slots (multiplied by 100) by type of management (public or
private). It should be noted that both day-nursery and additional services from the private
sector develop where public facilities are also more widespread. Moreover, it seems that
the participation of the private sector is higher in the provision of less-expensive additional
services, than in the provision of (more strictly regulated) day-nursery and center-based
facilities.
The 2007 plan has been renewed in 2010, providing additional resources to regions
for the implementation of additional child care policies. However, financial resources of
municipalities have dramatically decreased during last years, so that there has been a
growing use of outsourcing practices implying the contextual participation of the public
and the private sectors. Today, there may be several types of management and supply of
the service. Together with forms of supply completely public where the municipality has
the unique responsibility on management, personnels and quality standards, there may
be other forms where the municipality outsources part of the service to private entities or
buys some slots in private facilities. Summing up, it’s possible to identify the following
types of child care supply and management: (1) public supply of the service with direct
management of the municipality (the municipality is both the owner and the provider of
the service); (2) a mixed supply, where the municipality outsources parts of the service to
the private sector (the municipality can be the owner of the facility and outsources the
41Law 28 December 2001, N. 448, published in G.U. 29 December 2001, N. 301 and Law 27 December
2002, N. 289, published in G.U. 31 December 2002, N. 305.
42Judgments of Italian Constitutional Court 370/2003 and 320/2004. Budget Laws 2002 and 2003 have
been defined unconstitutional in their parts concerning the provision of funds from state to regions, aimed
to improve child care availability and to enhance existing child care supply; this state intervention vio-
lated the decentralized nature of child care services and the corresponding regional responsibility for their
management.
43Piano straordinario per lo sviluppo dei servizi socio-educativi per la prima infanzia, enacted with Budget
Law 2007 (Law 27 December 2006, n. 296) has provided state and local funds, for a total investment in
the period 2007-2009 of 727 million Euros (Governo Italiano, 2010).
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provision of some services, as cleaning services, or it can just buy some slots in private
structures; (3) private supply, where the private sector is the owner and the provider of
the service and does not receive any forms of subsidy from the state neither from the
municipality. As stated in section 2.6, the child care data used in this analysis refer to the
first type of management. At the time to which the analysis is referred (2002-2005), both
the second and the third types of supply were almost absent.
Table 2.A.1
Public child care coverage over population 0-2 years in Italy, several years. Source:
ISTAT (2011)
2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10
Nursery and Day-care centers 9.0 9.1 9.6 9.9 10.4 11.3
Additional services 2.4 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.3
All child care services 11.4 11.2 11.7 12.0 12.7 13.6
Figure 2.A.1
Slots in formal child care (per 100) by type of management (public or private),
2010. Own elaborations from Istituto Degli Innocenti (2011b).
2.B. The INVALSI data
The Italian Institute for the Evaluation of the Education System (INVALSI) have be-
gun a yearly survey of learning achievements both at primary and secondary schools in the
2008-09 school year. Starting from 2008-09, INVALSI and its National Evaluation Service
(Servizio Nazionale di Valutazione (SNV), in Italian) have assessed students’ competencies
in Language and Math in second, fifth and sixth grades (ISCED level 1 and 2).
For the first evaluation in 2008-09, INVALSI chose a random sample of primary schools
across all Italian regions and allowed not-sampled school to participate voluntarily to the
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Figure 2.A.2
Slots in additional services (per 100) by type of management (public or private),
2010. Own elaborations from Istituto Degli Innocenti (2011b).
evaluation. Of the 7,778 total primary schools in Italy, 1,121 were sampled while 4,263
decided to participate voluntarily. The compliance rate has been very high in the random
sample (about 95.36%), so that 1,069 schools, of 1,121 sampled, joined the analysis.
The 2009-10 evaluation has been the first imposed to the census of schools (7,700 pri-
mary schools and 5,895 secondary schools) and students. Among these schools, INVALSI
chose a random sample of classes and students that sit the test under the supervision
of an external inspector. Out of the 464 thousands students in second grade, 34,069 of
them belong to the sampled schools. The sample represents the 7.33 percent of the overall
student population in second grade.
In order to avoid potential biases due to the voluntary decision to participate to the
assessment (in the 2008-09 wave) or to the cheating behavior of students and teacher
during the test (in the 2009-10 wave), we consider in the analysis only sampled schools,
where tests have been conducted under the supervision of an external observer (INVALSI,
2009, 2011).
For second graders, INVALSI defines two assessment tools: a test for Language and a
test for Math. Each test is composed by a different number of items (i.e. questions), as
shown in the following table. The majority of items are multiple-choices questions.
2008-09 WAVE 2009-10 WAVE
Test Time Number of Items Time Number of Items
Language 30 minutes 34 35 minutes 26
Math 30 minutes 24 30 minutes 22
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The Language test includes questions on text comprehension, knowledge of Italian
grammar and sentence construction. The Math test include questions which evaluate stu-
dents’ knowledge of mathematical concepts, use of number patterns and their ability to
read graphs. These tests have been designed following the experience of the leading inter-
national assessments, as IEA-PIRLS and OCSE-PISA.44 For further details on INVALSI
assessment design see INVALSI (2009) and INVALSI (2011).
School administrations provide to INVALSI information on the children’s and parents’
background characteristics. The school staff is required to provide data on child’s gender,
birthplace and citizenship, together with information on parents’ birthplace, education
and occupation, as long as they are available from administrative records.
Table 2.B.1
Probit regression for missing values. Dependent variable: dummy for having any
family information missing.
Dep. Var. Having any family information missing
Male −0.0018
(0.0159)
Gender missing −0.3518∗∗∗
(0.0654)
Regular −0.0711
(0.0451)
Father born in Italy −0.2676∗∗∗
(0.0331)
Father birthplace missing 1.1288∗∗∗
(0.0507)
Mother born in Italy −0.2226∗∗∗
(0.0304)
Mother birthplace missing 0.2170∗∗∗
(0.0500)
North Italy 0.1074∗∗∗
(0.0184)
Central Italy 0.3441∗∗∗
(0.0209)
Constant −0.4647∗∗∗
(0.0492)
N.Observations 33708
Notes. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if information
on mother’s or father’s education or employment is missing. The reference categories are: female, not regular in the
school path, father born in abroad, mother born abroad and South Italy.
2.C. Analysis on missing values
As pointed out in Section 6, missing information are a crucial issue in INVALSI data
source, especially for data on households characteristics that are gathered by school staff.
This point is crucial for us, since one of our outcomes (mother’s working status) is taken
from these variables. In order to understand this point, it should be noted that school
44The programme IEA (International Association for the evaluation of Educational Achievemment) and
PIRLS (Progress in International Reading Literacy Study) provides international assessments of fourth
grade students in reading, while the programme OCSE-PISA (Programme for International Student As-
sessment) evaluates 15-years-old students across OECD countries in reading, sciences and Math compe-
tencies.
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personnels are responsible for providing personal child and family information to INVALSI
officers. When these data are not available on school records, school staff should survey
them directly from child’s parents. In our opinion, the existence of this mass of missing
data is due to the fact that school staff does not contact parents in order to gather missing
information.
In order to further analyze this issue and to see whether missing values are system-
atically linked with our analysis, we construct a dependent variable equal to 1 if any of
the parents’ education and work variables are missing and we perform a probit regression
using this dummy as dependent variable. Results are shown in table 2.B.1.
The coefficient estimates confirm our thought that the staff of several schools simply
do not gather any information on parents, when they are not available on administrative
records. In fact, children with missing information on citizenship, regularity and par-
ents’ birthplace are more likely to have missing information on parents’ education and
occupation, together with children whose father was born abroad. It should be noted,
however, that regional macro-area dummies are always significant and that children living
in the central and northern parts of Italy are more likely to lack information on parents’
education and occupation.
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CHAPTER 3
Mother or market care? A structural estimation of child
care impacts on child development
ABSTRACT - This chapter analyzes the effects of maternal employment and external
child care on child development, taking into account the additional choice the mother
makes between leisure and time with the child. I propose and estimate a behavioral model
where labor supply, external child care and leisure time allocation are endogenously cho-
sen by the mother and represent the inputs for the child cognitive development. The
model is estimated using U.S. data from the Child Development Supplement (CDS) of
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and the Time Diary (TD) component of the
CDS. Results show that a reduction in maternal time with the child induces a negative
effect on child’s ability, that is compensated for by the use of external child care for the
same amount of time. This implies that maternal employment is not detrimental for child
development. The estimated model is used to perform a counterfactual exercise, where
the mother spends all the time out of work with the child without having leisure: this
shows that previous literature has overestimated the productivity of maternal time and
the negative effect of maternal employment on child development.
JEL classification: D13, J13, J22.
Keywords: non-parental child care, mother time allocation, mother employment, child
development, structural estimation.
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3.1. Introduction
During the last decades, there has been a growing research on the determinants of child
cognitive achievement. Not only psychologists but also economists agree that one of the
most valuable inputs for child’s development is the time the child spends with the mother
(Cunha et al., 2006). Indeed, the increase in maternal employment rate and the use of
external forms of child care have raised concerns about the impacts that they may have
on child’s development. In the U.S., the participation rate of married women increased
from around 40 percent in the 1970s to more than 60 percent at the end of the 1990s.
Moreover, almost 65 percent of children aged 3-5 were enrolled in nursery schools before
kindergarten during the 1990s (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000). The majority of children of
employed mothers regularly spend time in some forms of non-school non-parental care, so
that the use of non-parental child care continues when the child reaches primary school
age (Blau and Currie, 2006).
The psychological literature argues that maternal employment and external child care
may determine insecure mother-child attachments, which are formed in the first years of
a child’s life (Varin, 2007). However, Brooks-Gunn, Han, and Waldfogel (2002) posit that
maternal employment may not necessarily have a negative effect on child development,
since employed mothers provide a more stimulating environment to their child than the
non-working ones do. The economic literature on these topics is large, but findings are
mixed and very few studies adopt a credible identification strategy. Moreover, a research
that evaluate the effects of maternal employment and non-parental child care taking into
account the actual time spent by the mother with the child is lacking.
The identification of the impacts of both maternal employment and external child
care on child’s development is hampered by three main sources of endogeneity. The first
is due to the selection of mothers into employment and external child care use, induced
by the correlation between mothers’ choices and their unobservable skills. For instance,
more skilled mothers may be more likely to work and to use external child care. If their
skills are transmitted to their child in a way that the researcher cannot control for, this
may overestimate the true effect of external child care. The second source of endogeneity
depends on the correlation between mother’s decisions and child’s ability that the mother
can (partially) observe, while the researcher does not. Finally, unobserved heterogeneity
of both mothers and children is more difficult to take into account due to the simultaneity
of these choices.
Most of the studies use Ordinary Least Square to evaluate the effect of maternal em-
ployment and external child care, but they are very likely to fail in taking into account
these sources of endogeneity. Other identification strategies that have been adopted in
the literature to account for these issues encompass Mother or Siblings fixed effects and
Instrumental Variables estimators. While the former allows to get rid of time invariant
unobserved heterogeneity of the mothers, the consistency of the latter relies on the as-
sumption that the mothers react to the instruments without taking into account child’s
ability.
An alternative approach that has not yet been extensively used in this literature is
structural estimation. This is the only strategy allowing to model different sources of
endogeneity and, most importantly, to describe the decision making process of the mother
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for more than one endogenous choice. Moreover, it provides parameters estimates from
theoretical model that can be used to simulate the effects of related policies.
Despite there being several studies in the child development literature using this ap-
proach, only Bernal (2008) applies this framework to the maternal employment and child
care case. Moreover, a study that estimates these impacts taking into account the actual
time spent by the mother with the child is lacking. In fact, both Bernal (2008) and all
other studies using a reduced-form approach assume a specific relationship between ma-
ternal employment time and the time the mother spends with the child (Keane, 2010).
More precisely, they estimate a cognitive ability production function with maternal em-
ployment as an input, arguing that the time the mother spends with the child can be
proxied by the total amount of time available to the mother net of the time she spends at
work. This definition of maternal time implies that the mother dedicates to the child all
the remaining time out of work and that she does not care about having leisure. The most
common finding of these studies is that maternal employment and external child care have
a substantially negative effect on child’s ability.
However, this assumption is very likely to fail if the mother decides how to allocate
the time out of work between leisure and care of the child. Moreover, the time allocation
may substantially differ across employment status, since non-working mothers have more
time out of work at disposal. For instance, Bianchi (2000) suggests that employed mothers
allocate their time in such a way to give priority to the time they spend with the child.
Hoffert and Sandberg (2001) show that there is not a one-to-one corresponding relationship
between the time the mother spends out of work and the time she actually spends with
the child.
In this chapter, I propose and estimate a behavioral model where the labor supply,
non-parental child care and time allocation choices of the mother are endogenous. The
model describes the mother’s decisions to work, to use external child care and to spend
time with the child starting from childbirth up to age 13. The model allows a direct esti-
mation of the impact of maternal time on child’s development, accounting for the fact that
the mother not only chooses how many hours to work and how much external child care
to use, but also how much time to devote to the child instead of having more leisure. The
mother’s utility maximization problem is subject to the mother’s time and budget con-
straints, as well as the child cognitive ability production function: the mother cares about
consumption, leisure and the child’s cognitive ability, while child’s ability is specified with
a value-added functional form and depends on the inputs received in the previous period.
The empirical specification of the model introduces several sources of heterogeneity: the
mother’s preference parameters depend on mother’s observable characteristics, while the
mother’s unobserved skills affect the taste for child’s ability, the participation to the labor
market, the demand for non-parental child care and the choice between leisure and time
with the child; finally, the child’s initial endowment, i.e., the child’s level of ability at
birth, depends on both mother’s and father’s education, capturing a non-zero correlation
between child’s skills and parents’ educational attainments.
The model is estimated using U.S. data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID) and the Child Development Supplement (CDS) conducted in 1997, 2002 and 2007.
The CDS provides retrospective information on all child care arrangements used since birth
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and widely-recognized measures of child’s cognitive outcomes; the Time Diary (TD) section
provides unique data on the amount of time the child spends with the mother. The main
PSID surveys give detailed information on mother’s work history and household income
during the child’s life cycle. The parameters of the model are estimated using a Simulated
Minimum Distance (SMD) estimator that minimizes the distance between several data
statistics and their model counterparts.
The main contribution of this study is to estimate the effect of maternal time and
external child care relaxing the assumption that mother time out of work is a good proxy
for maternal time with the child. In fact, differently from all existing studies using reduced-
form approaches and from Bernal (2008), this chapter takes into account the additional
(endogenous) choice of the mother between leisure time to spend alone and time to spend
with the child. Second, it represents the first attempt to estimate the elasticity of child’s
ability with respect to both maternal time and external child care time in a child cognitive
production function framework. To the best of my knowledge, there are not studies that
simultaneously evaluate the productivity of both inputs.1
The results show that more skilled mothers have higher preferences for child’s ability.
This implies that, even if they work more, they also make higher investments on their
child’s cognitive ability, either spending more time with the child or choosing more external
child care or both. The estimated parameters in the child’s cognitive ability production
function show that, for an equal amount of maternal time and external child care time,
the marginal productivity of maternal time is slightly lower than the one of external child
care. Hence, if the mother works, a reduction in child’s ability induced by a reduction
in maternal time can be fully compensated for if the child spends the same amount of
time in external child care. The model performs quite well in predicting the child’s score
distribution and the distribution of wage and income in the data.
In a counterfactual exercise, I re-estimate the model assuming leisure-minimizing pref-
erences of the mother: the mother does not care about leisure and spends all the time out
of work with the child. The results show that, in this case, a reduction in maternal time
due to mother’s work induces a reduction in child’s ability that is not compensated for
by the use of external child care. In other words, the final effect of mother’s employment
is clearly negative. Indeed, this result exactly replicates what has been mostly found be-
fore in the literature. Hence, previous studies, defining maternal time as a residual from
maternal working time, have overestimated maternal time productivity and the negative
effect of maternal employment.
The estimated model is used to simulate the (local) effects of policies improving the
economic conditions of the household or decreasing the price of the service. The results
show that policies aimed at boosting mothers employment may have controversial effects
on child’s development. Hence, the policy maker should take this into account when
implementing such interventions.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides a background of
the literature and presents some stylized facts in external child care use and maternal time
allocation. Section 3.3 presents the model that is estimated: subsection 3.3.1 defines the
1Recently Del Boca et al. (2012) and Hsin (2009) have exploited PSID-CDS data to assess the effects of
several time inputs on child development, one of them being maternal time. However, they do not consider
the productivity of external child care time.
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basic structure, while subsection 3.3.2 discusses how the model is solved and presents the
demand functions for all the choice variables. Section 3.4 presents the econometric speci-
fication of the model (subsection 3.4.1) and the empirical method used for the estimation
(subsection 3.4.2). Section 3.5 describes the data, while section 3.6 presents the results
and discusses the goodness of fit of the model (subsection 3.6.1). Section 3.7.2 presents
the results from the counterfactual exercises and section 3.8 concludes.
3.2. Background
The increase in female employment rate that has characterized all developed countries
has raised concerns for the impacts that maternal employment and external child care
may have on child development. This is one of the reasons why, in the last decades, many
studies try to assess the effects of these choices.
Starting with Becker and Tomes (1986), who first provide a framework for the implica-
tions of household decisions for children’s subsequent utility and earnings, there has been
a growing literature on the impacts of parental investments on children human capital
and development. However, the studies on maternal employment and external child care
present mixed findings. Several reduced-form studies find negative effects of maternal em-
ployment (Baydar and Brooks-Gunn, 1991, Belsky and Eggebeen, 1991, Chase-Lansdale
et al., 1989, Ruhm, 2004), while others find null effects (Chase-Lansdale et al., 2003,
James-Burdumy, 2005, Parcel and Menaghan, 1994). Also studies on non-parental child
care using reduced-form strategies provide ambiguous results. Bernal and Keane (2011)
report that one year of child care use decreases children’s cognitive outcomes, measured by
the PIAT and PPVT scores, by 2.13 percent. Currie and Thomas (1995, 1999), instead,
evaluate the impacts of the early childhood program Head Start and find that children
who attend the program get higher scores at PIAT reading and Math test. Similarly, Mag-
nuson et al. (2007) find positive effects of having attended pre-kindergarten on academic
achievement at kindergarten and primary school. The majority of studies just considers
the use of non-parental care, without taking into account the intensity of the treatment.
Just a few consider the impacts of the length of time spent in non-parental care. Loeb
et al. (2007) find that staying in center-based child care for more than 15 hours per week
increases reading and Math score by almost 8 and 7 percent of a standard deviation.
The identification of the effects of both mother’s employment and external child care
choices on child’s development is hampered by their correlation with both mother’s and
children’s skills, as well as by their simultaneity. While studies using OLS are very likely
to fail in taking into account these sources of endogeneity, there are studies using other
techniques to handle these issues. Currie and Thomas (1995, 1999) use Mother fixed effects
to control for time invariant unobserved heterogeneity of the mother, while Bernal and
Keane (2011) use an Instrumental Variables estimator to take into account the correlation
between the mother’s choices and the child’s ability. While the first strategy is robust to
the correlation of the mother’s decisions with mother’s skills that do not vary over time,
the second provides consistent estimates of the effects of interests only if it can be assumed
that the mother reacts to the instruments without taking into account child’s ability.
Structural estimation allows to account for the sources of endogeneity that may arise in
this context, modeling the mother’s decision making process for different choice variables.
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In this framework, each input is optimally chosen by the mother who maximizes her own
utility function, with child’s ability as an argument, and the child’s ability production
function is one of the constraints to this maximization problem. There are few studies
using structural estimation in the child development literature. The model presented
in this chapter builds on Del Boca et al. (2010), who estimate the impacts of parents’
time inputs on children’s development. They model household choices and investments in
child quality from childbirth up to the last developmental period, when the child reaches
adolescence. They define a dynamic discrete-time model where, in each period, both
parents decide how many hours to work, how much time to spend with the child and
the amount of expenditure on the child. In the definition of the choice variables, they
distinguish between active and passive time of the mother, i.e., if the mother is directly
involved in the child’s activities or she is just around without participating. They estimate
that the elasticity of child ability with respect to maternal active time ranges from 0.25
when the child is two years old to 0.05 when he reaches 15 years of age; indeed, they find
a very small elasticity for maternal passive time.
Mroz et al. (2010) specify and estimate a behavioral model of household migration
and maternal employment decisions in order to assess the effect of these choices on child’s
cognitive ability proxied by the PIAT Math score. In assessing the effects of maternal
employment on subsequent child outcome, they also consider the household migration
decisions, which can be induced by better labor market opportunities but also by better
school characteristics, which the parents may value for their child’s development. They
find that part-time employment of the mother reduces the child’s score by 3 percent of a
standard deviation while the mother’s full-time status reduces the score by 5 percent of a
standard deviation.
Bernal (2008) is the only study that evaluates the impact of maternal employment and
external child care attendance on subsequent child outcomes using a structural approach.2
She defines a single agent discrete-time multi-period model, where the mother decides
among different combinations of work and child care use. The choice variables are discrete
and the dichotomous variable for using child care is defined as being equal to one if the
child ever used (in each period) any form of non-parental care. Bernal’s main contribution
is to consider the impact of the work and child care choices in the first five years of life of
the child and to test whether the mother decides to work and to use external child care
after having observed the child’s initial ability endowment. Bernal (2008) finds that one
year in external child care reduces the child’s cognitive ability by 0.8 percent; however,
the impact of mother’s employment and external child care is even more detrimental, as
it decreases child’s outcome by 1.8 percent.
The substantially negative effects found in these studies (Bernal, 2008, Mroz et al.,
2010) may depend on the assumption they make concerning the relationship between
maternal time with the child and mother’s time at work. In fact, it is generally assumed a
one-to-one relationship between mother’s time out of work and maternal child care time.
Actually, this has implications for the effect that is estimated. Since this assumption
2Bernal and Keane (2010) propose a quasi-structural estimation: their identification strategy builds on a
model very similar to Bernal (2008), applicable to only one-child families, and they estimate it using a
sample of households with more than one child controlling for the number of children in the household.
It is quasi-structural in the sense that the estimation does not completely rely on the theoretical model
proposed.
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Figure 3.1
Non-parental child care time by mother’s employment status.
NOTES. The vertical axis represents the fitted values of the following regression:
childcarei = η0 + η1ti + η2di + i
where childcarei represents (weekly) hours of external child care, ti are child’s age fixed effects, di is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if the mother of child i works. η2 = 10.36 represents the difference in average child care use
(conditional on child’s age) between working and non-working mothers. Source: own elaboration from PSID-CDS
data (N = 3510).
implies that all the time the mother spends out of work represents an investment in the
child’s ability, and employed mothers spend less time at home, this turns out to estimate
a negative effect of mother’s work due to the reduction in maternal time. However, this
assumption may not hold if mothers decide how to allocate their time out of work between
leisure and time with the child. Neglecting this additional choice may lead to overestimate
the amount of time the mother spends with the child and, also, its productivity.
Even though data on mothers’ and children’s time use have become available only very
recently, there have been some studies suggesting that mothers do not differ only in terms
of participation decisions but also in terms of leisure time allocation. Leibowitz (1974,
1977) points out that more skilled and more educated mothers may also have a higher
propensity to stay with their child, even if working. Recent studies on mothers’ time
use confirm this point, since they do not find significant differences across employment
status in the amount of time mothers spend with their child (Bianchi, 2000, Hoffert and
Sandberg, 2001).
The absence of significant differences in maternal time with the child between working
and non-working mothers can be attributed to two main reasons. On the one hand,
during recent years, also non-working mothers have started using external child care,
so that children of non-working mothers may also not be always available for maternal
investments while attending external child care. For instance, Bianchi (2000) shows that
from the end of the 1960s to the end of the 1990s, the percentage of 3-5 children enrolled
in some forms of pre-primary educational programs increased from 7.9 to 51.7 for mothers
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Figure 3.2
Maternal child care time and leisure by mother’s employment status.
NOTES. The vertical axis in the graph on the left represents the fitted values of the following regression:
τi = η0 + η1ti + η2di + i
while the vertical axis in the graph on the right represents the fitted values of the following regression:
li = β0 + β1ti + β2di + εi
τ stems for (weekly) maternal time with the child and l represents leisure time, computed as l = TT − τ − h where
TT = 112 is the total time endowment and h represents weekly hours of work. ti are child’s age fixed effects and
di is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the mother of child i works. η2 = −8.32 represents the difference in average
maternal time (conditional on child’s age) between working and non-working mothers. β2 = −33.72 represents the
difference in average leisure time (conditional on child’s age) between working and non-working mothers. Source:
own elaboration from PSID-CDS data (N = 624).
in the labor force and from 4.8 to 44 percent for mothers not in the labor force. Blau and
Currie (2006) report that this trend is confirmed for school-age children, who regularly
spend time in some forms of after-school programs. On the other hand, working and non-
working mothers may allocate their time out of work differently, so that the actual time
that they spend with the child does not correspond to the time they spend out of work.
Descriptive evidence from the PSID-CDS data used in this chapter supports the ex-
istence of these patterns. Figure 3.1 shows that also non-working mothers use a positive
amount of external child care for their child. This may happen if, for instance, they value
the educational role of the service and choose it as an investment in their child’s human
capital. However, since the difference in average child care time between working and
non-working mothers is equal to 10.36, the graph also confirms that child care is needed
for its custodial purposes anytime the mother is working.
Figure 3.2 plots the fitted values of two regressions where the dependent variables are,
respectively, maternal time with the child and leisure time. The graph on the left confirms
that employed mothers allocate their time out of work in order to spend a positive amount
of time with their child. Conversely, non-working mothers do not spend all their time with
the child, but only around 30 hours per week when the child is very young and around 25
when the child grows up. The graph on the right shows the fitted values of a regression
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on child’s age fixed effects where the dependent variable is leisure time, computed as the
difference between the total time endowment and the sum between working time and time
with the child. Employed mothers spend a very low amount of time out of work in leisure,
while the corresponding level for non-working mothers is considerably higher. Notice that
while the difference in maternal time with the child between working and non-working
mothers is equal to 8 hours per week, the difference in leisure is equal to 33 hours per
week.
3.3. The model
This section describes the theoretical model on which the estimation is based. Sub-
section 3.3.1 presents the basic structure of the model, while subsection 3.3.2 derives the
demand functions for all the choice variables.
3.3.1. Basic structure. The model follows a standard framework from Becker and
Tomes (1986), where household preferences are described by a unitary utility function,
with child’s ability as an argument, and subject to a production function for child’s ability
plus budget and time constraints.3 The functional form assumptions are based on the
theoretical model developed in Del Boca et al. (2010).
As in Bernal (2008) and Del Boca et al. (2010), the model applies to intact households,
where both the mother and the father are present. Moreover, I consider only households
with one child and, following Bernal (2008), I assume that the mother is the unique de-
cision maker in the household concerning the work and external child care use decisions.
This assumption implies that father’s labor supply is exogenous with respect to child de-
velopment4 and that the father does not bargain with the mother concerning the external
child care choice. However, the model allows the father to affect child development in
two ways: the child’s ability endowment depends also on father’s education; father’s labor
income contributes to household earnings that are an input in the child cognitive pro-
duction function and influence mother’s choices concerning work, external child care and
time with the child. Finally, the simplification concerning the number of children allows
to avoid modeling the fertility decisions of parents and to make additional assumptions
on the different effects of investments on more siblings.5
The model is dynamic and evolves in discrete time. In each period, the mother decides
her own labor supply and time allocation, as well as the amount of external child care
to use. The choice variables are then: (i) ht, representing hours of work; (ii) it, hours of
external child care and (iii) τt, the time the mother spends with the child. The timing
is defined as follows: t = 0 represents the birth of the child and the mother makes all
the decisions (in a relevant way for the child’s development process) at each child’s age t
3As pointed out by Blau (1999b), the basic elements of any economic theory for the effect of an input on
child development ”are (i) a utility function that contains child outcomes as arguments; (ii) a production
function for the child outcomes with inputs including the time of family members and purchased goods
and services; (iii) budget and time constraints; and (iv) a specification of the information structure and
the formation of expectations.”
4Actually, this assumption mostly follows from the characteristics of the sample of intact households that
I see in the data. In fact, all fathers in the sample work and the average working time does not change
across child’s age or across mother’s participation decisions.
5As pointed out by Bernal (2008), ”In a model with multiple children, one would also have to specify how
total maternal contact time is allocated among children and take a stand on the extent to which maternal
time is a public good.”
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until the child reaches T years of age; t = 1 indicates the first 12 months of the child’s
life, t = 2 refers to the next 12 months of the child’s life, and so on and so forth; t = T
represents the terminal period of the model. One may interpret this terminal period as the
final of a specific developmental stage of the child, so that starting from this period both
the mother’s utility maximization problem and the child’s cognitive production function
change.6
The Mother’s Utility Function
Mother’s utility in each period is a function of her own leisure time (lt), i.e, the time
the mother spends alone without working, household consumption (ct), including father’s
and child’s consumption, and the child’s cognitive ability (At). I assume a Cobb-Douglas
form for preferences and I restrict the preferences parameters to be stable over time:
u(lt, ct, At) = α1lnlt + α2lnct + α3lnAt (3.1)
where
∑3
j=1 αj = 1 and αj > 0, j = 1, 2, 3.
The mother maximizes her utility subject to the budget and the time constraints.
The budget constraint takes into account household consumption and the total income
available in the family (from both parents’ labor supply and non labor income) and is
given by:
ct = wtht + It − pit (3.2)
where wt is mother’s hourly wage; It represents household earnings (including father’s
labor income and household non labor income); it represents the number of hours that the
mother uses non-parental child care and p is the hourly price of child care. The variable
it includes any kind of non-parental child care arrangement. Finally, the mother does
not make saving or borrowing decisions, hence household income defined by It can be
considered as exogenous with respect to all mother’s choices.
The time constraint takes into account both the leisure time the mother spends alone
and the time the mother devotes to the child:
TT = lt + ht + τt (3.3)
where TT is the mother’s total time endowment,7 ht is the number of hours the mother
works and τt is the number of hours the mother spends with the child. Notice that, in each
period, the mother can choose to spend her leisure time alone (lt) or to devote some time
to the child (τt): hence, the model allows the mother to further choose between leisure
and time with the child when she is not at work.
6T = 13. It may be interpreted as the final period of middle childhood before the child enters adolescence.
The definition of the terminal period theoretically implies that after T mother’s investments do not have
any impact on child development. According to table 3.E.1, controlling for the choice variables, the child’s
age at which the cognitive test score is maximized is equal to 11.92. As a robustness check, I repeat the
estimation of the model setting T = 12. Results are shown in appendix 3.E.1.
7TT = 112 hours per week: it assumes 16 hours per day, that the mother should allocate between working,
leisure and time with the child (see, for instance, Del Boca and Flinn (2012)). All choice variables are
defined on a weekly basis.
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The Child’s Cognitive Ability Production Function
The child’s cognitive ability production function (hereafter CAPF) is defined using a
value-added specification and taking a Cobb-Douglas form:
lnAt+1 = δ1tlnτt + δ2tlnit + δ3tlnIt + δ4tlnAt (3.4)
where At+1 is the outcome for a child at time t + 1, τt and it are the inputs decided by
the mother in each period t; It represents the income of the household, as already defined,
and At is the level of child ability at period t. Since current ability influences future
child’s ability, equation (3.4) shows that inputs operate with a lag: development takes
time. Moreover, the structure of equation (3.4) implies that when deciding the inputs on
child development, the mother knows the productivity of each of them and the level of
child’s ability in the previous period.8
Despite posing some limitations on the substitution pattern across inputs due to the
assumed functional form, the model allows the parameters in (3.4) to vary across child’s
ages in order to capture the fact that marginal productivity of inputs varies over the stages
of child development (Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach, 2010, Heckman, 2007).
Mother’s work is not explicitly included in the CAPF, because it may not have a
direct impact on child development per se. Mother’s employment may indirectly affect
child development through the change in the mother’s time allocation, together with the
use of non-parental child care. The child care input includes all contributions to child
development due to the alternative care providers’ time and may be more or less productive
than mother’s own time. This specification allows to test whether, in each period, maternal
time is more productive than external child care time. If this is the case, then, for any
period and for an equal amount of maternal time and child care time used, δ1t ≥ δ2t.9
While the amount of non-parental child care can represent a measure of the services
bought for the child, the household income in (3.4) proxies the expenditure in goods for
the child (Todd and Wolpin, 2003). The use of It as a proxy for the goods bought for
the child relies on two assumptions: (i) a constant proportion of income is devoted to
buy goods effective for child development and (ii) this proportion is not affected by the
mother’s labor supply decisions.10 Furthermore, income can have a direct impact per se
as long as it captures the economic conditions where the household resides (Blau, 1999b,
Levy and Duncan, 2012).
8This implies that the estimated parameters in the CAPF are robust to the mother deciding her investments
after having observed the child’s level of ability. As pointed out by Keane (2010), ”assumptions on
what the mother knows are essential if the econometrician is to solve the mother’s dynamic optimization
problem”. While assuming that the mother knows more about the child’s ability production function than
the econometrician does can be reasonable, it may be unrealistic to assume that the mother has complete
information. However, the mother can learn about the productivity of each input and the child’s ability
after some realizations. This chapter does not model this learning mechanism, simplifying to the mother’s
complete information case. See Fogli and Veldkamp (2011) or Fernandez (2007) for a model where the
mother is uncertain about the effect of her employment on child’s development and chooses her labor
market participation according to the available information set.
9For any period t, the marginal productivity of maternal time is given by MPτt =
δ1t
τt
, while the marginal
productivity of external child care is MPit =
δ2t
it
. For τt = it, MPτt ≥ MPit if δ1t ≥ δ2t; viceversa,
MPτt ≤MPit if δ1t ≤ δ2t.
10The model implies that the additional labor income the mother gets from her labor supply is spent in
external child care.
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Concerning the amount of external child care used by the child, the model does not
distinguish between different kinds of service (for instance, formal vs. informal arrange-
ments). Hence, it is assuming that all types of care have the same impact on child devel-
opment and that the mother’s decision making process for the two types of care is similar.
The same homogeneity is then reflected in the price of external child care. The model
predicts a strictly positive price of the service, regardless of its nature. This implies that
also services with a potentially zero price in the market are characterized by a shadow
price, representing, for instance, the limited availability of informal care or the value of
the unpaid care provider’s time in alternative activities (Blau and Currie, 2006, Ribar,
1992).
The CAPF defined in (3.4) provides consistent estimates of the productivity parame-
ters for each input if the following conditions hold: (i) At is a sufficient statistics for the
inputs history received by the child in the previous periods; (ii) the child’s initial endow-
ment (that the mother observes but the researcher does not) is only reflected in the level
of ability in the first period and does not affect subsequent ability (Todd and Wolpin,
2003).
Maximization Problem
In each period, the mother receives a wage offer. The wage offer is assumed to be
exogenously determined in each period and to be uncorrelated with labor supply and
wages in the previous periods.11
Given the wage offer and the level of child cognitive ability in each period, the mother
maximizes her expected life time utility, optimally choosing her labor supply, the child
care input and the number of hours to devote to the child.
The value function for the mother at period t is given by:
Vt(St) = maxht,it,τt u(lt, ct, At) + βEtVt+1(St+1) (3.5)
s.t. ct = wtht + It − pit
TT = lt + ht + τt
lnAt+1 = δ1tlnτt + δ2tlnit + δ3tlnIt + δ4tlnAt
where β ∈ [0, 1] and St = {At, wt} represents the vector of state variables. The child’s
cognitive ability represents an endogenous state variable, while the wage offer the mother
receives in each period is exogenous with respect to the maximization problem but differs
for each mother in each period. The initial condition of the problem is given by the value
of the state variables in the first period.12
11The structure of this wage offer will be defined in subsection 3.4.1. The fact that the wage process
is exogenous with respect to the mother’s working decisions in any period implies that the offer the
mother receives in period t is not affected by her working decisions in t − 1 and that it does not reflect
any depreciation in mother’s productivity due to the absence from the labor market after childbirth. If
the wage process were defined so to depend on previous labor supply choices, the model would become
intractable and could not be estimated using continuous choice variables and closed form solutions. Notice
that the use of continuous choice variables is necessary to allow for three choices and to take into account
the additional choice between leisure and time with the child, that is the main contribution of this work.
12The timing of the model implies that after childbirth and during the first 12 months of child’s life the
mother observes the initial level of child’s ability and receives a wage offer; then she makes her decisions.
Similarly, in the following periods, the mother chooses ht, it and τt after having observed the corresponding
level of At and after having received the wage offer from the labor market. The structure of the initial
condition for child’s ability will be defined in subsection 3.4.1.
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3.3.2. Terminal period value function and solution of the model. The prob-
lem defined by equation (3.5) can be re-written as:
Max{ht,it,τt}
∞
t=0
∞∑
t=0
βtu(lt, ct, At) (3.6)
s.t. St = {At, wt} ∈ Ωt
where Ωt represents the state space in each period t. The solutions to this maximization
problem involves three sequences of values.
The mother makes work, child care and time allocation decisions (that are relevant
for the child development process described by equation (3.4)) in the first T years of the
child’s life. After period T , both the mother’s optimization problem and the child’s ability
production function change: the mother may continue to optimally choose labor supply
and consumption, but she will not longer consider maternal and external child care choices.
The terminal level of child’s cognitive ability is AT+1, i.e., the level of ability reached
in T + 1, that will not be affected by subsequent mother’s decisions. Thus, At = AT+1 for
any period t = T +1, T +2, . . . ,∞. This level of ability may be interpreted as the starting
point for future child’s development during adolescence, from T + 1 on.
The period T+1 maximization problem for an infinitely-lived household may be written
as:
VT+1 = V˜T+1 +
+∞∑
κ=0
βκα3lnAT+1 (3.7)
where
V˜T+1 = maxhT+1 α1lnlT+1 + α2lncT+1 + βET+1V˜T+2(lT+2, cT+2)
and
∑+∞
κ=0 β
κ = ρ represents the value given by the mother to child’s ability in the last
developmental period.13 Equation (3.7) represents the terminal period value function14
and implies that the mother’s maximization problem after period T does not depend on t
and on the choices made in the previous period. Starting from period T + 1, the mother
decides only how much to work and, in each period, this choice affects only her current
utility, without affecting the utility and decision-making process in the following periods.
The model is solved by backward induction and yields closed-form solutions for all the
choice variables. The solution of the model involves the computation of the value function
starting from the terminal period and the corresponding optimal solutions in each period.
Following a two-stage process, I first derive the optimal solutions for external child care
(it) and maternal time (τt), conditional on ht, and then I compute the solutions for the
mother’s labor supply ht. Analytical derivations of the results are in appendix 3.A.
The demands for child care and time with the child, conditional on mother’s labor
supply, in each period, are given by:
ict =
βδ2tDt+1
p(α2 + βδ2tDt+1)
(wtht + It) (3.8)
τ ct =
βδ1tDt+1
(α1 + βδ1tDt+1)
(TT − ht) (3.9)
13In the estimation, the discount factor is set at β = 0.95. In order to increase the flexibility of the model
and to allow the discount factor of the mother to differ in the last period of investments with respect to
the previous ones, the parameter ρ is estimated.
14The terminal period value function is similar to the one assumed in Del Boca et al. (2010).
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where Dt+1 =
∂Vt+1
∂lnAt+1
represents the marginal utility the mother gets from child’s future
cognitive ability, in each period. The sequence of marginal utilities from period T + 1 to
period 1 is given by:15
DT+1 = ρα3
DT = α3 + βδ4TDT+1
DT−1 = α3 + βδ4T−1DT
...
Dt = α3 + βδ4tDt+1
...
D2 = α3 + βδ42D3
D1 = α3 + βδ41D2
(3.10)
An implication of the Cobb-Douglas specification used in the mother’s utility function
and in the child cognitive ability production function is that any input should be strictly
positive.16 However, I do allow the possibility of corner solutions for the mother’s labor
supply decisions.
The mother’s latent labor supply, conditional on ict and τ
c
t , is given by:
hct =
α2(TT − τ ct )
α1 + α2
− α1(It − pi
c
t)
wt(α1 + α2)
(3.11)
Substituting (3.8) and (3.9) in equation (3.11), the latent labor supply becomes:
h∗t =
TT (α2 + βδ2tDt+1)
(α1 + βδ1tDt+1 + α2 + βδ2tDt+1)
− It(α1 + βδ1tDt+1)
wt(α1 + βδ1tDt+1 + α2 + βδ2tDt+1)
(3.12)
The actual labor supply in each period is determined according to the following rule:
ht =
{
h∗t if h∗t > 0
0 if h∗t ≤ 0
According to equation (3.12), the mother’s latent labor supply is negative or zero only
if household income is strictly positive and sufficiently high. The reservation wage of the
mother, i.e. the wage offer for which the mother is indifferent between working and not
working, is given by the following expression:17
w∗t =
It
TT
(α1 + βδ1tDt+1)
(α2 + βδ2tDt+1)
(3.13)
Notice that the reservation wage of the mother is a function of both the preference param-
eters in the utility function and the productivity parameters in the child cognitive ability
production function. The mother’s reservation wage is higher if the mother cares more
about leisure or if the coefficient for mother’s time in the CAPF is higher (
∂w∗t
∂α1
> 0 and
15The same expressions can be derived computing Dt+1 =
∂Vt+1
∂At+1
instead of Dt+1 =
∂Vt+1
∂lnAt+1
(See appendix
3.A, footnote 35). Notice that the marginal utility in T + 1 is discounted for all the subsequent periods in
which child’s ability does not depend on mother’s investments decisions.
16Concerning the child cognitive ability production function, if any factor is set at zero, the child ability
is zero in all subsequent periods (since if At−1 = 0, then for any t, At = 0) and the mother’s utility will
approach −∞ as A→ 0, even if α3 > 0 (Del Boca et al., 2010).
17This expression is derived making h∗t = 0 and solving for wt.
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∂w∗t
∂δ1t
> 0); instead, the reservation wage decreases if the mother cares more about con-
sumption or if the coefficient for non-parental child care in the CAPF is higher (
∂w∗t
∂α2
< 0
and
∂w∗t
∂δ2t
< 0).
Substituting (3.12) into (3.8) and (3.9) yields the unconditional demands for child care
and time with the child:
i∗t =
βδ2tDt+1
p(α2 + βδ2tDt+1)
It
[
1− (α1 + βδ1tDt+1)
α1 + βδ1tDt+1 + α2 + βδ2tDt+1
]
+ (3.14)
+
(
wt
p
)
TTβδ2tDt+1
α1 + βδ1tDt+1 + α2 + βδ2tDt+1
τ∗t =
[
TT − TT (α2 + βδ2tDt+1)
α1 + βδ1tDt+1 + α2 + βδ2tDt+1
+
(
It
wt
)
(α1 + βδ1tDt+1)
(α1 + βδ1tDt+1 + α2 + βδ2tDt+1)
]
×
(3.15)
× βδ1tDt+1
(α1 + βδ1tDt+1)
Notice from equation (3.14) that demand for child care can be driven by necessity of
custodial care, i.e., if the mother is working and needs someone looking after the child,
or by valuing the educational role of the service. In fact, non-working mothers (for which
ht = 0) can demand of it if they value child’s ability and they think child care can represent
an input for child’s development, as long as household income is strictly positive. The
data generating process (DGP) defined by the model always predicts a positive amount of
external child care, regardless of mother’s working status. Instead, equation (3.15) shows
that the demand for time with the child is decreasing in wage, that is the opportunity cost
of maternal time in the labor market (
∂τ∗t
∂wt
< 0).
3.4. Econometric strategy
Structural estimation involves assumptions on how observed and unobserved hetero-
geneity enters the model described in the previous section. Section 3.4.1 presents the
empirical specification used to take the model to the data, taking into account the avail-
able information at my disposal. Subsection 3.4.2 describes the econometric method used
to estimate the model parameters. Further details on the empirical analysis performed to
estimate the model are in appendix 3.B.
3.4.1. Empirical specification. Unobserved and observed heterogeneity enters any
stage of the decision-making process of the mother described in the previous section.
Consider first the utility function, where the parameters represent the tastes of the
mother for leisure, consumption and child’s ability. I allow observed and unobserved
heterogeneity in preferences, defining these parameters as functions of some observed and
unobserved characteristics. Specifically,
α1 = f1(MotherEdu,MotherRace, γ1,Γ2,Γ3, µ0)
α2 = f2(MotherEdu,MotherRace, γ1,Γ2,Γ3, µ0)
α3 = f3(MotherEdu,MotherRace, γ1,Γ2,Γ3, µ0)
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where γ1 = 0, Γ2 = (γ2 MotherEdu, γ2 MotherRace) and Γ3 = (γ3 MotherEdu, γ3 MotherRace) are
vector of parameters representing the contribution of each observable characteristic to the
corresponding preference parameter. The functional forms for f1, f2, f3 are specified in
appendix 3.B.1. µ0 represents mother’s skills, that are assumed to be distributed with a
multinomial density and to take on two values representing two types of mothers: µ0high
represents the high-skilled type, while µ0low is the low-skilled type. The values µ0high, µ0low
and the probability that the mother belongs to each type (pimh and piml = 1 − pimh) are
parameters to be estimated.18 This specification allows the parameters in the mother’s
utility function to vary across subgroups in the sample19. Notice that observationally
equivalent mothers can still have different preferences according to their skills.
As stated in section 3.3, in each period, the mother receives a wage offer and decides
whether to enter in the labor market comparing the value of this offer with her reservation
wage. The offer the mother receives is described by the following wage equation:
ln(wt) = µt + t (3.16)
where
t
iid∼ N(0, σ2 )
is assumed to be uncorrelated over time and represents a transitory shock on wage that
the mother can observe. The term µt is the mean of the log wage draws of the mother at
time t and it is defined as follows:
µt = µ0 + µ1educ+ µ2aget + µ3age
2
t + µ4race (3.17)
where µ0 represents mother’s skills, as already defined. Equation (3.17) states that the offer
the mother receives from the market depends on her skills, her education and experience
(captured by the age component and its square), but also on her race.
As for the wage process, also the income process is exogenous with respect to the
mother’s inputs decisions in each period. The evolution of the household income reflects
the following structure:
It
iid∼ N(µinc, σ2inc) (3.18)
where µinc, σinc are parameters to be estimated.
Concerning the child’s cognitive ability production function, as stated in section 3.3.1,
the parameters can vary across child’s age. In order to respect the parameterization
implied by the Cobb-Douglas functional form, the coefficients in equation (3.4) must be
strictly positive; thus, they are defined as follows:
δi = exp(ξit) (3.19)
where i = 1, 2, 3, 4 and t represents the age of the child.20
18See appendix 3.B.1 for the specification of the parameters in the utility function and for the mother’s
type proportions.
19Each group is defined by the combination of mother’s years of education and race. Mother’s years of
education range from 2 to 17, while race is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the mother is white.
20Allowing the parameters to vary across child’s age partially compensates for the lack of substitutability
implied by the Cobb-Douglas functional form used to define the CAPF. Moreover, it allows to capture the
(potentially) decreasing productivities of the inputs considered in (3.4): when the child reaches primary
school age, other (unobserved) school inputs can contribute to his own cognitive development and family
investments have lower influence.
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In order to estimate the model and to take into account the dynamic optimization
problem faced by the mother, one needs to know the starting level of ability, i.e., the child’s
cognitive ability the mother observes in the first period before making her investments
decisions. The initial ability endowment is assumed to be specified as follows:
A1 = exp(ψck + η1MotherEdu+ η2FatherEdu) (3.20)
where ψck represents child’s skills, that are distributed with a multinomial density:
f(ψck) = Pk
with Pk ≥ 0 and
∑
k Pk = 1. ψc can take on two values (k = h, l), representing high
and low skilled children. As for the mother’s types, the values ψch and ψcl should be
estimated, together with their corresponding probabilities pick k = h, l. The inclusion of
mother’s and father’s education allows to capture a non-zero correlation between these
observable characteristics and child’s skills. Moreover, as suggested by Bernal and Keane
(2010), using as much observables as possible in the definition of (3.20) should reduce the
sensitivity of the results to the distributional assumptions on the unobserved heterogeneity
term.21
Finally, it should be described how the true child’s cognitive ability is related to the
measure of that given by the test scores. Existing studies using a structural approach
(Bernal, 2008, Bernal and Keane, 2010) define the test score measure as a continuous
variable and identify a linear relationship between this variable and the child’s cognitive
ability, including a disturbance term. This notation interprets the test scores as a proxy
for the true child’s ability, but it does not take into account the fact that these measures
represent just the number of questions answered correctly by the child. Following the
approach suggested by Del Boca et al. (2010) and based on classical test theory (Novick,
1966), I define the probability that the child answers correctly to each item as a function
of the true child’s ability:
piscore =
exp(At + vt)
1 + exp(At + vt)
(3.21)
where vt
iid∼ N(0, σ2v) represents measurement error capturing the fact that test scores
depict true child’s ability with a noise. The structure of (3.21) ensures this represents a
value between zero and one. The test score measure is then defined as follows:
St = piscore ∗ Jt (3.22)
where Jt is the maximum number of items answered correctly at each child’s age.
22
Summing up, the empirical specification of the model allows the mother’s preference
parameters to depend on mother’s observable characteristics and unobserved ability, while
mothers with higher skills receive, on average, higher wage offer, are more likely to work
21Due to the structure of the available data, the identification of more parameters in the child’s initial
endowment is hampered by the scarcity of test score observations for each child. In fact, at most, I
can observe 2 test score measures for each child and the test score measure is available only for children
aged more than 4. In appendix 3.E.4 I report the results of a robustness check where the child’s initial
endowment depends also on birth weight but all children are assumed to have the same level of skills.
22The score measure used in the empirical analysis is the Letter Word test. To define the thresholds
Jt I use the overall PSID-CDS data (3243 observations) and I identify the maximum number of items
answered correctly at each age: in the age range 4-5 J = 30, in the age-range 6-8 J = 50 and finally, for
t = 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 J = 57.
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and to use more external child care. Moreover, observationally equivalent mothers can
receive different wage offers over time because of the transitory shock on wage that the
mother can observe but the researcher does not. Finally, the definition of the child’s initial
endowment as a function of parents’ education captures a non-zero correlation between
parents’ cognitive abilities and child’s skills.
3.4.2. Estimation method. The model parameters are estimated using a Simulated
Minimum Distance (SMD) estimator that minimizes the distance between a large number
of data statistics and their model counterparts. The statistics used to construct the
moment functions are summarized in table 3.1.
The simulation of the data generating process (DGP) implied by the model accounts
for the selection of mother’s participation in the labor market and the endogeneity issues
arising for all the other choice variables. In other words, the DGP models the selection
mechanisms underlying the work, external child care and time decisions. This point has
practical consequences, in that it allows to recover non-randomly missing information, as
mother’s wage. In fact, when the information on mother’s employment status is available
in the data and the mother is not working, mother’s wage is missing in an endogenous
way. The simulation of the wage offer that each mother receives in every period allows
to describe the participation decision as a function of the preference and productivity
parameters.
Further, simulation is needed because the statistics and the moment functions recov-
ered from the model are not in a tractable form. The minimum distance estimator involves
the minimization of the distance between statistics provided by the data and statistics that
are functions of structural parameters. For instance, define m as the data points and sta-
tistics and M(θ) as the functions of the parameters to be estimated. If the functions are
not in an easily computable form, as in this case, they can be substituted with a simulator
estimator Mˆ(θ) for M(θ) (McFadden, 1989, Pakes and Pollard, 1989).
The simulation of the data is obtained by taking N ∗R23 random draws from the initial
distribution implied by the model, i.e., the child’s and mother’s skills distributions, and,
for each period, from the wage and income distributions and from the distribution of the
error in the test score measure. The time invariant preference parameters were assigned to
each mother, according to her observable characteristics and skills, while the productivity
parameters were updated in each period. After having drawn the child’s ability and the
wage offer in the first period, the optimal choices of the mother were obtained, exploiting
the optimal solutions derived in section 3.3.2. This process has been repeated for every
period, up to the final one T . The simulated data are used to compute the same statistics
defined in table 3.1. Both actual and simulated statistics have been used to construct the
objective function to be minimized.
The Simulated Minimum Distance (SMD) estimator is then:
θˆ = arg min gˆ(θ)′Wgˆ(θ) (3.23)
23N = 434 and R = 5. While R does not affect the consistency of the estimator, an higher number of
simulation draws, with N fixed, can decrease the simulation noise and the variance, improving efficiency.
However, I decide not to use more simulation draws, because the estimation is already time consuming.
Using a laptop computer with Intel i7/1.5 GHz processor and Matlab Version 7.13, the estimating time is
about 4 hours.
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Table 3.1
Statistics of actual and simulated data used for the estimation of the model.
Inputs and outcome conditional on child’s age
mean and std deviation of mother’s hours of work
mean and std deviation of child care hours
mean and std deviation of maternal time with the child
proportion of mothers working
average test score
Inputs statistics
mean and std deviation of mother’s wage
mean, std deviation and median of household income
corr mother’s wage and mother’s hours of work
corr mother’s wage and household income
corr mother’s hours of work and household income
corr mother’s hours of work and time with the child
corr mother’s hours of work and child care hours
corr household income and time with the child
corr household income and child care hours
Inputs and outcome correlation across time
corr maternal time with the child in 1997 and score in 2002
corr maternal time with the child in 2002 and score in 2007
corr child care hours in t and score in t+ 1
corr mother’s hours of work in t and score in t+ 1
corr household income in t and score in t+ 1
Inputs conditional on parents’ characteristics
mean mother’s wage by mother’s education, age and race
mean mother’s hours of work by mother’s education, age and race
mean maternal time with the child by mother’s education, age and race
mean child care hours by mother’s education, age and race
Outcome conditional on parents’ characteristics
average test score by parents’ education
Outcomes transition probabilities (for children with 2 scores measures)
prop of children with score in range p97 in 1997 and p02 in 2002
prop of children with score in range p02 in 2002 and p07 in 2007
NOTES. These statistics are computed using PSID-CDS data on children aged 0-12 in 1997, with at least one test
score measure and without siblings, and simulated data according to the model defined in section 3.3 and 3.4.1.
Maternal time with the child is measured in 1997 and 2002; child’s scores are measured in 1997, 2002 and 2007;
from 1997 on, mother’s hours of work, mother’s wage and household income are measured every two years and
these variables refer to the year before the survey (see section 3.5 and appendix 3.C for a description of the data).
Household income includes both father labor income and household non labor income. Child’s age t ranges from 1 to
13. Mother’s and father’s education are classified as ”college” (more than 12 years of education) and ”high-school”
(12 years of education); mother’s race can be white or not white; mother’s age is divided in two categories: more
than 40 years old and younger than 30. Ranges py , with y = 1997, 2002, 2007 are defined according to the following
ranges of the score distribution: 1st− 25th perc, 25th− 50th perc, 50th− 75th perc, 75th− 95th perc, higher than
95th perc. 82 observations have test score measures in 1997 and 2002; 99 observations have score measures in 2002
and 2007.
where
gˆ(θ) = mˆ− Mˆ(θ) (3.24)
mˆ is the vector of statistics defined from the actual data, while Mˆ(θ) is the vector of
simulated statistics according to the model. Given S number of moments, the weighting
matrix is defined as:
W =

Vˆ [mˆ1]
−1 0 0
0
. . . 0
0 0 Vˆ [mˆS ]
−1

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where Vˆ [mˆ] is estimated with non-parametric bootstrap.24
The SMD estimator consistently estimate the model parameters if the following condi-
tions hold: (i) the estimated moments from the data are consistent estimates of the pop-
ulation moments; (ii) the model is identified, a necessary condition for which is that the
number of moments is higher than the number of parameters to be estimated (S ≥ K);25
(iii) the model is correct: m0 = M(θ0), i.e., the population moments correspond to the
simulated moments at the true parameters vector.
Identification of the model parameters requires a unique solution for the minimization
of the objective function defined by (3.23). In practice, it depends on the uniqueness of
the minimum and on the curvature around it. I estimate the model parameters using
different starting values and results do not differ from the ones presented in the following
section. Moreover, I check that the objective function changes moving the values of the
parameters and I find the value of the objective function to vary around the estimated
parameters.
3.5. Data
The model is estimated using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)
and its Child Development Supplement (CDS).
The PSID is a longitudinal study that begun in 1968 with a nationally representative
sample of over 18,000 individuals living in 5,000 families in the United States. Starting
from 1968, information about each family member is collected, but much greater detail is
obtained about the head and the spouse. From 1997, the Child Development Supplement
(CDS) gathers information on children aged 0-12 in PSID families through extensive in-
terviews with their primary caregiver. The CDS has been replicated in 2002 and 2007 for
children in this cohort who remain under 18.
For this analysis, I exploit the child cognitive ability measures and non-parental child
care data provided in the Primary Caregiver Interview of the CDS, together with the time
use details given in the Time Diary (TD) component of the CDS. The main PSID surveys
are exploited to recover information on mother’s work and household income.
The CDS supplement provides several measures of child cognitive skills, based on the
Woodcock Johnson Achievement Test Revised (WJ-R) (Woodcock and Johnson, 1989).
The outcome measure considered in this study is the Letter Word (LW) test, which is
applied to all children older than 4 and proves child’s learning and reading skills (Hoffert,
Davis-Kean, Davis, and Finkelstein, 1997). The raw LW score represents the sum of
correct answers out of 57 items, ranging then from 0 to 57. This measure is available in
1997, 2002 and 2007.
The CDS I (1997 wave) asks to the primary caregiver information on all child care
arrangements used for the child since childbirth; a set of following-up questions is asked to
the primary caregiver in the 2002 wave of the same supplement. Using both waves, I can
recover the complete child care history for the children interviewed in 1997. The variable
of interests is the number of hours the child uses non-parental child care at each age. This
24See appendix 3.B.2 for further details on the estimation.
25To estimate 26 parameters, I use 103 moments conditions.
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variable refers to any type of child care arrangement, either formal or informal, provided
by people different from parents.26
In 1997 and 2002, the Child Development Supplement includes another instrument to
assess the time use of children. The Time Diary (TD) is a unique feature of the CDS and
consists in a chronological report filled by the child or by the child’s primary caregiver
about the child’s activities over a specified 24-hour period.27 Each participating child
completed two time diaries: a weekday (Monday-Friday) and a weekend day (Sunday or
Saturday).28 The TD additionally collects information on the social context of the activity
by specifying with whom the child was doing the activity and who else was present but
not engaged. The variable weekly time with the mother is constructed by multiplying
the daily hours the child spends with the mother by 5 for the weekday and by 2 for the
weekend day, and summing up the total hours in a week.29
I take information on mothers and fathers linking the CDS data to the main PSID
surveys. Since children in 1997 have different ages, ranging from 0 to 13 years old, in
order to identify the necessary information for all children in any period defined by the
model, CDS data should be matched with family information from PSID surveys in the
years 1985-2007.30 The family information I gather includes each parent’s hours of work,
wage and non labor income in each period.31
Finally, I construct all relevant variables for each child’s age, defining age 1 as the first
12 months of child’s life, age 2 as the next 12 months of the child’s life, and so on.
For the estimation of the model I consider all children without siblings interviewed in
CDS I, living in intact households (where both mother and father are present), without
26The CDS questionnaire allows the primary caregiver to indicate more than one arrangement used at
each child’s age. If the primary caregiver used simultaneously more than one arrangement in a period, I
define the child care variables exploiting the information on the arrangement used more hours per week.
Notice that, in this case, the corresponding number of child care hours is very likely to represent a lower
bound of the true child care use.
27The primary caregiver completed the time diary for the very young children (e.g., younger than 3), while
older children and adolescents were expected to complete the time diaries themselves (ISR, 2010a,b).
28These days were randomly selected when the interviewer completed the initial contact for the household
and there was no substitution of diary days once they were assigned to the CDS child (ISR, 2010a,b).
29More precisely, the TD distinguishes between contexts where the person with the child is directly involved
in the activity (”active time”) and others where the person is just around and not involved in the activity
(”passive time”). The following time categories can be derived: (1) the child is with the mother, being
the mother either involved in the activity or just around; (2) the child is with the mother, who is directly
involved in the activity, but the father is around; (3) the child is with the father only; (4) the child is with
the father and the mother is around; (5) the child is neither with the mother nor with the father. The
analysis has been performed defining the variable weekly time with the mother using only category (1),
so that all remaining time spells indicate that the child is not receiving investments from the mother. In
order to see whether the results are sensible to this specification, I re-estimate the model using different
definitions of maternal time. Results are reported in appendix 3.E.2.
30For instance, to identify household information for all relevant periods for a child born in 1996 (1 year
old in 1997) I need to use PSID surveys from 1997 to 2007; instead, if a child is born in 1986 (aged 11
years in 1997) I need to use PSID surveys from 1987 to 1999. Basically, all PSID surveys in the period
1985-2007 have been exploited. See appendix 3.C, tables 3.C.1 and 3.C.2.
31Between 1985 and 1997 PSID interviews were conducted annually and, since then, interviews have been
biennial. Note that all the variables that I use from the main PSID surveys concerning labor and non labor
income of the household members refer to the year before the survey. All monetary variables are deflated
into 1997 US$ using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) History for the U.S. See appendix 3.C for further
description of the data sources used for the analysis.
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Table 3.2
Descriptive statistics on all variables for the entire period.
Mean SD Min Max
Child’s LW raw score 35.10 (14.47) 0 57
Mother’s hours of work 27.12 (17.55) 0 100
Proportion of working mothers 0.80 0.39 0 1
Non-parental child care hours 14.68 (18.32) 0 70
Mother’s time with child 21.06 (17.01) 0.17 95.75
Child’s gender: male 0.51 (0.50) 0 1
Mother’s wage 14.25 (10.19) 5.01 133.93
Mother’s age at child’s birth 28.17 (5.10) 16 43
Mother’s education 13.25 (2.50) 2 17
Mother’s race: white 0.61 (0.49) 0 1
Father’s hours of work 45.22 (10.95) 0.06 109.85
Father’s wage 19.51 (12.96) 5.01 143.40
Father’s age at child’s birth 30.28 (6.11) 17 67
Father’s education 13.27 (2.49) 1 17
Household non labor income 12.79 (49.10) 0 924.45
NOTES. Monetary variables deflated into 1997 US$. Source: own elaboration from PSID-CDS data.
missing data on personal and parents’ demographic characteristics and with at least one
test score measure. The final sample is composed by 434 observations.32
3.5.1. Descriptive Statistics. This section provides some descriptive statistics on
the sample used for the estimation.
Table 3.2 shows the average values of all the variables for the period considered in the
model. In the sample, the average raw score is around 35 out of 57. Figure 3.3 shows the
distribution of the average test score measure by child’s age, while appendix 3.D provides
further descriptive statistics on the cognitive outcome measure. Mothers work, on average,
27 hours per week and use non-parental child care for almost 15 hours; moreover, they
spend with their child, on average, 3 hours per day. Mother’s wages are significantly lower
than their male counterparts (on average 14.25 US$ versus 19.51 US$), and mothers work
less than fathers. Household non labor income represents, on average, around 13 US$ per
week.
Table 3.3 provides some descriptive statistics on mother’s work, child care and maternal
time, by child’s age. The temporal pattern of these variables is also reported in figure 3.4.
There are not significant differences in mother’s participation to the labor market across
child’s age. The number of hours worked by the mother ranges from 24 when the child is
very young, to 30 when the child reaches 11 years of age; conversely, the average number
32Out of the 3,563 children interviewed in 1997, 314 do not have information on their parents, 2,069 have
siblings and 602 live in households where one (both) parent(s) is (are) not present. Moreover, 52 children
have not information on parents’ age, education and race and 85 have not test score measures in the period
1997-2007. Table 3.C.4 compares the average values of the most relevant variables in the sample used for
the analysis (N = 434) with their values in the overall PSID-CDS data (N = 3243).
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Figure 3.3
LW raw score by child’s age.
NOTES. Source: own elaboration from PSID-CDS data.
of hours the child is cared for by someone other than his parents decreases as the child
ages, ranging from 17 hours per week in the first years of life to 11 hours per week when he
is 11 years old. Notice that the daily amount of time the mother spends at work when the
child is younger than 6 almost corresponds to the time the child is cared for by someone
else (4.8 hours per day vs 3.5 hours per day). When the child starts going to school, he
does spend out of home not only the time in external care but also a fixed amount of
school time. If the child spends at school 6 hours per day, he stays out of home almost 8
hours, while the mother works, on average, 5.6 hours per day. This difference shows that
the amount of leisure time of the mother significantly increases when the child reaches
school age. The average number of hours the child spends with the mother decreases as
the child grows up: the mother spends with the child almost 4 to 5 hours per day when
the child is younger than 5, while the time drops to 2 to 3 hours per day when the child
reaches 6 years of age.
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Figure 3.4
Mother’s hours of work, time with the child and non-parental child care time per
week, by child’s age.
NOTES. Source: own elaboration from PSID-CDS data.
Table 3.3
Descriptive statistics on maternal employment, non-parental child care and ma-
ternal time by child’s age. Means and standard deviation in parentheses.
Child’s Age 1-2 3-5 6-10 11-12
Mother’s hours of work per week 24.40 26.03 28.10 29.34
(17.67) (17.55) (17.21) (17.29)
Proportion of working mothers 0.77 0.79 0.82 0.82
(0.42) (0.41) (0.38) (0.39)
Child care hours per week 17.39 20.02 12.76 10.76
(19.11) (19.28) (17.49) (16.49)
Mother’s time with the child 28.55 29.05 19.31 16.64
(18.06) (20.27) (14.80) (14.21)
NOTES. Source: own elaboration from PSID-CDS data.
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3.6. Results
This section presents the estimated parameters, while subsection 3.6.1 discusses the
goodness of fit of the model.
Table 3.4 shows the estimates of the parameters in the mother’s utility function. The
γs parameters represent the contribution of each observable characteristic of the mother on
mother’s tastes for leisure, consumption and child’s cognitive ability. Figures 3.5, 3.6 and
3.7 report the values taken by each preference parameter by subgroups and by mother’s
education. While the taste for leisure does not vary across mother’s levels of education,
more educated mothers care less about consumption. Low skilled mothers have higher
preferences for leisure and consumption, while there are not differences in tastes induced
by mother’s race. Figure 3.7 shows the value of the preference parameter for child’s ability.
For any group, one more year of education implies an higher taste for child’s ability, even
though the marginal contribution of each year decreases as education increases. Moreover,
more skilled mothers care more about their child’s ability than the low skilled ones.
The parameter ρ indicates the value the mother poses on the child’s level of ability
reached in the last developmental period. The estimated value is roughly 34. To give an
intuition to this number, consider the case of an infinitely lived household with a discount
factor in the last period that is equal to the factor in all previous periods. Since β = 0.95,
the value of this parameter would be equal to ρ =
∑∞
k=0 β
k = 11−β = 20. Having found
that the discount factor in the last period is higher than this value means that, in T + 1,
the mother poses additional weight on child’s ability, because she may think it represents
Table 3.4
Estimated parameters for mother’s utility function.
Mother’s Utility Function Parameters
γ2 MotherEducation contribution of mother’s education to α2 −0.2094
(0.0878)
γ2 MotherRace contribution of mother’s race to α2 0.1369
(0.1064)
γ3 MotherEducation contribution of mother’s education to α3 0.0169
(0.0425)
γ3 MotherRace contribution of mother’s race to α3 0.1104
(0.0514)
ρ weight on future child’s ability in the last period 34.1643
(1.8554)
p hourly price of child care 5.1502
(0.6517)
Mother’s Skills Distribution
µ0 high skill level for high type 3.2011
(0.8090)
µ0 low skill level for low type 1.2603
(0.1833)
pim high proportion high skilled 0.3203
(0.1006)
pim low proportion low skilled 0.6797
(...)
NOTES. Standard errors are estimated with non-parametric bootstrap; standard errors for type proportions are
computed using the delta method. See appendix 3.B.3 for further details. Since type proportions should add to
one, so that one of the type probabilities is obtained as a residual, I do not report standard errors in this case.
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Table 3.5
Estimated parameters for the wage and income processes.
Wage Equation Parameters
µ1 coefficient of mother’s education 0.0788
(0.0445)
µ2 coefficient of mother’s age 0.0018
(0.0116)
µ3 coefficient of mother’s age squared −0.0006
(0.0008)
µ4 coefficient of mother’s race −0.0156
(0.0038)
σ standard deviation transitory shock 0.3031
(0.0111)
Household Income Process
µinc mean 15.9606
(0.3432)
σinc standard deviation 12.8553
(1.2765)
NOTES. Standard errors are estimated with non-parametric bootstrap. See appendix 3.B.3 for further details.
”an important initial condition for developmental processes that begin in the later teen
years” (Del Boca et al., 2010).
The panel at the bottom of table 3.4 reports the parameters identifying the mother’s
skills distribution. The skills level of high type mothers is more than two times higher
than the corresponding level for the low type. This implies a significant difference in the
offer that mothers with different skills receive from the market and, as a consequence, in
their employment decisions. The proportion of low skilled mothers in the sample is equal
to 68 percent.
Table 3.5 shows the results from the wage equation and the income process. All
parameters in the wage equation have expected signs and reasonable magnitudes. The
education effect on wages indicates that wage increases by 7.8 percent with each additional
year of education. This effect is in line with the one found by Keane and Moffitt (1998) but
slightly higher than the estimated effects in Del Boca et al. (2010) (4.8 percent), Bernal
and Keane (2010) (4 percent) and Bernal (2008) (2 percent).
Table 3.6 presents the results of the parameters in the child’s cognitive ability produc-
tion function and the initial level of ability. The parameters shown in the first panel of
this table represent the slope of each input productivity with respect to child’s age. To
simplify the presentation of the results, figures 3.8 and 3.9 show the time-varying elastic-
ities as a function of child’s age. Figure 3.8 reports the elasticities of child ability with
respect to maternal time and non-parental child care time, while figure 3.9 reports the
elasticities with respect to household income and the child’s ability in the previous period.
First of all, notice that the elasticity with respect to all inputs is higher during early years
and decreases over time, as suggested by previous studies on human capital accumulation
(Carneiro and Heckman, 2003, Heckman, 2008). According to figure 3.8, the elasticity of
child’s cognitive ability with respect to external child care is slightly higher than the one
with respect to maternal time. The elasticity of child’s ability with respect to maternal
time ranges from 0.65 when the child is 1 year old to less than 0.05 when the child has
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Figure 3.5
Preference parameters for leisure by subgroups and by level of education.
NOTES. This graph represents the estimated preference parameter for leisure by mother’s years of education and
for different subgroups, identified through mother’s race and mother’s skills level. The parameter is defined as
α1 = f1(MotherEdu,MotherRace, γ1,Γ2,Γ3, µ0) where γ1 = 0 and the estimated values for Γ3,Γ2 and µ0 are
shown in table 3.4. See appendix 3.B.1 for further details.
Figure 3.6
Preference parameters for consumption by subgroups and by level of education.
NOTES. This graph represents the estimated preference parameter for consumption by mother’s years of education
and for different subgroups, identified through mother’s race and mother’s skills level. The parameter is defined
as α2 = f2(MotherEdu,MotherRace, γ1,Γ2,Γ3, µ0) where γ1 = 0 and the estimated values for Γ3,Γ2 and µ0 are
shown in table 3.4. See appendix 3.B.1 for further details.
Figure 3.7
Preference parameters for child’s ability by subgroups and by level of education.
NOTES. This graph represents the estimated preference parameter for child’s ability by mother’s years of education
and for different subgroups, identified through mother’s race and mother’s skills level. The parameter is defined
as α3 = f3(MotherEdu,MotherRace, γ1,Γ2,Γ3, µ0) where γ1 = 0 and the estimated values for Γ3,Γ2 and µ0 are
shown in table 3.4. See appendix 3.B.1 for further details.
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13 years of age. These estimates are higher than the values estimated by Del Boca et al.
(2010) for the early years, but lower from age 5 on. For instance, Del Boca et al. (2010)
find that the coefficient for maternal time when the child is 1 year old is equal to 0.25,
while it is equal to 0.1 when the child is aged 8 years. At the same age, figure 3.8 reports
a coefficient roughly equal to 0.05.33
These estimates should also be compared with existing studies evaluating the impacts
of maternal employment and child care, using the information on mother’s time out of
work as a proxy for maternal time with the child. For instance, Bernal (2008) finds that
one year of full-time work and external child care use reduces child’s score by 1.8 percent;
Bernal and Keane (2011, 2010) estimate a reduction in child’s cognitive assessment due
to one year of full-time work and external child care use of around 2 percent.
According to figure 3.8, if maternal time reduces by 10 percent when the child is 1 year
old, because of mother’s employment, the child’s cognitive ability decreases by 6.5 percent.
Assuming that the mother uses external child care for an equal amount of time, child’s
cognitive ability increases by 7.1 percent. This means that the reduction in child’s ability
due to the reduction in maternal time can be compensated by the use of external child
care services, so that the overall effect of maternal employment turns out to be null or very
small, but positive. This result is completely new in the literature and strongly confirms
that using the time out of work as a proxy for maternal time with the child overestimates
the real amount of time spent by the child with the mother, as well as its productivity.
Section 3.7.1 further confirms this issue, presenting the results of a counterfactual exercise
where the model has been estimated setting τ = TT − h and α1 = 0. In this scenario,
the mother chooses zero leisure and maternal time with the child is proxied with the total
time endowment net of working time.
Moreover, the specification of the model allows to identify the mechanisms with which
maternal employment affects child development. In fact, despite having a negative effect
due to the reduction in maternal time with the child, this impact can be compensated by
child care facilities providing other inputs for child’s cognitive development. Notice that
maternal employment is not detrimental for child’s development as long as external child
care has at least the same productivity than maternal time.
Figure 3.8 shows that the coefficients of both external child care and maternal time
strongly decrease over time. This pattern can be due to two main reasons. On one hand, it
may depend on the fact that starting from compulsory school age, children start receiving
other inputs that are unobserved in the data and not taken into account in the model.
Hence, both maternal time and non-parental child care may play a weaker role. On the
other hand, the steep fall in external child care productivity when the child starts going
33The results reported in figure 3.8 are also close to the ones found recently by Del Boca et al. (2012), even
though the two studies are not directly comparable. In fact, Del Boca et al. (2012) find that 1 additional
hour of maternal time during childhood (when the child is aged 5 years) leads to a 1 percent of a standard
deviation increase in child’s cognitive assessment during adolescence (when the child is aged 10 years). In
the present study, the coefficient for maternal time at each child’s age represents the elasticity of the child’s
ability in the subsequent period with respect to an additional hour with the mother in the immediately
preceding period. The coefficient of maternal time when the child is 5 years old implies than a 1 percent
increase in maternal time at age 5 increases child’s cognitive ability at age 6 by 0.12 percent, corresponding
to 0.83 percent of a standard deviation ((0.12/14.47) = 0.0083). The higher effect found in Del Boca et al.
(2012) may be due to this timing issue, since their estimate may incorporate the potential multiplicative
effect of maternal time from age 5 up to age 10.
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Table 3.6
Estimated parameters for the child’s cognitive ability production function.
CAPF Parameters
ξ1 slope productivity of maternal time −0.4388
(0.1299)
ξ2 slope productivity external child care −0.3514
(0.1169)
ξ3 slope productivity income −0.0566
(0.0510)
ξ4 slope productivity child’s ability in previous period −0.1026
(0.1215)
σv standard deviation measurement error in test score 15.2839
(1.2061)
Child’s Initial Ability Parameters
ψ0 high skill level for high type children −52.3704
(4.8011)
ψ0 low skill level for low type children −108.0380
(13.7080)
pic high proportion high skilled children 0.0001
(3.3533)
pic low proportion low skilled children 0.9999
(...)
η1 correlation child’s endowment and mother’s education 2.0618
(1.2880)
η2 correlation child’s endowment and father’s education 0.2255
(1.1359)
NOTES. Standard errors are estimated with non-parametric bootstrap; standard errors for type proportions are
computed using the delta method. See appendix 3.B.3 for further details. Since type proportions should add to
one, so that one of the type probabilities is obtained as a residual, I do not report standard errors in this case.
Figure 3.8
Maternal time and non-parental child care productivity.
NOTES. This graph represents the productivity parameters for maternal time (τt) and non-parental child care (it)
as a function of child’s age t = 1, 2, . . . 13. These parameters are defined as
δi = exp(ξit)
where i = 1, 2 and the estimated values for ξ1 and ξ2 are shown in table 3.6.
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to kindergarten or primary school can be explained by the different purposes of external
child care from the mother’s point of view. In fact, the mother may choose a positive
amount of child care if she works and needs someone looking after the child, but also if
she thinks it can represent an input for subsequent child’s development. The educational
role of child care can be less important when the child starts going to school, because he
is receiving other educational inputs from other institutions, so that from this age on the
custodial role can be prevailing. As a consequence, child care productivity decreases even
if the amount of time spent in external care remains constant.
Figure 3.9
Income and previous period child’s ability productivity.
NOTES. This graph represents the productivity parameters for income (It) and child’s ability (At) as a function of
child’s age t = 1, 2, . . . 13. These parameters are defined as
δi = exp(ξit)
where i = 3, 4 and the estimated values for ξ3 and ξ4 are shown in table 3.6.
Figure 3.9 shows the productivity of both household income and child’s ability in the
previous period. The result for household income seems in line with existing literature
saying that economic conditions in early and middle childhood are more important for
children’s cognitive outcomes than those during adolescence (Duncan and Brooks-Gunn,
1997, Duncan, Yeung, Brooks-Gunn, and Smith, 1998, Levy and Duncan, 2012). It is also
interesting to note that the productivity of the child’s ability in the previous period is
higher than the ones for maternal time and external child care. This can be explained
by the fact that when the child ages he receives other inputs that are not included in the
model (e.g., school) and that become more effective as he grows up.34
These results are robust to alternative specifications that are presented in appendix
3.E. More precisely, I check the robustness of the results on the following dimensions: (i)
the definition of the terminal period; (ii) the definition of the variable for maternal time;
(iii) the specification of the wage and income processes that does not allow any correlation
between the two; (iv) the specification of the child’s initial endowment.
34Due to the assumption implied by the value-added functional form, if the level of child’s ability in every
period is a sufficient statistic for all the inputs received by the child in the previous period, the productivity
of At should incorporate also the effects of inputs that I am not observing in the data.
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Figure 3.10
Goodness of fit for child’s test score measure by child’s age.
NOTES. Actual data represent PSID-CDS data on children aged 0-12 in 1997, with at least one test score measure
and without siblings. See section 3.5 and appendix 3.C for further details on the data. Simulated data represent the
data obtained simulating the model described in section 3.3 and 3.4.1 and setting the parameters at the estimated
values shown in tables 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6.
Table 3.7
Goodness of fit for mother’s wage and household income.
Actual Data Simulated Data
All sample
Mean mother’s wage 14.2510 14.7531
Sd mother’s wage 10.1874 16.6083
Mean household income 17.6326 16.0272
Sd household income 12.8244 12.8255
Wage by mother’s education
Some college education 16.3756 16.6014
High School 12.0478 12.6266
Wage by mother’s race
White 15.0246 14.8084
Black 12.8967 14.6671
NOTES. Actual data represent PSID-CDS data on children aged 0-12 in 1997, with at least one test score measure
and without siblings. See section 3.5 and appendix 3.C for further details on the data. Simulated data represent the
data obtained simulating the model described in section 3.3 and 3.4.1 and setting the parameters at the estimated
values shown in tables 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6. Some college education stems for more than 12 years of education; high
school education stems for 12 years of education.
3.6.1. Goodness of fit of the model. The reliability of the results and the cred-
ibility of the counterfactual exercise and policy simulations described below depend on
how the model fits the data.
Figure 3.10 shows the model fit for the child’s score measure. Despite there being
some differences between the actual and simulated data for the child’s first years of life,
the model predicts quite well the pattern of the score measure for subsequent child’s ages.
Table 3.7 shows how the model performs in fitting the data concerning the wage and
the income processes. Specifically, it shows the average and standard deviation of wage
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Table 3.8
Goodness of fit for mother’s choices.
Actual Data Simulated Data
Hours of work 27.1166 30.8259
External child care hours 14.6839 10.2375
Maternal time with the child 21.0582 18.3568
NOTES. Actual data represent PSID-CDS data on children aged 0-12 in 1997, with at least one test score measure
and without siblings. See section 3.5 and appendix 3.C for further details on the data. Simulated data represent the
data obtained simulating the model described in section 3.3 and 3.4.1 and setting the parameters at the estimated
values shown in tables 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6.
and income, observed in the actual and in the simulated data. The model behaves well for
the prediction of average wage and income and there are not differences between the actual
and simulated data concerning the standard deviation of income. Moreover, it reproduces
the patterns in the data concerning the average wage by mother’s education, while the
average wage of black mothers is slightly overestimated. Table 3.8 presents the average
values for the choice variables. The model predicts an higher amount of working time and
a slightly lower maternal time with the child with respect to the data. Finally, external
child care time is narrowly underestimated.
3.7. Counterfactual exercises
In this section, I use the estimated model to perform several counterfactual exercises.
Subsection 3.7.1 presents the results from the estimation of the model where maternal
time with the child is approximated from maternal working time, as it is usually done in
the literature. Then, in subsection 3.7.2, I use the estimated model to simulate the effects
of policies (i) increasing household income, by offering a lump-sum grant to households
with children, (ii) increasing the wage offers by 50 percent, or (ii) subsidizing external
child care, setting the price of the service at 1 US$ per hour.
3.7.1. Leisure-minimizing preferences. The main contribution of this work is to
estimate the effect of maternal employment and external child care taking into account
the actual time spent by the mother with the child.
In the literature it has been usually assumed that maternal time can be proxy by
the mother’s total time endowment net of working time. If this is the case, the mother
does not care about leisure and spends all the time out of work with the child. In order
to see what are the implications of this assumption, I re-estimate the model setting the
preference parameter for leisure α1 = 0 and defining maternal time with the child as the
difference between the total time endowment and the time spent at work, i.e. τ = TT −h.
Figure 3.11 reports the elasticity of child’s ability with respect to maternal time and
external child care in this counterfactual exercise. For comparison purposes, the figure
reports also the elasticities found in the main analysis and already presented in figure 3.8;
they are labeled as ”actual time”. Notice that the parameters for external child care do
not change across specifications, while the estimates for the elasticity of child’s ability with
respect to maternal time differ substantially. In this counterfactual scenario, the elasticity
of child’s ability with respect to maternal time ranges from 0.86 when the child is 1 year
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old to 0.1 when the child is aged 13. These values imply that if maternal time reduces by
10 percent, the child’s cognitive ability decreases by 8.6 percent. If the same amount of
time is spent in external child care, child’s cognitive ability increases by almost 7 percent.
Thus, in this case, the reduction in child’s ability due to the absence of the mother is only
partially compensated by the use of external child care. The final effect of mother’s work
is then a 2 percent decline in child’s ability. This result replicates what has been found
before in the literature, in particular in studies using structural estimation (Bernal, 2008,
Bernal and Keane, 2010).
The difference between the estimates found in this chapter and the results found before
in the literature is very likely to depend on the way of defining maternal time. If maternal
time with the child is interpreted as all the time available to the mother net of working
time, assuming that the mother does not have any leisure, this is very likely to overestimate
maternal time productivity and the negative effect of maternal employment. Instead, if
an actual measure of maternal time is used, allowing the mother to allocate the time out
of work between leisure and care of the child, maternal employment is found not to be
detrimental for child’s development.
Figure 3.11
Productivity parameters for maternal time and child care obtained assuming
leisure-minimizing preferences of the mother. Comparison with the corresponding
parameters found in the main analysis.
NOTES. ’Mother time = total time - hours of work’ and ’child care time if mother time = total time - hours of
work’ represent the productivity parameters of maternal time and external child care, respectively, obtained from
the estimation of the model setting α1 = 0 and τ = TT − h, where α1 is the preference parameter for leisure and
TT = 112. ’Actual mother time’ and ’Child care if actual mother time’ represent the productivity parameters of
maternal time and external child care, as already shown in figure 3.8.
3.7.2. Policy simulations. In this section, I use the estimated model to simulate
the effects of policies on mother’s choices and behavior as well as on the level of child’s
ability reached in the last period. More precisely, I simulate the effects of the following
policies: (i) a lump-sum subsidy that increases household income by 100 US$ in each
period; (ii) an increase in mother’s wage by 50 percent, and (iii) a child care subsidy that
set the price of child care at 1 US$ per hour. Results are shown in table 3.9.
The first panel of the table refers to a policy providing subsidies to households with
children. More precisely, the policy implies that all households in any period receive an
additional amount of 100 US$ that increases their (exogenous) income. One may think
to this exercise as a simplification of subsidy policies targeted toward poor families and
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providing cash transfers not conditioned on specific behavior of the household members.
The estimated percentage change shows that the implementation of this policy determines
an income effect, for which mothers’ employment time decreases. Moreover, mothers
adjust their time using more external child care and also dedicating more time to the
child. The demand for external child care increases also for a direct income effect induced
by the policy. The overall effect on child’s ability is large, since the change in income
determines a shift not only in the input related to the expenditure for the child (i.e., It),
but also in external child care and maternal time. Notice that while this policy has a
substantially positive effect on child’s ability, it also influences the behavior of mothers
inducing a strong reduction in their labor market participation.
The second panel of table 3.9 reports the percentage change of the variables induced by
an increase in mother’s wage by 50 percent in any period. This may be due, for instance, to
policies decreasing taxation on mothers’ labor income or providing incentives for mothers’
employment. The increase in wage, in fact, determines an increase in maternal time at
work. The demand for child care is positively affected by this policy through two different
channels. First, since mothers are working more they use more child care because they
need someone looking after their child. Second, they are also earning more, so that they
can buy an higher amount of the service for their child. The same two channels have also
an effect on consumption, that is characterized by a percentage change similar to the one
in child care. However, the policy has a very little effect on child’s ability. This result
stresses the importance of taking into account all the plausible channels with which the
policy affects the outcomes of interests. In other words, a policy increasing mothers’ labor
income may be effective in increasing mothers’ participation to the labor market, but can
fail in having an effect on child’s development although improving the economic conditions
of the households.
The panel at the bottom of table 3.9 shows the percentage change of the variables
after the implementation of a policy setting the price of child care at 1 US$ per hour.
Similar policies have been implemented and evaluated during last years, especially in the
U.S. and Canada. For instance, Baker et al. (2008) evaluate the effects of a policy setting
the out-of-pocket price at 5$ per day in Quebec on maternal employment, child care use
and child’s outcomes. They find that the policy increases the use of the subsidized service
and it also has a positive effect on maternal employment; they do not find any effect on
the cognitive outcomes of children. The simulation of this policy has been done setting
the hourly price of child care at 1 US$ instead of 5.15 US$, that is the estimated value, as
shown in table 3.4. The results of this simulation are in line with the ones found by Baker
et al. (2008): the reduction in child care price, in fact, determines a large increase in the use
of external child care but also an increase in mother’s net wage. The substitution effect
seems to prevail, since mothers’ labor supply increases after the policy, while maternal
time with the child and leisure seem to be unaffected. However, differently from Baker
et al. (2008), the simulation of the policy yields an increase in the child’s ability, induced
by the increase in external child care use.
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Table 3.9
Policy simulations.
Increase in household income
Baseline Percentage change
Test score measure in the last period 37.4241 50.8744
Child’s ability in the last period 7.0119 431.3410
Hours of work 30.8259 −24.6236
Maternal time with the child 18.3568 4.4408
External child care time 10.2375 16.3742
Leisure 64.6404 9.2906
Consumption 482.5416 17.1592
Increase in mother’s wage
Baseline Percentage change
Test score measure in the last period 37.4241 0.1884
Child’s ability in the last period 7.0119 1.0525
Hours of work 30.8259 2.3768
Maternal time with the child 18.3568 −0.5555
External child care time 10.2375 49.5170
Leisure 64.6404 −0.8584
Consumption 482.5416 49.5000
Reduction in child care price
Baseline Percentage change
Test score measure in the last period 37.4241 0.8772
Child’s ability in the last period 7.0119 4.5409
Hours of work 30.8259 7.1795
Maternal time with the child 18.3568 −0.0005
External child care time 10.2375 415.0235
Leisure 64.6404 −0.0045
Consumption 482.5416 0.0027
NOTES. This table reports percentage changes with respect to the baseline levels from (i) an increase in household
income by 100 US$ per week, (ii) an increase in mother’s wage by 50 percent, and (iii) a policy setting external
child care price at 1 US$ per hour. Test score measure in the last period is the value of the simulated test score at
the end of period t = 12. Child’s ability in the last period is the value of the simulated child’s ability at the end of
period t = 12.
3.8. Concluding remarks
This chapter proposes and estimates a behavioral model where the labor supply, non-
parental child care and time allocation choices of the mother are considered endogenous.
In contrast to all existing studies in the literature, this chapter takes into account the
additional choice the mother makes concerning the time allocation between leisure and
time with the child.
Maternal time and external child care serve as inputs in a child’s development process
that represents a constraint to the mother’s utility maximization problem. The model is
estimated using U.S. data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and its Child
Development Supplement (CDS) conducted in 1997, 2002 and 2007. The parameters of
the model are estimated using a simulated minimum distance estimator that minimizes
the distance between several data statistics and their simulated counterparts.
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The results suggest that maternal employment does not have a negative effect on child
development, as long as the reduction in maternal time is compensated for by the alter-
native forms of care available to the mother. In fact, even though maternal employment
reduces the amount of time the child spends with the mother, this negative effect on
child’s ability can be compensated for by a positive effect induced by non-parental child
care attendance for the same amount of time.
Previous literature has neglected the additional choice of the mother between leisure
time and maternal time with the child, defining the variable maternal time as the total
time endowment available to the mother net of working time. It implies assuming that
the mother does not care about leisure and that she spends all available time with the
child. A counterfactual exercise that I perform using the estimated model shows that this
assumption overestimates the amount of time spent by the mother with the child, as well
as its productivity for child’s development. In fact, if the model is estimated under this
framework, maternal employment has a detrimental effect, since the reduction in maternal
time cannot be compensated for by the use of external child care. This confirms that in
order to estimate the effect of maternal employment and external child care on child’s
development it is important to take into account also the additional choice the mother
makes concerning the time allocation out of work.
The policy simulations performed using the estimated model suggest that the policy
maker should take into account all the potential effects and mechanisms with which the
policies can affect the outcomes of interests. In fact, even though these simulations allow
to only evaluate ”local” effects, they show that policies aimed at increasing participation
of mothers in the labor market, or at improving the economic conditions of poor house-
holds, may not necessarily have the same effect on child’s development. Similarly, policies
decreasing the cost of using external child care can induce an higher use of the service,
but may have very small effects on either mothers’ participation or child’s ability.
The model presented in this chapter has some limitations that leave space for addi-
tional improvements. First, the model is assuming a constant and unitary elasticity of
substitution across inputs and goods. However, the mother’s decision making process may
change if one takes into account the substitutability or complementarity of the inputs.
For instance, it would be interesting to analyze in more detail whether maternal time or
external child care time are complements to rather than substitutes in the child’s ability
production function. Second, the model only considers a cognitive ability production func-
tion, ignoring the production function for non-cognitive skills. However, there is a growing
literature saying that the main contribution of external child care, especially if received
during early childhood, is through the development of noncognitive skills, that are also
likely to be used in adult life and matter for education and labor market outcomes (Cunha
et al., 2006, Heckman et al., 2006). It would be interesting to consider an application of
the model presented in this chapter to the development of noncognitive skills.
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3.A. Analytic solution of the model
In this appendix I derive analytically the closed-form solutions of the model, for all
the choice variables.
The process of backward induction involves the solution of the optimization problem
in each period, starting from the last one, T . Consider first the choice variables it and τt.
The first step is to find the optimal child care and time input decisions at time T . The
value function of the mother at period T can be written as:
VT = maxiT ,τT α1ln(TT−hT−τT )+α2ln(wThT+IT−piT )+α3ln(AT )+ETβ{V˜T+1+ρα3lnAT+1}
(3.A.1)
where the variables lT and cT have been already substituted using the time and budget
constraints. Notice that the expectation operator in (3.A.1) is with respect to the terminal
period value function, as defined in (3.7).
The optimal solutions for both icT and τ
c
T at period T , conditional on hT , are given by
the solutions of the following first order conditions (FOCs):
icT ⇒
∂VT
∂iT
= 0 (3.A.2)
τ cT ⇒
∂VT
∂τT
= 0
Due to the value-added specification of the child cognitive ability production function,
as defined by (3.4), child ability in period T + 1 is a function of the inputs received by
the child at period T . Hence, the conditions in (3.A.2) can be rearranged, using total
differential, in the following way:
icT ⇒
∂V¯T
∂iT
+
∂VT+1
∂lnAT+1
× ∂lnAT+1
∂iT
= 0 (3.A.3)
τ cT ⇒
∂V¯T
∂τT
+
∂VT+1
∂lnAT+1
× ∂lnAT+1
∂τT
= 0
where V¯T is the current utility in period T :
V¯T = α1ln(TT − hT − τT ) + α2ln(wThT + IT − piT ) + α3ln(AT )
The corresponding derivatives35 are given by the following expressions:
35The second term of the expressions defined in (3.A.3) is derived using the logarithm of AT+1 just for
computational convenience. The results are the same computing
∂Vt+1
∂At+1
× ∂Vt+1
∂it
and
∂Vt+1
∂At+1
× ∂Vt+1
∂τt
, i.e.
substituting the CAPF in exponential form:
AT+1 = τ
δ1T
T i
δ2T
T I
δ3T
T A
δ4T
T
In this case, the second terms of the expressions in (3.A.3) become:
∂VT+1
∂AT+1
× ∂AT+1
∂iT
=
βρα3
τ δ1TT i
δ2T
T I
δ3T
T A
δ4T
T
(τ δ1TT i
δ2T−1
T I
δ3T
T A
δ4T
T ) = βρα3
δ2T
iT
∂VT+1
∂AT+1
× ∂AT+1
∂τT
=
βρα3
τ δ1TT i
δ2T
T I
δ3T
T A
δ4T
T
(τ δ1T−1T i
δ2T
T I
δ3T
T A
δ4T
T ) = βρα3
δ1T
τT
that are equivalent to (3.A.6) and (3.A.7).
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∂V¯T
∂iT
=
−pα2
wThT + IT − piT (3.A.4)
∂V¯T
∂τT
=
−α1
TT − hT − τT (3.A.5)
∂VT+1
∂lnAT+1
× ∂lnAT+1
∂iT
= (βρα3)
(
δ2T
iT
)
(3.A.6)
∂VT+1
∂lnAT+1
× ∂lnAT+1
∂τT
= (βρα3)
(
δ1T
τT
)
(3.A.7)
and the FOCs become:
icT ⇒
−pα2
wThT + IT − piT + (βρα3)
(
δ2T
iT
)
= 0 (3.A.8)
τ cT ⇒
−α1
TT − hT − τT + (βρα3)
(
δ1T
τT
)
= 0
The solutions for both inputs at period T are given by:
icT =
βδ2TDT+1
p(α2 + βδ2TDT+1)
(wThT + IT ) (3.A.9)
τ cT =
βδ1TDT+1
α1 + βδ1TDT+1
(TT − hT ) (3.A.10)
where DT+1 =
∂VT+1
∂lnAT+1
= ρα3.
These solutions can be substituted into the value function of the mother at period T ,
in order to get VT (i
c
T , τ
c
T ).
Consider now period T − 1. The value function for this period is:
VT−1 = maxiT−1,τT−1 α1ln(TT − hT−1 − τT−1) + α2ln(wT−1hT−1 + IT−1 − piT−1) + α3ln(AT−1)+
+ ET−1β{α1ln(TT − hT − τCT ) + α2ln(wThT + IT − piCT ) + α3lnAT+
+ β{ ˜VT+1 + ρα3[δ1T lnτCT + δ2T lniCT + δ3T lnIT + δ4T lnAT ]}}
(3.A.11)
The expectation in (3.A.11) is with respect to the value function at period T (VT (i
c
T , τ
c
T ))
and the terminal period value function at period T + 1.
Applying total differential, the solutions for both inputs in period T − 1 are given by:
icT−1 ⇒
∂V¯T−1
∂iT−1
+
∂VT
∂lnAT
× ∂lnAT
∂iT−1
= 0 (3.A.12)
τ cT−1 ⇒
∂V¯T−1
∂τT−1
+
∂VT
∂lnAT
× ∂lnAT
∂τT−1
= 0 (3.A.13)
where
V¯T−1 = α1ln(TT − hT−1 − τT−1) + α2ln(wT−1hT−1 + IT−1 − piT−1) + α3ln(AT−1)
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and
∂V¯T−1
∂iT−1
=
−pα2
wT−1hT−1 + IT−1 − piT−1 (3.A.14)
∂V¯T−1
∂τT−1
=
−α1
TT − hT−1 − τT−1 (3.A.15)
∂VT
∂lnAT
× ∂lnAT
∂iT−1
= (α3 + βα3)
(
δ2T−1
iT−1
)
(3.A.16)
∂VT
∂lnAT
× ∂lnAT
∂τT−1
= (α3 + βα3)
(
δ1T−1
τT−1
)
(3.A.17)
Substituting (3.A.14),(3.A.15),(3.A.16) and (3.A.17) into (3.A.12) and (3.A.13) yields:
icT−1 ⇒
−pα2
wT−1hT−1 + IT−1 − piT−1 + (α3 + βα3)
(
δ2T−1
iT−1
)
= 0 (3.A.18)
τ cT−1 ⇒
−α1
TT − hT−1 − τT−1 + (α3 + βα3)
(
δ1T−1
τT−1
)
= 0 (3.A.19)
The solutions for both choice variables in period T − 1, conditional on hT−1, are then:
icT−1 =
βδ2T−1DT
p(α2 + βδ2T−1DT )
(wT−1hT−1 + IT−1) (3.A.20)
τ cT−1 =
βδ1T−1DT
α1 + βδ1T−1DT
(TT − hT−1) (3.A.21)
where
DT =
∂VT
∂lnAT
= α3 + βδ4TDT+1
The solutions for period T − 1, given by equations (3.A.20) and (3.A.21), can be
substituted in (3.A.11) in order to get VT−1(icT−1, τ
c
T−1). This expression can be used to
write down the value function at period T − 2. Using the same process described for
periods T and T − 1 and computing the corresponding derivatives yields the solutions for
period T−2. The solutions for all the periods up to period t = 1 can be retrieved similarly.
At the end, two sequences of optimal choices can be obtained. The sequence of optimal
non-parental child care choices, conditional on mother’s labor supply, is given by:
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icT =
βδ2TDT+1
p(α2 + βδ2TDT+1)
(wThT + IT ) (3.A.22)
icT−1 =
βδ2T−1DT
p(α2 + βδ2T−1DT )
(wT−1hT−1 + IT−1) (3.A.23)
icT−2 =
βδ2T−2DT−1
p(α2 + βδ2T−2DT−1)
(wT−2hT−2 + IT−2) (3.A.24)
...
ict =
βδ2tDt+1
p(α2 + βδ2tDt+1)
(wtht + It) (3.A.25)
...
ic2 =
βδ22D3
p(α2 + βδ22D3)
(w2h2 + I2) (3.A.26)
ic1 =
βδ21D2
p(α2 + βδ21D2)
(w1h1 + I1) (3.A.27)
Equation (3.A.25) is equal to (3.8) in the main text. Instead, the sequence of optimal
choices for time with the child, conditional on mother’s labor supply, is given by:
τ cT =
βδ1TDT+1
(α1 + βδ1TDT+1)
(TT − hT ) (3.A.28)
τ cT−1 =
βδ1T−1DT
(α1 + βδ1T−1DT )
(TT − hT−1) (3.A.29)
τ cT−2 =
βδ1T−2DT−1
(α1 + βδ1T−2DT−1)
(TT − hT−2) (3.A.30)
...
τ ct =
βδ1tDt+1
(α1 + βδ1tDt+1)
(TT − ht) (3.A.31)
...
τ c2 =
βδ12D3
(α1 + βδ12D3)
(TT − h2) (3.A.32)
τ c1 =
βδ11D2
(α1 + βδ11D2)
(TT − h1) (3.A.33)
Equation (3.A.31) is equal to equation (3.9) in the text. The sequence of values for
Dt+1 is defined in the main text.
Once having found the solutions for both the child care and the time allocation de-
cisions, the solutions for the labor supply can be computed using the same backward
procedure. Equation (3.11) represents the optimal labor supply in each period as a func-
tion of it and τt; substituting (3.8) and (3.9), it yields the optimal labor supply choice for
each period t, as defined by (3.12).
The unconditional demands for child care and time with the child are derived substi-
tuting the labor supply solution into equations (3.8) and (3.9) (corresponding to (3.A.25)
and (3.A.31) in this appendix). The final expressions for them are reported in equations
(3.14) and (3.15).
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3.B. Empirical analysis and estimation
This appendix provides additional details on the empirical analysis performed to esti-
mate the model.
3.B.1. Empirical specification. As stated in section 3.4.1, the definition of the
model parameters should ensure that they respect the requirements imposed by the func-
tional form restrictions. In order to respect these requirements without posing additional
constraints to the estimation algorithm, I use a suitable transformation of the original
parameters for any coefficient on which the model imposes restrictions due to functional
form or empirical specification assumptions.
Concerning the parameters in the mother’s utility function, they should be positive and
sum to one. Following Flinn (2000) and Mroz et al. (2010), I define them as multinomial
probabilities and equal to the following expressions:
α1 =
exp(γ1)
exp(γ1) + exp(X ′γ2) + exp(X ′γ3 + I(µ0 = µ0high))
(3.B.1)
α2 =
exp(X ′γ2)
exp(γ1) + exp(X ′γ2) + exp(X ′γ3 + I(µ0 = µ0high))
(3.B.2)
α3 =
exp(X ′γ3 + I(µ0 = µ0high))
exp(γ1) + exp(X ′γ2) + exp(X ′γ3 + I(µ0 = µ0high))
(3.B.3)
where X = [MotherEducation,MotherRace], γ1 is normalized to being 0 and µ0 repre-
sents mother’s skills. The distribution of mother’s skills is explained in the text. A similar
transformation has been implemented for parameters representing probabilities, i.e. type
proportions of high and low skilled mothers and children. More precisely, the proportion
of high skilled mothers is defined as
pimh = exp(zm)/(1 + exp(zm)) (3.B.4)
while the proportion of high skilled children is
pich = exp(zc)/(1 + exp(zc)) (3.B.5)
The parameters zm and zc are actually estimated and are used to recover the type pro-
portions of high skilled mothers and children. Notice that the proportion of low skilled
mothers and children is just derived as a residual, since they must sum to one.
Concerning the CAPF, the parameters in this case should be strictly positive. Hence,
I implement the transformation defined by (3.19) that exploits the properties of the ex-
ponential function.
The vector of parameters to be estimated is the following:
Θ = {Γ2,Γ3, ρ,Ξ, σv, µ0k, zmh,Υ, σ, ψck, zch,∆, p, θinc} (3.B.6)
where Γ2 = (γ2 MotherEdu, γ2 MotherRace), Γ3 = (γ3 MotherEdu, γ3 MotherRace), Ξ = (ξ1, ξ2, ξ3, ξ4),
k = (h, l), Υ = (µ1, µ2, µ3, µ4), ∆ = (η1, η2) and θinc = (µinc, σinc).
The parameter p represents the hourly price of child care. As in Bernal (2008), it has
been estimated as if it were a parameter because the actual distribution of that measure
in the data has a large mass toward zero, also for children actually using the service. This
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may be due to the usage of informal child care, that can have a zero market price. Using
the direct measure available in the data yields an infinite demand for external child care
for those using an arrangement with a zero price, regardless of mother’s labor income and
household earnings.
3.B.2. Estimation. The estimation has been done in two-stages, after having set the
discount factor β = 0.95: the parameters of the income process have been estimated in
the first stage, while all remaining parameters have been estimated in the second stage.36
After having computed the statistics defined in table 3.1 for the actual data, I proceed
with the first-stage estimation of the income parameters. This involves the simulation
of the income process, after having drawn from a standard normal distribution N ∗ R
times, for every period. This distribution is actually a function of the two parameters that
should be estimated, i.e., µinc and σinc. The statistics used to estimate these parameters
are the average, standard deviation and median income for all the periods. I compute
these points for both the actual and the simulated income processes. The SMD estimator
for this first stage minimizes an objective function where each moment condition is the
distance between the income data moments and their simulated counterparts. Each mo-
ment condition is weighted using the inverse of the corresponding statistics in the data.
The vector of first-stage estimated parameters is then: θˆinc = (µˆinc, σˆinc).
The second-stage involves the estimation of all remaining parameters using the same
estimator. First of all, I simulate the data according to the DGP implied by the model,
taking N ∗R ∗T draws for wage, error in test score measure and income and N ∗R draws
for child’s and mother’s skills. Following Keane and Moffitt (1998), I re-draw the errors
to simulate the income distribution using the parameters estimated in first stage. In each
period, the values for mother’s labor supply, non-parental child care and maternal time are
derived using the optimal solutions implied by the model.37 Then, after having simulated
the data for all the periods, I compute the statistics defined in table 3.1 from the simulated
data.
The estimator used in this second-stage minimizes an objective function where each
moment condition is the distance between the data statistics and the simulated counter-
parts, as summarized by table 3.1:
θˆ = arg min gˆ(θ)′Wgˆ(θ)
where
gˆ(θ) = mˆ− Mˆ(θ)
mˆ is the vector of statistics defined from the actual data, while Mˆ(θ) is the vector of simu-
lated statistics according to the model that are functions of the structural parameters to be
estimated. W is a positive definite diagonal weighting matrix. According to Cameron and
Trivedi (2005, pag. 203), the most efficient minimum distance estimator uses a weighting
36Results do not change estimating all parameters in only one stage. However, the estimation in two-stages
is less time consuming.
37To test numerically the accuracy of the solutions given by the theoretical model, I also perform a grid
search, assuming that the mother’s decision to work were actually discrete. In other words, I compute the
value of the demands for child care and time with the child, as well as the mother’s inter temporal utility,
for different levels of mother’s labor supply (with the number of hours of work ranging from 0 up to the
total time endowment) and I define as optimal choices those that provide the highest utility. The solutions
do not differ from the ones provided by the theoretical model.
118
matrix whose elements are estimates of the inverse of the covariance matrix of the vector
mˆ. Given S number of moments and neglecting the off-diagonal elements of the covariance
matrix, the weighting matrix is defined as:
W =

Vˆ [mˆ1]
−1 0 0
0
. . . 0
0 0 Vˆ [mˆS ]
−1

where Vˆ [mˆ] is estimated with non-parametric bootstrap and according to the formula
(Davidson and MacKinnon, 2003, p. 208):
Vˆ [mˆ] =
[
1
B
] B∑
b=1
(mˆ∗b − m¯∗) (mˆ∗b − m¯∗)
′
(3.B.7)
Non-parametric bootstrap (with replacement) has been implemented according to
Wooldridge (2002, p. 379): I used a random number generator to obtain N integers,
where N = 434 represents the sample size of the actual data, and these integers index
the observations drawn from the actual distribution of data. Repeating this process B
times,38 it yields B bootstrap samples on which the statistics defined in table 3.1 can be
computed: mˆ∗b represents a statistic computed for the sample b, while m¯
∗ is the average
of the statistics across the B samples.
3.B.3. Standard errors. Non-parametric bootstrap with replacement has been used
also to compute the standard errors. After having drawn Bse samples from the actual
data,39 I repeat the estimation of the parameters for each sample. This yields an empirical
distribution of the parameters estimates, from which I can recover a bootstrap estimate
of the variance, using the formula (Train, 2009, pag. 201):
Vˆ
[
θˆ
]
=
[
1
B
] B∑
b=1
(
θˆ∗b − θ¯∗
)(
θˆ∗b − θ¯∗
)′
(3.B.8)
Taking the square root of (3.B.8) yields the bootstrap estimate of the standard errors
seθˆ.
The standard errors for the type proportion parameters pimh, pich have been computed
applying the delta method on the non-linear functions (3.B.4) and (3.B.5). Defining
g(zl) = exp(zl)/(1 + exp(zl)) as the function to be approximated for mothers (l = m) and
children (l = c) respectively, the standard errors of the new parameters pimh and pich are
given by (Davidson and MacKinnon, 2003, chapter 5.6):
sepˆilh = |g
′
(zˆl) |sezˆl (3.B.9)
where l = m, c and g
′
(zˆl) =
∂g(zˆl)
∂zˆl
.
38B = 200.
39Bse = 50
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3.C. PSID-CDS data
This appendix provides further details on the data used to estimate the model.
The overall dataset is composed by different supplements of the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID) gathered in the period 1985-2007. Table 3.C.1 summarizes the main
information on availability and sources of data. Notice the difference in the availability
of information between data taken from the main PSID surveys or related to the external
child care information, and the other variables taken from the CDS supplements of the
PSID. PSID surveys and the retrospective nature of questions on child care use allow to
cover all the periods considered in the model. Instead, the information on maternal time
and child’s cognitive outcomes are available only at the year of the survey, i.e., 1997, 2002
or 2007.
The merging procedure between PSID and CDS data has been done exploiting infor-
mation on the relationship of each CDS child with respect to the head of the household
and the primary caregiver (PCG). The final sample is composed by all children aged 0-12
in 1997 without siblings and with both parents living in the household, without missing
information on child and parents characteristics and with at least one test score measure.
As summarized in table 3.C.2, birth cohorts of children in this sample range from 1984 to
1996, while the terminal period of the model (T = 13) corresponds to 1997 for those born
in 1984 and to 2009 for those born in 1996.
Table 3.C.3 summarizes the available data for a child born in 1996. This table stresses
the existence of long time-gap of missing data due to the structure of the surveys and
the timing of the interviews. In fact, while the child care information is available for all
periods, data on maternal time and child’s cognitive outcomes are available only in the
years of the CDS supplement, i.e., 1997, 2002 and 2007.
Table 3.C.4 shows the average characteristics of the sample used for the estimation
(N = 434) and the total sample of children in CDS, for whom it has been possible to derive
information on their parents (3243 observations). This comparison sample includes both
families with only one child and families with more children. Mothers in the sample used
for the analysis spend less time with their child, work more and use a slightly higher amount
of external child care; moreover, they are older and more educated than the mothers in
the PSID-CDS data. However, they do not differ in terms of wage at childbirth and race.
3.D. Additional descriptive statistics
See table 3.D.1.
3.E. Robustness checks
The results that have been presented in section 3.6 are robust to several sensitivity
analyses that will be described below. For the sake of brevity, I only report the results
concerning the parameters for maternal time and external child care time in the CAPF.
3.E.1. Terminal period. The model has been estimated setting T = 13. However,
looking at figure 3.3, it seems that the child’s ability measure increases up to age 12 and
starting from this point it becomes flatter. This issue is further confirmed by table 3.E.1,
showing that the age at which the child’s outcome is maximized is around 12. Then, I
re-estimate the model setting T = 12. This change yields a sample of 368 observations
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Table 3.C.1
Information on availability and sources of data.
Set of Variables Source Survey Years Additional Info
Non-parental child care CDS 1997-2002 Retrospective
questions on all
arrangements used
since birth and
questions on ar-
rangements used
at the time of the
survey
Child cognitive outcomes CDS 1997-2002-2007 Only for children
older than 3
Child demographic characteristics CDS 1997-2002 Time-invariant (ex-
cept age)
Maternal time with the child CDS-TD 1997-2002 Available only for
the year of the sur-
vey
Parents’ hours of work PSID 1985, 1986, 1987,
1988, 1989, 1990,
1991, 1992, 1993,
1994, 1995, 1996,
1997, 1999, 2001,
2003, 2005, 2007
Referred to the year
before the survey
Parents’ wages PSID 1985, 1986, 1987,
1988, 1989, 1990,
1991, 1992, 1993,
1994, 1995, 1996,
1997, 1999, 2001,
2003, 2005, 2007
Referred to the year
before the survey
Parents’ non labor income PSID 1985, 1986, 1987,
1988, 1989, 1990,
1991, 1992, 1993,
1994, 1995, 1996,
1997, 1999, 2001,
2003, 2005, 2007
Referred to the year
before the survey
Parents’ demographic characteristics PSID 1997 Time-invariant (ex-
cept age)
Table 3.C.2
Cohorts of children in the final sample.
Year of Birth Child’s Age
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 · · · t = 12 = T − 1 t = 13 = T
1984 1985 1986 1987 · · · 1996 1997
1985 1986 1987 1988 · · · 1997 1998
1986 1987 1988 1989 · · · 1998 1999
1987 1988 1989 1990 · · · 1999 2000
1988 1989 1990 1991 · · · 2000 2001
1989 1990 1991 1992 · · · 2001 2002
1990 1991 1992 1993 · · · 2002 2003
1991 1992 1993 1994 · · · 2003 2004
1992 1993 1994 1995 · · · 2004 2005
1993 1994 1995 1996 · · · 2005 2006
1994 1995 1996 1997 · · · 2006 2007
1995 1996 1997 1998 · · · 2007 2008
1996 1997 1998 1999 · · · 2008 2009
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repeated for 12 periods.40 Figure 3.E.1 presents the results, that are very close to the ones
presented in section 3.6.
Figure 3.E.1
Productivity parameters for maternal time and child care setting T = 12.
NOTES. This graph represents the productivity parameters for maternal time (τt) and non-parental child care (it)
as a function of child’s age t = 1, 2, . . . 12. The final period of the model is T = 12.
3.E.2. Definition of maternal time. The variable weekly time with the mother
has been defined considering the time spells in which only the mother was present, either
being directly involved in child’s activities or being just around and not participating. I
test the robustness of this choice on two dimensions. First, the category of time when the
mother is not actively involved with the child may include housework activities, that may
not represent an investment in child’s human capital. If this is the case, the estimated
coefficient reported in figure 3.8 overestimates the true effect of maternal time. I can test
for this issue defining the variable maternal time in such a way that only activities when
the mother is directly participating are included. Results are reported in figure 3.E.2: the
elasticity of child’s development with respect to maternal time is lower than the one found
in the main analysis. This suggests that the true effect of maternal time on child’s ability
may range in between the one found in the main text and the one reported in figure 3.E.2.
Second, the definition of the variable in the main analysis does not consider as maternal
time the time spells when the mother is involved in child’s activities but also the father
is present. In order to test whether also the latter category represents an input for child
development (meaning that the results shown in figure 3.8 underestimate the true effect),
I repeat the estimation of the model defining the variable for maternal time adding also
this category. The results shown in figure 3.E.3 do not differ from the ones presented in
section 3.6.
3.E.3. Correlation between household income and mother’s wage offers.
The specification of the mother’s wage offer in (3.16) and household income in (3.18)
prevents these two components to be correlated. However, it is very likely that mothers
in wealthier families receive different wage offers from the market; moreover, a correlation
between mother’s wage and father’s labor income (included in household income) may
indicate assortative mating between the two. An easy way to allow these components to
be correlated is to include household income as a determinant for the average wage draw
40The reduction in sample size is due to observations that have only one test score measure at age 13.
122
Figure 3.E.2
Productivity parameters for maternal time and child care if maternal time is only
active time with the mother.
NOTES. This graph represents the productivity parameters for maternal time (τt) and non-parental child care (it)
as a function of child’s age t = 1, 2, . . . 13. τ includes all activities where the mother is actively participating with
the child (active time) and excludes the ones where is present but not engaged (passive time).
Figure 3.E.3
Productivity parameters for maternal time and child care if maternal time includes
also time when the father is not involved in child’s activities but he is around.
NOTES. This graph represents the productivity parameters for maternal time (τt) and non-parental child care (it)
as a function of child’s age t = 1, 2, . . . 13. τ includes all time spells when the mother is with the child and also
those when the mother is present and the father is around but not involved in child’s activities.
the mother receives in each period. Hence, the wage offer described in (3.16) becomes:
ln(wt) = µ0 + µ1educ+ µ2aget + µ3age
2
t + µ4race+ µ5It + t (3.E.1)
Figure 3.E.4 presents the estimated values of the coefficients for maternal time and external
child care and they do not differ from the ones presented in section 3.6.
3.E.4. Specification for child’s initial endowment. As pointed out in section
3.4.1, the identification of parameters in (3.20) is hampered by the paucity of test score
observations in the available data. This fact is further confirmed by the high standard
errors of the estimated parameters, as reported in the panel at the bottom of table 3.6. As
a robustness check, I re-estimate the model using a specification of the child’s initial en-
dowment depending on more observable characteristics and on less parameters describing
the distribution of child’s unobserved skills. Equation (3.20) becomes:
A1 = exp(η0 + η1MotherEdu+ η2FatherEdu+ η3BirthWeight) (3.E.2)
where η0 is a constant and η3 is an additional parameters to be estimated. Notice that this
specification assumes that all children have the same level of unobserved skills. To perform
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Figure 3.E.4
Productivity parameters for maternal time and child care allowing household in-
come to affect wages.
NOTES. This graph represents the productivity parameters for maternal time (τt) and non-parental child care (it)
as a function of child’s age t = 1, 2, . . . 13. The wage offer is defined as:
ln(wt) = µ0 + µ1educ+ µ2aget + µ3age
2
t + µ4race+ µ5It + t
where It represents household income.
Figure 3.E.5
Productivity parameters for maternal time and child care with a different specifi-
cation for child’s initial endowment.
NOTES. This graph represents the productivity parameters for maternal time (τt) and non-parental child care (it)
as a function of child’s age t = 1, 2, . . . 13. The child’s initial endowment is defined as:
A1 = exp(η0 + η1MotherEdu+ η2FatherEdu+ η3BirthWeight)
where η0 is a constant and η3 is an additional parameter to be estimated. The estimation of this version of the
model has been done adding the following statistics to the moment conditions: average score if birth weight is higher
than 90 ounces; average score if birth weight is lower than 90 ounces.
this replication, I keep only children without missing data in birth weight, ending up with
340 observations. Moreover, in order to allow the identification of the new parameter η3, I
add to the existing moment conditions the average child’s score conditional on the child’s
birth weight.41 Results reported in figure 3.E.5 do not differ from the ones presented in
section 3.6, even though the productivity coefficient for maternal time is slightly lower.
41More precisely, I add the following statistics: average score if child’s birth weight is higher than 90
ounces; average score if child’s birth weight is lower than 90 ounces (90 ounces correspond to almost 2552
grams). Hence, the number of moment conditions turns to be equal to 105.
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Table 3.C.3
Available data for a child born in 1996.
Child’s age (t) Source Survey Year
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Non-parental child care X X X X X X X X X X X X X CDS 1997, 2002
Child cognitive outcomes X X CDS 2002, 2007
Child demographic charact. X X X CDS 1997, 2002, 2007
Maternal time with the child X X TD 1997, 2002
Parents’ hours of work X X X X X PSID 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007
Parents’ wages X X X X X PSID 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007
Parents’ non labor income X X X X X PSID 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007
Parents’ demographic charact. X X X X X PSID 1997, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007
Table 3.C.4
Mean characteristics of the sample with respect to PSID-CDS data.
PSID-CDS Sample T-test
Mother’s hours of work 23.59 27.12 −10.69***
(0.14) (0.29)
Non-parental child care 12.21 14.68 −9.34***
(0.10) (0.24)
Maternal time with the child 25.83 21.06 6.34***
(0.32) (0.68)
Mother’s wage before childbirthab 10.98 11.24 −1.25
(0.09) (0.18)
Mother’s education 12.98 13.25 −7.23***
(0.02) (0.03)
Mother’s age at child’s birth 26.98 28.17 −15.77***
(0.04) (0.07)
Mother’s race: white 0.61 0.61 0.35
(0.00) (0.01)
Father’s hours of work 38.66 45.22 −30.22***
(0.11) (0.19)
Father’s education 12.66 13.27 −16.98***
(0.01) (0.03)
Household non labor incomea 16.86 12.79 2.50**
(1.39) (0.84)
N 3243 434
a Monetary variables deflated into 1997 US$.
b Mother’s wage before childbirth refers to the year before the child was born.
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Table 3.D.1
Descriptive statistics on LW raw test scores, by child’s age and by subgroups.
Child’s age 4-5 6-10 11-13
All Sample (N = 434) 6.70 30.05 44.84
(4.13) (11.68) (6.23)
Female 6.88 30.69 45.23
(3.97) (11.18) (5.65)
Male 6.53 29.40 44.47
(4.31) (12.18) (6.76)
Non-White 7.26 30.16 43.10
(4.10) (11.19) (6.42)
White 6.32 29.98 45.93
(4.15) (12.05) (5.86)
Mother Education: 7.24 31.86 43.39
years of schooling> 12 (4.44) (11.62) (5.60)
Mother Education: 5.62 27.71 43.24
years of schooling= 12 (3.44) (11.19) (6.52)
Table 3.E.1
OLS estimates of LW raw score on child’s age.
Dep. Var. LW raw score
Child’s Age 18.195*** 18.163***
(1.883) (1.829)
Child’s Age Squared −0.764***−0.762***
(0.097) (0.095)
Controls
Maternal Time X X
Child Care Time X X
Household Income X X
Mother Education X
Father Education X
N 195 195
Child’s age maximizing the outcome
11.90 11.92
NOTES. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at child level. The
age maximizing outcome (last row) is computed setting ∂LWscore
∂t
= 0.
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